New thinking on Security
I would very like to inntroduce a different dimension to the topic which
is has very much evolved. Security in the post cold war era is no
longer shaped by the bi polar that characterised it. The balance of
power has shifted, but there are more than 50 armed conflicts which are
taking place at the moment. These cconflcts are taking the form of
intrastate rather than interstate. The complex interplay of historical
and cultural forces is leaving a very small role for foreign
intrevention to assist in conflict resolution.
Does that mean that the world should stand and look when Sierra Leon,
Algeria, Afghanistan, Sudan burn into ashes. I say no. A collective
effort needs to be initiated to deal with the most distructive weapon of
morden age that is small arms.
Relationship between culture of violence and small arms proliferation
Introduction
The relationship between small arms and culture of violence is an
understudied area. Previous research has only looked at these issues
seperately. Therefore too little is known about the impact of the former
to the latter. International security research on arms trades has
focused mainly on major weapons like nuclear proliferation. As a result
of this ignorance, small arm’s trade, black market and its impact on
conflicts is not known.
The end of the Cold War and “new world order” have reshaped the security
debate altogether. One of the noticeable changes is the decline in
inter-state conflicts that characterized the Cold war era. Instead
there has been a rise in intra-state conflicts carried out by religious
extremists, warlords, ethnic and criminal organisations, seperatists or
insurgents groups. The changing nature of the conflicts has also
changed the tools of the trade. Assesment has revealed that these
groupings rely more on light weapons than major conventional weapons to
carry out their mission.
Several reasons account for the prominence of small and light weapons
among these groupings. The nature and course of the insurgents,
seperatists and ethnic groups make the small arms more suitable for
their missions. Since most of these groupings are non-state actors they
rely on black market and clandestine routes that is most appropriate
supplying small arms. Most of these groupings are formed by volunteers
who lack training to operate complicated weaponry thus they rely on
user-friendly small arms. Logistical problems and lack of access to port
and airstrips mean they have to rely on poor transport like the civilian
vehicles that are suitable for transporting light weapons.
There are clear signs that use of violence is on the rise. The rising
violent crimes in South Africa and growing banditry in Mozambique are
the testimony to this rise. Conflict is being accepted as the only means
of resolving conflict. Peaceful strategies for resolution of disputes
have fallen on deaf ears. In some other cases even democratic election
results have been ignored, instead violence resumes afresh e.g Angola in
1992. There is a culture of violence that is deeply entrenched in the
society.
The converging of small arm’s proliferation with culture of violence has
created an explosive situation in many parts of the world. For example
in Angola out of the population of 9 million, 55 000 are amputees.
Economies of the affected countries have suffered heavily. In Angola for
instance is estimated that there are 20 million mines, covering one
third of the country, making it unworkable.
It is important to understand that the impact and relationship between
small arms and culture of violence are not a clear cut. Nevertheless as
Louise’s said “the hypothesis of a link must be considered since these
contrasting phenomenon appear to be two sides of the same geopolitical
coin the currency of which is shaping the security debate of the post -
Cold war world.”
The first section of this paper will look at different origins of small
arms, past and present and try to analyze the flow, statistics or the
value of the trade in Southern African region. The second section will
look at different perspectives on the origins of the culture of
violence. On the last section I will take South Africa as case study of
the convergence of these two phenomena, culture of violence and small
arm’s proliferation.
Origins and flow of small arms in Southern African Region
The Southern African region is awash with weapons especially small and
light weapons. A large percentage of these weapons is the material
legacy of the Cold War. During 1970’s, 80’s and 90’s the superpowers
pumped the regional countries with massive amount of ammunition.
These weapons were issued as Cold war goverment grants. This was part of
Soviet Union strategy to support Marxist regimes and groups, while the
US was trying to counter that by pumping pro-capitalists with weapons.
With the decline of the cross border raids and inter-state wars these
weapons have taken a new meaning. In Mozambique these weapons are
falling into banditry groups, while in Angola they are in the hands of
unemployed demobilised soldier and opportunistic black market
syndicates. Let us first study the origins of the weapons before trying
to understand their flow.
