This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
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16 May 1998 10:08:48 -0500 (EST)
Date: Sat, 16 May 1998 09:15:47 -0500
From: manning@neu.edu (Patrick Manning)
Subject: Dialogue: Frank, Landes et al #4 (10 messages)
To: H-WORLD@h-net.msu.edu
Joshua Rosembloom <rosenbl@lark.cc.ukans.edu>
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H-WORLD editor's note: This is the fourth
in a series of postings containing the
dialogue of Gunder Frank, David Landes and
others on global economic history. It
includes 7 messages originally posted on
eh.res, two messages originally posted on
H-ASIA, and one message posted herein by
H-WORLD. PM
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(1). Originally posted on eh.res.
Date: Thu, 14 May 1998 10:52:26 -0500
From: "Anthony Patrick O'Brien" <ao01@Lehigh.EDU>
Subject: EH.R: Frank versus Landes
================= EH.RES POSTING =================
The May 25 issue of the New Republic contains a review by Jagdish Bhagwati of
Landes and of Kindleberger's _World Economic Primacy: 1500-1990_. Bhagwati's
conclusions about Landes:
"Landes wishes to link the European miracle causally, in the spirit of Max
Weber, to underlying values as defined by the Judeo-Christian, and especially
Protestant, universe. Islam is held to be inimical to a repetition of the
European experience owing to its allegedly holistic nature, with religion 'in
principle supreme and the ideal government that of the holy men.' Such
assertions recur throughout the book. And here Landes is stepping into
quicksand. For it is impossible to relate culture or values to these pro-growth
institutions and policy frameworks, and hence to economic growth, in a causally
tight way.
....
I do not mean to deny culture any role. But the precise role of culture in
economic behavior remains elusive. The encouraging truth appears to be that
growth-inducing institutions, like hardy perennials that will grow in different
and indifferent soils, are resilient and compatible with a range of cultures.
And for a historian who is confronted with economic success in extremely diverse
cultures, it is ahistorical to assert otherwise."
It would be interesting to learn where Bhagwati thinks the IR came from.
Tony O'Brien
Lehigh University
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(2). Originally posted on eh.res.
Date: Thu, 14 May 1998 12:45:52 -0500
From: "Joshua L. Rosenbloom" <jrosenbloom@UKANS.EDU>
Subject: EH.R: Frank versus Landes
================= EH.RES POSTING =================
At 09:43 AM 5/14/98 -0500, jack a. goldstone wrote:
>(2) Frank, Pommeranz, and others now make it difficult if not impossible
>to see the roots of the great bifurcation in long-term structural changes
>c. 1000-1700. The "action" is in the last few centuries.
>(3) ...I would suggest instead a sudden "leap forward" in England,
>due to (a) new institutions developed post-1689; (b) new technology
>developed post-1689; and (c) a new religiously tolerant, scientifically
>empirical, culture of inquiry, experiment, and innovation that developed
>in England post-1689.
>(4) If this seems to pivot everything on the Glorious Revolution, that's
>right...If James II had triumphed...[t]he Dissenters who
>provided the bulk of the entrepreneurial energy of the IR
>in England might simply not have made their contribution, and perhaps
>modern science and industry as we know it might never have developed in
>the west....
>(5) In short, I think what needs to be explained is not a "long-term,
>inevitable" process that leads to industrialization, but a rare, one-off,
>developmental anomaly or "sport" that leads England on what is, by world
>standards, a "peculiar path."
The assertion that the Industrial Revolution may hinge on "accident" is
certainly intriguing, but I am not yet prepared to accept that conjecture
and give up looking for systematic differences. As a purely logical matter,
even if we accept the view that the "great bifurcation" in incomes did not
emerge until sometime in the 18th century, it is not so obvious that the
roots of the West's distinctive path in the last several centuries are not
to be found in prior events. These may not have translated into discernable
differences in economic prowess, but they may still have a long history.
I am hardly expert enough on this topic to suggest what these roots might
be, but I have always been intrigued by the argument that William H. McNeill
offers in _The Pursuit of Power_ (especially chapters 2-3), which identifies
a unique trajectory of western development associated with political
fragmentation and the emergence of significant international military
competition within Europe. This competition, according to McNeill, both
stimulated the development of new and more powerful military technologies
(which ultimately gave the west a considerable advantage vis a vis the rest
of the world), and obliged monarchs to grant increasing freedoms to
merchants and financiers as part of the bargain for raising the funds to pay
for military expenditures.
Clearly some countries within Europe benefitted more from these developments
than others, but their competition with eachother greatly raised the
prospects of the emergence of regimes that loosened restrictions on
religious and scientific dissent, thus making the ultimate transition that
occurred in the 18th century more likely.
Comments?
