I'm think I'm not so well prepared to discuss properly about the long
economics cycles, because they don't belong to my discipline's
theoretical corpus, but I want to make some specifications about it.
First, and most important, the long cycles are models (not properly
mathematical models, but instead theoretical economy models which uses
the maths as justification) which try to match with reality. The
matching problem is, of course, data retrieval. I can accept that the
data of this century have signification for their intended use, but What
about the data of the 19th century? I hope that I don't say a non sense
if I doubt about their reliability. So, It isn't impossible that apply
the long cycles to periods long than this century is just to force the
reality to match the model.
Second, I'm not doubting about the utility of economics in the
description of reality, but I think that is extremely reductionist to
justify the entire sense of a major social dynamic just with economic
reasoning. Even the marx' sense of economics, being social, is
reductionist (yet useful), then the orthodox economic theory is simply
too reductionist for threat a major social dynamic with merely itself's
tools, even if the base of the dynamic is economic. Our sciences, our
knowledges if you prefer, are just not prepared to threat a social
dynamic properly, with more than a coarse approximation to reality.
If we don't use the economical approach, the nowadays discourse tends to
use the historical or even periodistics approach to social reality.
Then, the elements of the actual paradigm are used once and again, until
they proves directly that they don't match with the next problems. It
has no solution: it is not possible (or believable) to use superficial
elements to analyze the base elements. I want to propose you another
element for analyze the Asia's meltdown crisis: the cultural tension.
Indeed, I hope that there is no doubt about, at least, the partial
cultural base of the Asia's actual problem. It is not just a problem of
internal and external demand. If you talk about the long cycles, you
have to think in that countries, and in the entire world, long time ago.
Until not much time, the world wasn't the less-defined thing that now
is, or tend to be. The cultural differences exist as a almost
impenetrable barrier, and the sense of minor or even major elements of
reality (for dress to ideas about the economic circumstances) was very
different and very difficult to translate between cultural context.
Then, think about Asia's problem. That countries are (and will be, in
the near future) subject to a major cultural tension. Some of these
countries were colonies of Europe until not much time ago, the rest have
to adapt in a very short period of time (if you compare it with the
entire process in Europe or, even, in America). Then, Governments,
industries and population have had to change very, very quickly. The
extremely quick changes only can be if the changed item renounces to
part of its cultural identity; not just it; it also has to adapt the new
elements without time for give them a sense: tension is simply awesome.
The economical crisis have no definitive explanation; if they have so,
the crisis could be predicted. I'm don't talk about an EXCLUSIVE
cultural reason, nor a common cultural problem for all those countries.
Every country have, I think, a cultural tension, but it have different
shapes and ways of develop it directly dependent of the country
culture(s) and history(ies).
The long cycles are a MODEL which was created from the history of the
development of the capitalism and industrial revolution in Europe and
America. I think that you have to be cautious at its application to the
dynamics of the non-occidental world (the majority of the world). I
think that apply it without considering the cultural differences is,
simply, a nonsense.
Juan Luis Chulilla
Complutense university, Madrid
C/. de la Paz, 8 28012 Madrid, Spain.
e-mail: epaminon@ergos.es