During the Cold war era superpowers used different means to provide
these weapons but their intelligence organisation played the
facilitating role. The US through the military assistance programme MAP
pumped millions worth of weapons to UNITA and FNLA. The statistics of US
military aid to Unita reveals a massive growth. The US aid increased
from $15 millions of weapons in 1986 to $50 million in 1990. By the time
the US suspended military aid in 1992 in it had reached a massive $300
million. China also supported the FNLA with weapons.
South Africa also played a very big role in supplying this kind of
military grants to UNITA. South Africas capability of granting this aid
was boosted by the established internal armament industry. Until the 90s
South Africa supplied more than $80 million of military aid to Unita.
Russia is said to have supplied most of the military aid to Angola’s
Marxist aligned MPLA goverment than any other country. The Soviet case
like other one was operating in a clandestine manner through KGB routes.
These also makes it difficult to get to exact figure of this aid. The
available figures reveal that Russia pumped $2 billion of weapons
annualy to MPLA, while Cuba supplied $200 million of Soviet arms.
It is important to understand that even though military goverment grants
was open, this was complemented by covert deliveries. For obvious reason
the statistic for this kind of support are not available. The few
sources that are available reveal that between 1975 - 76 the CIA
secretly supplied anti-Communist insurgents in Angola with 622 crew
served mortars, 42.100 anti-tank rockets, 20.900 rifles, and millions of
rounds of ammunition. On top of all these supplies both the MPLA and
Unita spent huge amounts on weapons. By the mid 1980s MPLA was running a
debt of $4 billion on weapons.
Mozambique is one of the main source of illegal arms smuggle throughout
the region. Since the civil war broke out in 1975 the country became the
recipient of massive weapons support. Like most other regional countries
the Cold war was fought in the Mozambican soil. Freelimo goverment
received military support from USSR while Renamo rallied support from
World anti-Communist League.
Throughout the 16 years of war weapons were distributed alarmingly on
both sides of the war. It is estimated that the Freelimo goverment
supplied 1.5 million assault rifles to civilians who supported their
course. The detailed figures of the Freelimo military supports are not
been available.
The war was terminated with a peace agreement in 1992 followed by the
United Nations sponsored demobilisation and disarmament. Unfortunately
United Nation Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) was plagued by problems
that made it unsuccesful and it is estimated that 6 million AK47s are
‘still at large.’
Though the general sources of weapons in Mozambique are known, the
actual value of this support is not known, so we can rely on indirect
revelations to estimate this support. Recent news bulletin has also
given some intensity of this support. “Mozambican police in conjunction
with their South African counterparts recovered arms cache in
Mozambique” Sept. 5, 1997. This article revealed a list of firearms
that included 11.734 firearms of all sorts, 7.718 hand guns, 14.000
landmines, 8.039 ammunition clips, 378 boxes of assorted munition and
24.000 rounds of loose ammunition . In the region South Africa became
the major suppliers of Renamo until the 1980 signing of the Nkomati
Accord.
There are countries in the region who survived this massive pump of
weapons because of their internal political dynamics. Swaziland is one
such case. The stable mountain Swazi Kingdom political system did not
experience any internal or external conflict throughout the Cold war
era, thus there has not been huge demand for arms.
Swazilands source of weapons has been from theft of legal firearms.
Another origin of weapons has been the use of this country as arm
smuggling transit point to South Africa until last quarter of 1993.
Throughout this use of the Swazi borders as transit many weapons ended
in Swaziland without moving on to intended destinations. This route
stopped after the opening of the direct border crossing between Maputo
and KwaZulu-Natal.
Botswana is another country that did not experience this massive
injection of weapons. The main source of firearms in Botswana is the
licenced firearms. The strict rules governing the issuing of firearm
licences has made sure that they do not have a big firearms problem. It
is only those firearms that are stolen from legal owners that creates a
problem.
