[Fwd: Nuclear Tests on the subcontinent]

Fri, 05 Jun 1998 09:35:40 -0400
christopher chase-dunn (chriscd@jhu.edu)

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
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for chriscd@jhu.edu; Fri, 05 Jun 1998 03:50:24 -0400 (EDT)
Date: Fri, 05 Jun 1998 19:46:16 +1200
From: Ravi Arvind Palat <r.palat@auckland.ac.nz>
Subject: Nuclear Tests on the subcontinent
To: chriscd@jhu.edu
Reply-to: r.palat@auckland.ac.nz
Organization: University of Auckland

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

--Boundary_(ID_Ge625Q7QQO8+1w0ZgKP7uA)

Chris: I enclose an article I published in _The Press_, a Christchurc=
h,
New Zealand newspaper on Wed June 3, 1998...Can you post it on WSN?
Thanks...Ravi
How Asian tests reveal =91nuclear apartheid=92?
Ravi Arvind Palat

If five nuclear detonations by India last month shattered our
complaisant assumption that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) =
had
virtually eliminated such tests, the six nuclear explosions Pakistan
conducted in retaliation last week reinforced fears that we stand at =
the
beginning of a new nuclear arms race.
An arms race between the two neighbours, is potentially more incendia=
ry
than the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union
during the Cold War. The two super-powers did not share a common
border. By the time they acquired the capability to launch missiles
against each others=92 home territories, the certainty of assured mut=
ual
destruction operated as a strong deterrent.
India and Pakistan, in contrast, share a 2000-mile frontier and their
long-standing territorial dispute over Kashmir is now inflamed by the
growth of religious fundamentalist movements on both sides. While th=
e
Arctic Ocean provided a 40 minute warning between the launch of missi=
les
and their targets in the Soviet Union or the United States, it takes
only 3 minutes for Indian or Pakistani missiles to reach their target=
s.
There is no margin for error.
If this realization has catapulted nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament to the top of the global agenda, fears of a new nuclear a=
rms
race are exaggerated as indicated by the Indian government=92s calm
reactions to the Pakistani tests. Indeed, calculating that Pakistani
tests would legitimate India=92s own tests and end the country=92s mo=
ral and
political isolation, hawkish members of the ruling Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP) did their best to goad Pakistan.
Though Indian tests provoked the predictable Pakistani response, it m=
ust
be recognised that the two countries were responding to very differen=
t
geo-strategic imperatives and perceptions. The Indian tests were not
directed against Pakistan. India has defeated Pakistan in three
conventional wars over the last 50 years and can do so again as India
has twice as many soldiers as Pakistan: 1.2 million against 600,000.
=46rom its inception, India=92s nuclear weapons programme was always
directed towards China. India=92s sense of vulnerability after her
humiliating defeat in a brief border war with China in 1962 was
heightened by the Chinese acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1964.
Within four years, it was well-known that India had the technological
capabilities to make nuclear weapons and all doubts were removed in 1=
974
when its scientists conducted a "peaceful nuclear explosion."
Just as military defeat by China led to India=92s sense of insecurity=
, the
forceful vivisection of Pakistan by Indian forces in the War of
Bangladeshi Secession in 1971 galvanised Pakistan=92s nuclear program=
me.
Former Prime Minister, Mr. Zulfikhar Ali Bhutto famously said that
Pakistanis would even "eat grass" if that is what it took to develop
nuclear weapons.
During subsequent years, both countries were widely acknowledged to h=
ave
acquired all the requirements to assemble nuclear weapons at short
notice. It is widely accepted that Pakistan had got blue-prints to m=
ake
nuclear bombs from China. As Chinese tests had proved that these
designs worked, there were no compulsions to test them especially sin=
ce
tests would have triggered international condemnation. Why then, did
India and Pakistan choose to rattle their nuclear sabres now?
Strategically, the demise of the Soviet Union was a major blow for
India. It lost its most powerful ally and increased its sense of
isolation. Weak protests by the United States government against the
transfer of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles from China and
North Korea to Pakistan did nothing to assuage the Indian government=
=92s
growing sense of isolation and insecurity. Rather than addressing th=
ese
concerns, Western powers seemed bent on forcing India to accept a
