Fw: Politico-military "pacification" in Chiapas

Fri, 15 May 1998 10:10:05 +0200
Austrian Embassy (austria@it.com.pl)

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> From: Le Monde diplomatique <dispatch@london.monde-diplomatique.fr>
> To: English edition dispatch <dispatch@london.monde-diplomatique.fr>
> Subject: Politico-military "pacification" in Chiapas
> Date: Donnerstag, 14. Mai 1998 16:50
>
> _________________________________________________________________
>
> A CENTRAL AMERICAN CLASSIC
>
> Politico-military "pacification" in Chiapas
>
>
> (translated from http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/dossiers/chiapas/ )
>
> At first glance, it would be both unjust and almost
> irrelevent to blame the Mexican authorities for the murder
> of 45 inhabitants of the Chiapas village Acteal on 22
> December 1997. As soon as the news broke out, President
> Ernesto Zedillo described the massacre as "cruel, absurd and
> unacceptable". On 3 January 1998 Minister of Interior Emilio
> Chuayffet tendered his resignation, followed on 7 January by
> Julio Cesar Ruiz Ferro, Governor of the State of Chiapas. As
> early as 9 January, 46 people were arrested and charged.
> Among them were the priista (1) mayor of Chenalho, Jacinto
> Arias Cruz (accused of providing the murderers with vehicles
> and weapons), and the director of public security of the
> State of Chiapas. After a swift investigation, 113 people
> were jailed.
>
> Control of the electorate in the federation's states,
> especially in rural areas, has long been in the hands of
> local oligarchies and casiques. Given the current discourse
> of the central government in support of a more democratic
> political system (witness the victory of Cuauhtemoc Cardenas
> of the Democratic Revolution Party as mayor of Mexico), it
> is hardly surprising to see local oligarchies distancing
> themselves from control from the centre, which they fear
> intends to change the rules of the game that have always
> assured them domination and impunity.
>
> But there is more to be said. On 26 December 1997 Jorge
> Madrazo, Attorney General of the Republic, went to the scene
> of the crime, expressed his solidarity with the victims and
> offered his explanation of the events. "Since the 1930s acts
> of great violence have been witnessed in the commune of
> Chenalho and other communes of Chiapas and this situation
> has unfortunately never disappeared. These conflicts can be
> labelled as inter-communal in the context of constant
> disputes between local political and economic powers. They
> also stem from the existence of religious diversity and,
> more recently, ideological divisions (2)".
>
> This is an overly simplistic explanation. Just between
> 1982-88, under the governorship of General Castellanos,
> human rights organisations recorded 153 political
> assassinations in Chiapas (inter-communal?), 692 abusive
> incarcerations (disputes?), 503 sequestrations accompanied
> by torture (religious diversity?), 407 expulsions of
> families from their communities, 54 expulsions from
> villages, 12 rapes and 29 attacks against protest movements.
>
> In 1988 and 1990, the state's penal code was revised,
> penalising various offences said to be "political",
> including the occupation of public roads and public
> buildings and "tumultuous" gatherings, all of which are
> traditional means of expression of peasant populations (3).
> This series of violations of basic rights was not unrelated
> to the January 1994 uprising and was a far cry from the
> usual "local disputes". On 23 January, in Kanasin (Yucatan),
> President Zedillo pledged not to use force to resolve the
> Chiapas conflict. This was all very well. But at the same
> time, the defence minister was sending several military
> detachments to the area to "re-establish a climate of
> security and avoid confrontations between rival groups".
>
> This is a return to a strategy developed in the 1980s in
> Central America by, among others, the Christian Democrats in
> Salvador: a democratic government "squeezed" between two
> extremes - of the far left and the far right - which did not
> differentiate between an armed social movement (the Frente
> Farabundo Marti de Liberacion Nacional - FMLN) and the death
> squads. And, on the pretext of fighting the death squads, it
> attacked the FMLN. It was no secret that a proliferation of
> paramilitary groups - Peace and Justice, the Chinchulines,
> the Red Mask, the Throat Cutters, the Alliance San Bartolome
> de los llanos, the Mixed Operations Brigades, the Indigenous
> Anti-Zapatista Revolutionary Movement, the Tomas Muntzer
> Community, etc. - were operating in Chiapas, sowing terror
> and causing massive population displacements, with the
> passive - if not active - complicity of the army and the
> authorities.