Recently this country has only been used as a transit for arms
smugglers, its south borders made it suitable for arms smuggling
destined for South Africa. During the apartheid era, arms smuggled from
ANC camps in Zambia went to Zimbabwe and through Botswana to South
Africa. It is this use of Botswana as transit point that is creating
firearm problem. It is only through the use of its borders that it is
experiencing a firearm problem.
Zambia acquired the problem of weapons through its support of the
regional liberation movements. Throughout the Cold war Zambia harbored
the liberation movements like the ANC inside its borders. Since these
movements were involved in wars in their respective countries, they
accumulated arsenals in Zambia.
This acceptance of liberation movements and their weapons has created an
arms proliferation in Zambia. Arms from superpowers destined for leftist
liberation movements in South Africa and Mozambique landed by plane in
Zambia and smuggled by road through Swaziland or through Botswana to
South Africa. Zambia claimed to have been in control of the arms flow
in their borders. Staff and resource shortage this has open this flow to
abuse by corrupt officials.
Namibia on the other hand was a scene of tense battles between Peoples
Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) and South African Defence Force SADF.
Independence was achieved through Resolution 435 of United Nations and
calmed down the situation. Demobilisation and disarmament through United
Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) were succesful. The main
problem with Namibia is its proximity with Angola. This country is also
used as a transit point for arms smugglers from Angola through its south
borders to the eastern Cape.
The end of the Cold War has dramatically reduced this form of goverment
military support in the region. The security threats that drove the
bi-polar world to arms supports programmes has vanished, but the weapons
themselves have remained and they have taken a new meaning.
One of the new meanings of small arm proliferation that has received
little attention is the black market. The decline in inter-state
military support has led to the growth of the black market. In
Mozambique for instance large stockpiles of weapons that were seized
during the UN disarmament were never destroyed. When the UN mission
withdrawn in the country, these arsenals were open for sale by corrupt
officials.
In Angola also the black market has also grown extensively Firstly the
international dealers have cashed in from supplying UNITA during the
arms embargo that was instituted by the UN. It is known that UNITA has
been able to collect more weapons in spite of the embargoes. Secondly
Angolans themselves who are poor and hungry because of decades of war
have been accused by Zambians of illegally crossing the border to Zambia
and exchanging their weapons for food.
Another dangerous dimension that has emerged out availability of weapons
is alliance between criminal organisations, insurgent groups and
ex-soldiers who still retain their weapons of war. The recently alleged
link of ex-MK soldiers to the multi-million rand robberies in South
Africa is the testimony to above relationship. The flow of guns between
these groups takes place in many forms, while they do sell to each other
there are also favors. These favors may be because of ideological
leniency or some other secret understanding.
In the region where wars have destroyed the economy to its knees and
demobilised soldiers face zero job opportunities, weapons have become
the only means of survival. For obvious reasons there is no available
statistics on the value of the black market. The huge number of
non-state actors including criminals who are engaged in acts of
violence, without access to legal arms market constitutes a big demand
of the light weapons.
Culture of Violence
Theoretical Consideration
‘Violence is everywhere in our culture. on television, music, art,
literature, newspaper, people’s minds- second only to sex.
Violence is ever present in the world today, with daily reports of
slaughter specifically in intra-national armed conflicts. The use of
violence in all facets of our lives have grown extensively in recent
history.
Violence is so deeply entrenched in the society, that it is being viewed
as part of life. There is even biological explanation of the sources of
violence. It is this social acceptance of violence as part and parcel of
natural and social relations between human beings that creates a
“culture of violence.”Violence takes many forms in different countries
therefore it is important to try to outline the different views on the
origins of this culture of violence.
In many countries the dynamics that lead to conflicts, differ. Batchelor
divides conflicts into four typologies. There is the conflict over
political participation, conflict over distribution of resources,
political identity conflict and conflict related to the termination of
the war . Kumar on the other hand divide internal conflicts into four
that is ideological conflicts, governance and authority conflicts,
racial conflicts and identity conflicts .These typologies are actually
interrelated, but they help in identifying similarities and differences
in each country.