Joshua Rosenbloom
University of Kansas
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(3). Originally posted on eh.res
Date: Thu, 14 May 1998 14:47:54 -0500
From: Jonathan_Liebowitz@uml.edu (Jonathan Liebowitz)
Subject: EH.R: Frank versus Landes
================= EH.RES POSTING =================
1) I've been pleased at the turn this discussion has taken in the past few days
and thank recent posters for their insightful comments. In that vein I hope
Gunder Frank would give his counter-Landes interpretation of modern economic
growth. (I know we can all read his forthcoming book, but ...until it appears.
2) This is a bit in advance, but it seems like a good occasion to mention
it--There will be a session at next fall's SSHA meeting discussing Landes's
book. Participants will include P. David, D. McCloskey, J. Mokyr, K. Pomeranz,
and G. Grantham, as well as Landes. Hope to see you all there.
Jonathan J. Liebowitz (jonathan_liebowitz@uml.edu)
Department of History
University of Massachusetts Lowell
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(4). Originally posted on eh.res.
Date: Fri, 15 May 1998 12:36:12 -0500
From: Robert Marks, Whittier College <rmarks@whittier.edu>
Subject: EH.R: Frank versus Landes
================= EH.RES POSTING =================
Having followed this discussion with interest, and now with Jack Goldstone
including me in the "California school" with regard to many of the issues
raised, I thought it was time to introduce myself to the Eh.Res list by way of
comments on some of postings.
First, and as a preliminary, the interest of historians whose primary focus
has been Europe and/or North America in the work of Asianists is a welcome
change, Brad de Long's comments about his education notwithstanding (maybe his
experiences were exceptional). Most of us working on China have for a very
long time immersed ourselves in work on Europe, becoming familiar with issues
and perspectives coming from that body of work, and clearly that experience is
beginning to bear fruit, as the work of Ken Pomeranz, Bin Wong, and James Lee
(among others in the "California school") attests. Now that we are beginning
to have a global dialog, maybe we will make some progress on understanding
global processes.
Now to some comments on others' postings:
Greg Clark asserted (5/13/98) that prior to 1800, all economies in the
world were Malthusian "in the sense that living standards did NOT depend
directly on the production technology," but did depend on population dynamics.
The work that I have done on the part of South China called Lingnan (and here
I'll try to help Brad de Long begin to remember some of these regions of China
by offering a translation: "South of the Mountains"), indicates that that
region (Guangzhou/Canton and its hinterland, a very wealthy and "developed"
part of late imperial China) may well have begun to break with a Malthusian
regime in the second half of the eighteenth century, without having
experienced an "industrial revolution" (but perhaps an industrious one). But
that does not mean, as Greg suggests, that that important demographic change
arose only from family and social structure reasons, and not technological
developments. The evidence that I've developed (in my book, Tigers, Rice,
Silk, and Silt: Environment and Economy in Late Imperial South China) suggests
that in Lingnan, by the end of the 18th century grain prices and food supply
had become delinked from harvest quality, assuring food supplies to urban and
sub-urban residents and workders at reasonable prices, regardless of what the
harvest was.
The question is, Why? And here I would point to both technological
developments in agriculture, in particular irrigation and the use of various
techniques by which peasant farmers could get 5 or 6 harvests in two years
from the same plot of land, and to organizational changes, in particular the
development of a large, integrated, and efficient market for food grains, in
particular rice. In fact, the eighteenth-century grain market in Lingnan was
larger, more integrated, and more efficient (by various measures) than those
in the most developed parts of Europe, allowing for the development of a very
large and productive textile industry (both cotton and silk) in the Pearl
River delta, utilizing spinning wheels and looms worked (and powered) by
several individuals. In short, in at least one region of China ca. 1800, it
is likely that living standards were not "determined" by birth and death rates
(and their causes), although population dynamics undoubtedly remained
important.
None of this gets to the question of explaining the industrial revolution,
as Greg Clark wants, but it should cast doubt on some verities, perhaps
including the one that does away with the industrial revolution altogether in
favor of an industrious revolution. For once again, even if we go down that
route, historians working on China can demonstrate that China got that far
too, and by 1800.
So, yes, the work of yet another historian of China tends to support the
case that the differences between China and Europe appeared very late, around
1800 in Lingnan, or later than the 1750 date suggested by Alan Taylor. So
maybe we have to think about "the great bifurcation" as coming later than
1750. Which brings me to my last observation: in 1984 Braudel (in the
Structures of Everyday Life) had already identified "the gap," its late
appearance around 1800, and the need for explaining it, as the most important
item on historians' agendas. But contrary to the thrust of Alan Taylor's last
paragraph, it is not necessarily the Europeanists (e.g. the North/Landes/Jones
Eurocentric view summarized by Jack Goldstone) who are helping the most with
crafting an explanation (or perhaps more precisely, one that will hold up
globally given the historical evidence we now have for China). In fact,
I would submit that this whole debate is possible only because of the work
that Asianists in general, but those working on China in particular, have done
over the past 15 years. Gunder Frank is right: it's time for economic
historians to ReOrient their views.