>
> An investigation revealed that former military and police
> personel had trained Red Mask, the group held responsible
> for the Acteal massacre. The arrest on 2 April of General
> Julio Cesar Santiago Diaz (until then in hiding) confirmed
> the involvement of the army at its highest level: the
> general commanded a detachment of 40 troops posted nearby,
> who could have prevented the tragedy, but failed to do so.
> This shows the strategy (and the real responsibility) of the
> authorities: the "militarisation" of a large portion of the
> territory and an appeal, albeit more discreet, to the
> paramilitary (by nature "uncontrollable") to embark on a
> sweeping repression of the whole social movement.
>
> The tragedy of Acteal is only one unfortunate "bungle" which
> came to public attention both because of its extent and,
> consequently, the reactions it produced - not only
> internationally. Negotiations carried out between the
> Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) and the
> government had allowed the signing in February 1996 of the
> San Andres Accords. Based on these accords, the Commission
> for Reconciliation and Peace (Cocopa), comprising delegates
> of all parties represented in parliament, presented a bill
> integrating their content into state legislation, which
> would mean a reform of the constitution.
>
> The minister of the interior, Francisco Labastida Ochoa said
> on 1 March 1998: "If the government signed the San Andres
> Accords, it was obviously to comply with them. The president
> of the republic has on numerous occasions stated that the
> government will stand by its commitment: this is not
> negotiable. Whoever says otherwise would be telling a lie.
> The Cocopa has drawn up a proposal of constitutional reform.
> This project has never been approved by the government. We
> have never committed ourselves in this area. Nothing has
> been signed". In fact, the authorities, alleging that
> indigenous autonomy and its effects would constitute an
> encroachment upon national sovereignty and the unity of
> Mexico, have reneged on their commitments.
>
> A government bill on constitutional reform presented on 15
> March 1998 by President Zedillo was rejected by the
> Zapatistas and by the main opposition party, the Democratic
> Revolution Party (PDR). The EZLN refuses to renew
> negotiations but the Zapatista social bases are unilaterally
> implementing the Accords by forming 38 autonomous
> municipios. More than the EZLN (which has not fired a single
> shot since January 1994), it is this process of pacific
> social organisation led by the indigenous people that the
> authorities intend to crush. As in Central America, where
> "the guerrilla moves amongst the people as fish in water",
> the objective is to take the water away from the fish. A
> large portion of the rural population of Chiapas now live in
> a state of military occupation. And the paramilitary groups
> have instituted a reign of terror. All the authorities need
> do is to restore the discretion necessary to any campaign
> aimed at regaining control. Since 1996, 4,435 foreigners
> have accessed the conflict zones, most of them members of
> some 200 non-governmental organisations (4).
>
> What we see here is, more or less, and without any formal
> link, a process successfully applied in Guatemala in the
> early 1990s: the presence of international observers with
> two major missions: to dissuade, by their presence,
> violations of human rights, and to spread information to the
> outside world. In the context of an official campaign
> against foreigners who are being accused of "manipulating
> the indigenous", some fifteen people were "shown out" of the
> country between 13 and 16 April. A 67 year-old Frenchman,
> Michel Chanteau, priest of Chenalhe for the past 32 years,
> was also expelled, accused of "pro-Zapatista activism"
> (three other members of the clergy had been similarly
> treated).
>
> Repression, isolation and silence: these are the ingredients
> which accompanied the "pacification" campaigns applied in
> Central America not so long ago.
>
> ______________________________________________
> (1) Member of the Institutional Revolutionary Party which
> has held power for over 60 years.
> (2) Le Mexique aujourd'hui, Information service of the Mexican
> embassy, Paris, no. 68-69, December 1997-January 1998.
> (3) "Rapport Mexique", Federation internationale des ligues
> des droits de l'homme (FIDH), no 251, February 1998.
> (4) El Pais, February 13 1998.
>
>
>
> MAURICE LEMOINE.
>
> <Maurice.Lemoine@Monde-diplomatique.fr>
>
>
> _________________________________________________________________
>
> See also :
>
> * The fourth world war has begun,
> by sub-commandante Marcos, août 1997.
> http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/en/1997/08-09/marcos.html
>
>
> On the Web
> ----------
>
> * EZLN. - http://www.ezln.org/
>
> * FZLN. - http://spin.com.mx/~floresu/FZLN/
>
> * Sipaz. - http://www.nonviolence.org/sipaz/
>
> * Tendance floue. - http://www.chez.com/tf/
>
> * Zapatistas in Cyberspace. -
> http://www.eco.utexas.edu/faculty/Cleaver/zapsincyber.html
>
>
>
> ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
> Le Monde diplomatique. - http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/md/
>
>
>