These typologies help to get the wide view of the sources of conflict
but it is very much important also to get the deeper bases of this
culture of violence.Psychologists are one group that has studied the
deeper sources of the culture of violence. Psychoanalysts, Sigmund Freud
and Albert Einstein both agreed that human beings are aroused to engage
in war. From his writings Freud goes farther to observe that human
beings as animals have an inborn tendency for hatred and destruction,
which is instinctual.
McDougall and Lorenz took the point farther by arguing that man has an
inherited disposition of aggression, although it needed frustration to
make it active. Lorenz went as far as to extend his findings on animal
aggression to man. He concluded that since aggression is instinctual to
animals and humans, therefore murder and warfare are an inevitable
characteristic of human race.
The instinct theory of aggression was challenged by R. L. Olukayode
Jegede, who argued that aggression can be learned. He supports his
argument with the results of his observation on learning in experimental
animals, based on the laboratory observation of rats in learning
simulations.
The Lorenz’s theory of aggression as a source of frustration was also
challenged by Berkowitz. He argued that not all instances of aggression
result from frustration, moreover every frustration increase the
instigation to aggression. Berkowitz then concluded, that if aggression
is learned therefore ‘social rather than biological characteristics
determine the aggressiveness and the warlikeness of nation’
Another group who has studied the culture of violence argued that social
relations are the main cause of conflicts and violence. This view
developed by Jacklyn Cock, argues that violence is identity based.
There are many variants of identity like religious, ethnic and the
soldier, etc. Identity encompasses a sense that one is safe in the world
physically psychologically, socially and spiritually. Any events or
factors that try to invalidate the core sense of identity elicit violent
responses. This violence is aimed at avoiding physical annihilation. We
will only focus on three identities that is political and ethnic
belonging, because of their relevance to Southern African region. We
will try to identify the role these identities play in violence.
It is natural for man to have a feeling of belonging. The strong feeling
to has driven man closer to their ethnic groups. These ethnic identities
are not naturally conflictual, rather it is the circumstances that
surround them that create violent response and antagonism. The
relationship between ethnicity and violen ce is based on the social
interaction theory. It is only when these identities feel threatened,
insecure or manipulated in their political and social interaction that
they become violent.
Conflict over the distribution of resources or ideological can take an
ethnic dimension if manipulated. The violence 1980s between United
Democratic Front and the Inkatha Freedom Party was ideological at the
beginning but Buthelezi introduced an ethnic dimension to conflicts by
mobilising support among the Zulus to the conflict. Unequal power
relations have also been identified as one of the sources of conflict
among the ethnic groups. It is these kinds of insecurities and threats,
politicization or plainly manipulation that has driven ethnic groups to
become defensive and survivalistic.
This argument fits into Michael Klares concept of relocation of
authority. Klare observed that global interdependence, mass media and
influence of international organisations are shifting the power away
from the nation states. The relocation of authority from the national
goverment to powerful international forces is creating anxiety and
insecurity among ethnic identities, thus strengthening them.
Mordenisation and the concept of “global village” that it was supposed
will erode these identities, has instead created anxiety among
individuals and they are turning to these smaller ethnic identities for
support.
Mordenisation has also created new ethnic elite who have skills to
provide new dynamic leadership and competitive leadership to their
group. A population of group-based unequal social classes rootless
morden individual is vulnerable to ascriptive mobilisation. The case of
Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi and the IFP is an example of political
mobilisation along ethnic lines. Individuals rely on ethnic identities
either for economical and political favors, and it is this competition
for favors that creates antagonism that usually burst into conflict.
This links to the argument by Malvern Lumsden when he says the main
source of violence in the international system result from the
competition between expanding population and limited resources. While it
is not the main source his argument worth taking note.