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(5). Originally posted on eh.res.
Date: Fri, 15 May 1998 12:36:12 -0500
From: Gunder Frank <agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca>
Subject: EH.R: Frank versus Landes
================= EH.RES POSTING =================
Liebowitz requests more information from my book.
i'll see what i can do when i formulate some response.
but one of them is to inform that at the same SSHA meets in Chicago
Pomeranz is also an another panel
ORIENTING THE EUROPEAN 'MIRACLE": COMPARISONS, CONNECTIONS, CONJUNCTURES
along with Bin Wong, Gunder Frank as the other two paper givers, and
Jim Blaut and Bruce Cumings as discussants
organized by yours truly
gunder frank
Andre Gunder Frank
University of Toronto
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(6). Originally posted on eh.res.
Date: Fri, 15 May 1998 12:46:21 -0500
From: "Alan M. Taylor" <amt@nwu.edu>
Subject: EH.R: Frank versus Landes
================= EH.RES POSTING =================
Joshua Rosenbloom trenchantly points out:
>...As a purely logical matter,
>even if we accept the view that the "great bifurcation" in incomes did not
>emerge until sometime in the 18th century, it is not so obvious that the
>roots of the West's distinctive path in the last several centuries are not
>to be found in prior events. These may not have translated into discernable
>differences in economic prowess, but they may still have a long history.
I certainly agree. The great bifurcation may or may not have begun in 1800,
but that empirical question is (yes) totally separate from the question of
when and where any institutional/cultural/policy divergence began between
West and "not-West". Lags [and thus path dependence] could indeed be very
important.
Jonathan Liebowitz persuasively argues:
>1) I've been pleased at the turn this discussion has taken in the past few
>days
>and thank recent posters for their insightful comments. In that vein I hope
>Gunder Frank would give his counter-Landes interpretation of modern economic
>growth. (I know we can all read his forthcoming book, but ...
So I second that motion. Assume for the time being that post-1800 is where
the big empirical gaps are. Far from substituting for our purchase of his
400-page book, a few words from Frank might whet our appetite even more.
Can Frank say:
1) if he agrees that the great bifurcation post-1800 is the big issue;
2) whether institutional/cultural/policy differences across regions
mattered at that juncture (or else what did);
3) whether these institutional/cultural/policy differences, even if they
DIDN'T cause a pre-1800 bifurcation, nonetheless had very long-run
gestations over the preceding centuries.
The Rise of the West, sooner or later, has to come from somewhere.
Yours,
Alan M. Taylor
Hoover Institution and Northwestern University
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(7). Originally posted on eh.res.
Date: Fri, 15 May 1998 12:46:22 -0500
From: Brad De Long <delong@econ.Berkeley.EDU>
Subject: EH.R: Frank versus Landes
================= EH.RES POSTING =================
On Thu, 14 May 1998 Jack Goldstone wrote:
>There is emerging what I like to call the "California"
>school or interpretation of global economic history. This has been
>developed in good part by scholars in California, and holds that there
>were NO significant long-term advantages enjoyed by Europe over the main
>centers of civilization in Asia; that the level of technology, science,
>agriculture, and living standards were similar in these regions from 1000
>to 1800 AD, with Europe lagging if anything until nearly the end of this
>period; and that even the dynamics of political and social structures and
>conflicts in Asia and Europe were essentially similar from 1500 to 1850.
Living standards and agriculture I can buy. And "Technology" is complex:
are we talking rice seedlings, porcelain, or printing presses? Yet the
slope of European technological progress in the second millennium is very
impressive. By 1700 where outside of Europe are the equivalents of the
eyeglasses? The astrolabes? The microscopes? The logarithmic tables? The
lathes? The slide rules? The high-volume printing presses? The telescopes?
The escapement clocks? The grenades? The--advanced--cannon?
It is certainly true that eyeglasses, logarithms, screw-cutting lathes, and
printing presses churning out volumes by Erasmus don't mean beans
(directly) for sugar or cotton consumption in the Rhine or Thames delta
(and that grenades and cannon tend to make life a lot more nasty, brutal,
and short). But they mean a lot in terms of laying the groundwork for
further developments.
And science? 1800 is more than a century and a quarter past Newton.
And politics? Where is the William the Silent of Asia? Where is Magna
Carta? Where are the self-governing cities of Asia? Listen to only a few
speeches from Mahathir Muhammed or Lee Kuan Yu and you can't help but be
struck by the difference between their belief that rulers command and
people obey and the ideas that governments are instituted not to give
rulers the style of life to which they want to be accustomed but to secure
the people's natural rights,and that they derive their just powers from the
consent of the governed.
