Date: Mon, 23 Feb 1998 19:29:37 +0100
From: isa@sis.ucm.es (International Sociological Association)
Subject: ISA Presidential Letter no.8
Apparently-to: chriscd@jhu.edu
To: chriscd@jhu.edu
Reply-to: isa@sis.ucm.es
To: Members of the International Sociological Association
Presidential Letter No. 8
Sociology and Useful Knowledge
by Immanuel Wallerstein
Robert Lynd asked us fifty years ago, "Knowledge for What?" Max
Weber adjured us, about a century ago, to strive to create
value-free (wertfrei) knowledge. The implications of the two
exhortations seem to be opposite. The intent of the two authors
may have been less totally opposite than it may seem, or that
many have claimed.
Max Weber was writing in a context in which one of his
major concerns was the appropriation and utilization of social
science knowledge by German nationalists to pursue particular
political objectives. One implication of calling for value-free
knowledge was to insist on the necessity of scholars to
disentangle themselves from the social pressures of powerful
forces within their country which were pushing them to conduct
their work and engage their writings in particular directions.
Robert Lynd was writing in a context in which he believed
that many social scientists, under the cover of value-neutral
research, were pursuing agendas and describing the world in ways
that were in reality dictated by the powerful of their
countries, seeking to reinforce the status quo. By posing the
question, "knowledge for what?", he intended to persuade social
scientists to reflect on the uses made of their knowledge, the
biases inherent in their premises, and the alternatives
available to them.
Finally, we are all conscious of the many ways in which
those who finance education and research (first of all
governments, but also private foundations and corporations)
channel our teaching and our scholarly work by creating
priorities and/or insisting on education and research is
practical, that is, applicable to activities in the world of
work and legislation, as this "practicality" is defined by the
funding agency. We are also conscious of the parallel insistence
of social movements that the world of social science reflect
their concerns and their priorities, and that our work be useful
to them, as they define usefulness.
It is obvious that we are in the midst of a cauldron which
is incessantly boiling, and that there is no simple egress from
this cauldron, no simple solution to our dilemmas. There have
been two classic responses of individual scholars. Some have
opted for open commitment (to whatever side of the political
spectrum), and have defended this commitment as one required by
their social values. Others have claimed to withdraw from the
combat and sought to pursue a path that they said was
exclusively "scientific," without fear or favor to political
combatants, and also without any immediate concern about the
uses to which others might put the findings they made and
published.
Today, increasingly, there are many who find themselves
very uncomfortable with either of these classic responses. They
believe that, on the one hand, their role is not to be the
mouthpieces of the ever-evolving political agendas of either the
powerful of the world or the social movements in opposition to
the powerful. But they also doubt that it is really possible to
withdraw from the fray and stand above it, that there can be any
truly value-free knowledge, that knowledge is always for
something, or at least is always used for something, and that
this something is in the end something political (that is,
something about which there is conflict in the world outside the
world of knowledge).
This dilemma is not unconnected with another dilemma, much
in discussion today - what we mean by "truth." Is there an
objective reality out there that can (ultimately) be known, if
only we use the appropriate methods and put in the necessary
(cumulative) effort? Or is all so-called truth merely a mask for
some ideological position which has defined in advance what it
will permit to be called truth? And in this case, is not
everyone the author of his/her own truth, equally valid with
that defined by everyone else? In which case, is there anything
we can call science, or social science, or even scholarship?
Here again, we have had a classic conflict between the
"universalist/positivists" and the "relativist/social
constructionists," a conflict which seems to be more acute today
than before. And yet, despite the acuteness and the loudness of
this debate, I have the sense that the majority of social
scientists in the world today do not wish to have the question
defined for them as an either/or choice. This group recognizes
the social bases and social origins of truth claims, but also
recognizes the solipsistic implications of a total relativism.
They are searching for a path that will allow them to
incorporate what William McNeill has called "mythistory," what
others talk about as the centrality of metaphors, in ways that
will enable to emerge with knowledge that they can consider
useful (in Lynd's sense) yet unsubordinated to the passing
claims of ideologues (Weber's concern).
Is this possible? Is there socially-located truth that is
useful, and has at the same time some basis of credibility
beyond the assertions of the author? That is, can there be truth
that is collectively validated and controlled but beyond the
imperative claims of the current participants in the immediate
political battles? And if so, how may we arrive at it?
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