To conclude this section on identity it important to note that in ‘an
environment where we create rootless individuals, who may turn to their
ancestral collective identities in their search personal meaning, where
new elite are created by the mass media and globalisation, elites who
may mobilise group membership and where inequalities and ideologies
provide a ready basis for socio-political mobilisation we should not be
surprised by the recent rise in ethnicity.’
To sum up this chapter I must first dismiss the instinctual bases of
violence in human, espoused by Freud and Einstein as pessimistic and
invalid. They apply their finding on animals observation to human but
their argument lack practical evidence. While human do sometimes react
violently to frustration there are exceptions to frustration aggression
model. The model fails to explain the rise of violence that was not
triggered by any frustration, as in the case of ideological differences.
The applicability of the model in real life situations is also
complicated by the vague use of concept of “frustration,” which have
many meanings.
The socially oriented definition of the culture of violence holds much
truth. Cock who espoused this theory while optimistic she does raises
some valid analysis and concerns. Identities, racial, ethnic, political,
national and gender are part of social relation and they play a huge
role in conflict situation. The antagonism mentally of “us” and “they”
are based on these identities.
In the modern world of scarce resources and complex power relation it is
very easy for these identities to be manipulated into conflict for
economic or political purposes. The Inkatha Freedom Party is South
African example of the political organisation that has rallied for
support through ethnic lines. Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi leader of the
IFP manipulated the Zulu ethnic group throughout the transition, by
raising insecurities and anxieties to rally political support.
South Africa: Identity, violence and small arms.
Identity and small arms play a big role in violence in South Africa. In
order to analyse the role of identity in violence of South Africa we
need to study the dynamics that were involve in each stage of the
conflict. One of the most important institutions that played a role in
forming a link between identity and violence is the army. The MK and the
SADF both as armies played a big role in shaping up this link.
The “solder” identity and the army taught insensitivity, aggressiveness
and violence. It is on this bases that we should view armed struggle by
MK and the counter insurgency measures by the SADF as an identity based
violence. The ideologies that drove the different sides “soldier”
identities in South Africa legitimised violence as means of obtaining
and mantaining power. The slogan by the PAC of “one settler, one
bullet” and the popular one by the then - ANC youth league president
Peter Mokaba “ kill the boer, kill the farmer” are examples of violent
indoctrination that accompanied the “soldier” identities of the
resistance - apartheid era.
The middle of the 1980s came up with a different dimension to violence
of South Africa. In 1983 the United Democratic Front (UDF) was formed
which was a mouthpiece of the ANC while it was banned. From its
formation the relationship between the UDF and IFP soured, because of
the number of reasons. The main ones were the challenge the UDF posed to
the IFPs over the monopoly of African politics especially in
KwaZulu-Natal and the close relationship between the IFP and National
Party.
The National Party relied on the IFP to challenge UDF. The main basis
for this relationship was that, because of the lack of significant
number of Afrikaner population in KwaZulu Natal, NP relied on IFP
alliance to counter the UDF. The IFP on the other hand saw the
relationship as a way of holding on to political control of KwaZulu
Natal.
The situation cycled into violent outburst, ambushes and attacks between
the IFP and UDF, and culminated in the formation of IFP aligned Self
Protection Units and ANC aligned Self Defence Units. The death
statistics vary with sources but the general figure reveal that from
1987 to 1990, 4 000 people died in KwaZulu Natal. Political identity was
the dividing line between both sides of the conflict
In the 1990s violence taken another turn. Period subsequent to the
elections was accompanied by deadly violence. The ANC was unbanned in
1990 and immediately won the support of majority of blacks. With such a
strong opposition Buthelezi decided to introduce a new strategy. He
manipulated the ethnic loyalities of the Zulu nation by mobilising
around ethnic consciousness. IFP boycotted the elections demanding the
clarity on the status of the Kingdom on KwaZulu in the new dispensation.
Buthelezi went even farther as to draw the support of King Goodwill
Zwelithini of the Zulu Kingdom to win the support of the Zulus. Through
this period ethnic identity played a role in the violence. This was a
clear manipulation of ethnic identity for political gains of IFP.