And as Alan Taylor eloquently pointed out, to reduce the European Miracle
from a ten-century to a two-century affair makes understanding and
accounting for it much, much harder...
Brad DeLong
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(8). Originally posted on H-ASIA.
Date: Fri, 15 May 1998 19:06:18 -0500
Reply-to: H-Net list for Asian History and Culture <H-ASIA@h-net.msu.edu>
Subject: H-Asia: A Discussion of World History - Landes Review
H-ASIA
May 15, 1998
============================
From: b.pavier@bilk.ac.uk
Subject: A Discussion of World History - Landes Review
It seems to me that the discussion is rapidly heading towards one of
those inconclusive academic wrangles, since it is missing the central
point of the central dynamic of social conflict. It is surely
pertinent that on the thirtieth anniversary of May 68 I last night
watched Indonesian students and workers taking charge of central
Jarkata and, hopefully, toppling Suharto and his corrupt and brutal
gang. Hopefully, this will be the start of a hot summer both in
Indonesia and in an increasing number of other countries.
This brings back the point that the driving force of world history is
class conflict - who takes part and who wins. In other words,
contrary to 'common-sense' assumptions of a large part of the
academic community, the future does really lie with old Karl Marx and
Fred Engels. Looking very briefly at a couple of examples, work in
recent years on C18 South Asia (notably, but not only, by Chris
Bayly) demonstrates how the East India Company's empire rested for
sixty years on collaboration with sophisticated and extensive
merchant classes. What comes out of a reading of this era is that,
with the exception of Tipu Sultan, no-one in South Asia realised
the nature of the people with whom they were dealing, and thus did
not undestand the dynamics of capitalism. The British were thus able
to wage a successful class struggle against these people in the first
three decades of the C19 - even though they had been formally ruling
them for the previous sixty years.
Secondly there is the instance of Muhammad Ali in Egypt. This ruler
attempted to modernise the Egyptian state and economy in the first
four decades of the C19 and to turn his state in the dominant one in
West Asia. The events of the period, and the response of the major
capitalist powers, especially Britain, clearly indicate that this was
a viable aspiration, and they then moved to crush the Egyptian
imperialist state.
Thus there is nothing inherent about who's more advanced than someone
else - it depends on the material conditions of a society and the
most important element in those is class conflict, inside particular
societies or between ruling classes in different societies.
The key seems to lie in the opening paragraph of the Communist
Manifesto - if class conflict is not resolved, then what results is
the mutual ruin of both contending classes. If you look at Asia it
seems to me to be that in China, South Asia, etc., the failure of
anyone to decisively win the class war meant that they became
vulnerable to the European bourgeoisie from those countries who had
achieved decisive victories in class struggles.
I realise that this may not be the most popular view with our
correspondents - however, it has the advantage of offering a general
explanation as to what happened.
Barry Pavier
Department of General Education,
Bradford and Ilkley Community College,
Bradford BD7 1AY,
UK
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(9). Originally posted on H-ASIA.
Date: Fri, 15 May 1998 19:06:18 -0500
Reply-to: H-Net list for Asian History and Culture <H-ASIA@h-net.msu.edu>
Subject: H-Asia: A Discussion of World History - Landes Review
From: "Thomas C. Bartlett" <T.Bartlett@latrobe.edu.au>
In reply to Jack Goldstone's interesting remarks, particularly his
reference to sholars who have "documented the extensive silver flows into
China......", I would like to add the name of William Atwell of Hobart and
William Smith College. I believe Atwelll's first publication on this
subject was done around 15 years ago, or more. Atwell is a historian of
China, not an economist, by primary training, according to my
understanding, so he may not have become so conspicuous among the people
involved in this debate. But he has recently spent time as a visiting
faculty member at U. Cal-Berkeley, which presumably would have put him in
close communication with some California-based scholars.
Atwell's work, as I remember it, showed dramatic oscillations in the inflow
of silver from abroad in the 17th century. This can be related to the
views of the 17th century Chinese scholar Gu Yanwu, whom I have studied.
Gu's writings make clear the highly negative view taken by this
conservative elite Confucian statecraft writer to the monetization of tax
payment in late Ming China. His argument is that the requirement to pay
taxes in silver impoverishes peasants and so causes social unrest. Gu
wrote an essay on this subject which is said to show remarkable
similarities to an essay written by his nephew when taking the civil
service examination in the 1670s. But, like many of Gu's opinion, this
recommendation was not implemented by the Qing.
Thomas Bartlett
La Trobe University
Melbourne, Australia
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(10). Posted here for the first time on H-WORLD.
From: Steve Muhlberger, Nipissing University
stevem@faculty.unipissing.ca
This is shaping up to be the best discussion since I joined this list.
Thanks to all the contributors. Keep it up.
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