nuclear containment regime that it considers flawed and discriminator=
y.
Finally, the new BJP-led coalition government is unstable and the
popular support certain to be generated by the tests would grant the
government a new lease of life.
Once India had tested, pressures to test were irresistible for the Na=
waz
Sharif Government in Pakistan. Soon after India=92s five nuclear tes=
ts
last month, Ms. Benazir Bhutto, a former prime minister and leader of
the Pakistan Peoples=92 Party even called on Western states to launch=
a
pre-emptive attack on India to "neutralize India=92s nuclear capabili=
ty."
Religious leaders and politicians in Pakistan, instigated by provocat=
ive
claims by fundamentalist Hindu politicians in India, also clamoured f=
or
nuclear tests.
Internationally, while the United States gave North Korea some US$4
billion to renounce nuclear options, no such dollops of aid were offe=
red
to Pakistan. The offer to let Pakistan finally take delivery of the =
28
F16 aircraft it had bought and paid for in 1990 was never going to be
enough especially when Ms. Bhutto was threatening mass demonstrations=
in
favor of` testing. The powerful military was also demanding tests an=
d
no Pakistani politician can ignore the military.
Nuclear tests by India and Pakistan have completely derailed the
non-proliferation framework and scuttled President Clinton=92s policy=
of
promoting economic and commercial interests over other goals as in th=
e
subordination of human rights issues in China to trade and investment=
..
Will a nuclear Pakistan spur Iran to acquire nuclear weapons of its
own? In the global indignation over Indian and Pakistani tests, it i=
s
also conveniently forgotten that Germany, Italy, and Japan had reserv=
ed
the right to withdraw from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty if th=
e
list of nuclear weapons states expanded from the original five.
China=92s weakness in computer simulations may lead it to violate the=
CTBT
if India refuses to sign it. Since the CTBT was designed to cement U=
S
technological superiority in nuclear weapons, a resumption of Chinese
tests would shatter any hope of the US Senate ratifying the treaty.
The collapse of the Warsaw Pact was accompanied by a major review of
security policies in Europe, culminating in the eastward expansion of
the Western security alliance, NATO. There has been no comparable
review of the post-Cold War security environment in Asia. Preoccupied
with budget deficits, the US government has reduced military expendit=
ure
by 30 percent between 1989 and 1998 and hoped that the growing
prosperity of Asian states will automatically create a strong consens=
us
against militarism. This hope has now been shattered.
In dealing with the new geopolitical conditions created by the Indian
and Pakistani tests, it is important to recognize the very different
strategic perceptions that guide New Delhi and Islamabad. The Indian
tests were claims to be recognised as a great power as the right of
one-sixth of humanity. Pakistan=92s geostrategic aims are more modes=
t.
It is a claim to security rather than to great power status.
The need for security can only be addressed within a larger framework
which includes China, Russia, and the United States at the very least=
..
In an age of intercontinental ballistic missiles, there are no
defensible borders and security can be guaranteed only by political
understanding. A regional security arrangement that accommodates all
interested powers rather than Cold War-like alliances directed agains=
t
opposing superpowers is the only viable solution but it is one that
would take time to establish.
In the short-term, the only way Pakistan=92s legitimate security conc=
erns
can be addressed would be an offer by the five recognised nuclear
weapons states to extend their nuclear umbrella over the country if i=
t
renounces nuclear weapons. An iron-clad commitment to defend Pakista=
n
would raise military expenditures when the trend is towards declining
outlays but the alternative is far more destabilising.
Simultaneously, the United States and Russia should offer to share
advanced warning technologies with India and Pakistan to reduce
tensions.
India=92s claim to recognition as a major power cannot be accommodate=
d
merely by a commitment to defend it against nuclear attack as it sees
China as its main adversary. India is also less likely to accept wha=
t
it calls "nuclear apartheid" now that it has tested weapons than it w=
as
before the tests. The only viable solution is for other nuclear weap=
ons
states to join India in working towards global nuclear disarmament. =
If
that were to be the case, there would be a silver lining to the mushr=
oom
clouds hovering over the subcontinent.

--Boundary_(ID_Ge625Q7QQO8+1w0ZgKP7uA)

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