Violence that accompanied this period claimed 3000 people in East Rand
alone between 1990 and 1994. A different form of identity was taking a
center stage in the conflict. Manipulation of ethnic identities became
the electioneering strategy for the IFP.
Finally the IFP was taken aboard the election through the last minute
promise of consideration of their worry over the Zulu Kingdom, after the
election. The passing of the 1994 election has dramatically reduced
violence. Both sides of African political spectrums in South Africa has
dismissed themselves to the violence.
Our concern for this chapter has been to determine the impact of
identity in the violence. From armed struggle to political violence to
1990s identity has played a role in the violence. The political identity
and ‘soldier’ identity played an important role in 1980s. Violence based
on these identities continued in the beginning of the 90s but a
different dimension was included to the conflict. Ethnic dimension was
introduced by Buthelezi when he mobilised the Zulu nation.
Proliferation of small arms in South Africa started long before the
political violence of the 90s. The major source weapon in South Africa
was through smuggling by liberation movements. During the apartheid
era, the liberation movements in S.A. (especially ANC) were engaged in
the deadly armed struggle with the Nationalist Party goverment.
As in most other regional countries Russia, China and Cuba backed the
liberation movements with military equipment. Most of the weapons were
small arms because of the nature of the operations. These weapons were
smuggled into South Africa by ANC operatives to carry out their
offensive mission. Arms caches were created inside the country. General
Bantu Holomisa of the then Transkei opened up the small bantustan for
liberation movements for use as launch base for its operations. Large
amounts of weapons entered Transkei.
To counter these developments and further the strategy of ‘divide and
rule’ the Nationalist Party through its National Security Management
System trained and militarily equipped the IFP paramilitary force, the
SDUs. There are also no figures for this support we can only asses the
value by looking at the types of weapons that were used in the violence
especially in KwaZulu Natal during the 80s and early 90s. Between 1993
and 1995, 3000 people were killed and 60% of these involved the use of
light weapons (AK47s, pistols, homemade guns)
After the election, disarmament strategies were not succesful at all. In
October 1994 a disarmament operation called ‘Rollerball’ was started. It
was also a disaster. In February 1995 Chief of Staff,Lt. Col Siphiwe
Nyanda released the seizure statistics for this operation that were as
follows 70 AK47s, 93 handgrenades, 53 pistols, 316 limpet mines. This
figure is nothing compared with the millions worth of military equipment
supplied to IFP by NP and the superpowers to ANC.
The second major source is the internal armament industry. During the
violent 80s and sensitive transitional stage the white population armed
themselves alarmingly. They relied mostly on legal firearms. The anxiety
was raised by the uncertainty and fear of the resumption of war. By the
early 1990s the white population was well armed and the proliferation of
weapons was at its peak.
This trend of acquiring legal firearms is still continuing in South
Africa. Recent statistics reveal that the Central Firearm Registry still
receives the average of 18 000 applications. Theft of legal firearms is
still a major problem per month there are still 2700 reports of stolen
firearms every month.
I therefore conclude that in South Africa the flow of small arms had
and still has a great impact in the culture of violence that rose during
the 80s and continued until the early 90s.
Socio-political dynamics of South Africa created identities that were
impregnated with violence. These identities legitimised violence.
Violence was seen as the only means to achieve (in case of ANC) and
mantain (in case of NP) power.
Small arms became the suitable tools, because of the nature of conflict
Assasinations, ambushes and attacks by ‘faceless’ killers were better
carried out in light weapons. Flow of small arms grew with the violence.
Without the huge amount of light weapons that entered South Africa and
massive legal militarisation of white community, South Africa would not
have experienced violence in massive scale.
By Enough Sishi
Researcher: Institute for Security Studies
Small Arms Programme
South Africa
ESishi@iss.co.za
+27-11-315 7096(phone)
+27-11-315 7099(Fax)