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Kind regards
Arno Tausch
(technical note: use as a print-out font Courier 8 or Times Roman 8 point)
Dear AGF and colleagues,
I thank you for your interest in the long cycle/Asian-melt-down debate. Let
me emphasize here - in case that my recent posting did not come through -
how similar my own (Bornschierean) results are to colleague Thompson's
dating scheme, known especially from his superb piece published in Internat
Organization in 1990. To make matters more transparent still, I include
here my growth rate data series as well as details on calculation method
from Joshua Goldstein's classic publication in 1988, as well as my dating
scheme, adapted and expanded from Bornschier's 1988 German language
publication, available to you now via Transaction (1996/97) in an expanded
and extended version. This piece of European sociology should be known to
you all, and I am sure it will will influence the course of the future
debate. Note that Goldstein's series 1740 to 1975 is all about world
industrial production.
As to Andre Gunder: new social contracts determine the upswing, while
protest movements start (1917, 1968 etc.) more or less at the middle of the
long cycle, when the new technologies (productive forces) are already ripe,
while the productive relationships are still determined by the old cyclical
and societal contract. (That sounds like orthodox Marxism, but since
Giovanni's - I think correct - re-interpretation of the G-W-G' formula in
a cyclical fashion everything should be possible). Bornschiers excellent
data series about protest strikes suicide etc. along cycles further could
refine that argument.
So again, what is the beef (I hope without BSE): no long cycle melt down,
but an Arrighean semi-periphery 1 against 2 (possibly East Asia substituted
by India, possibly Tigers substituted China, possibly East Asia substituted
by Eastern Europe) ascent/decline process in the hierarchical world
economy, plus a pretty strong Juglar/Kuznets low. The upswing, dear
friends, - and this is where Arno Tausch the pessimist comes in - will be
severely constrained, though, by phenomena of the environment - which, are
more glaring than ever before (el Nino effect etc.).
So here are the details
1) the calculation method:
Let Xtn+1 be the index value of world production for tn+1; Xtn index value
of world production for tn
DYN = ((Xtn+1)/Xtn))-1
Post-1975 data: UN ECE; Fischer Weltalmanach, IMF. X is the time axis.
2) the data post 1975:
1975
-0,7
1976
4,8
1977
3,7
1978
4,1
1979
3
1980
0,4
1981
1,5
1982
-0,3
1983
2,8
1984
4,9
1985
3,4
1986
2,6
1987
3,4
1988
4,3
1989
3,6
1990
2,5
1991
0,8
1992
1,7
1993
0,9
1994
2,8
1995
2,1
1996
2,3
1997
2,5
please note that Goldstein's data series ends in 1975.
1740 - 1975
1741
-4,8
1742
10,1
1743
-4,6
1744
14,3
1745
-4,2
1746
4,4
1747
4,1
1748
8,1
1749
-11,1
1750
12,5
1751
0
1752
0
1753
3,7
1754
-3,5
1755
3,7
1756
-10,7
1757
4
1758
0
1759
-3,9
1760
0
1761
4,8
1762
0
1763
-3,9
1764
8,1
1765
0
1766
14,8
1767
0
1768
-3,2
1769
6,6
1770
-3,1
1771
0
1772
9,7
1773
-5,9
1774
-6,2
1775
3,3
1776
3,3
1777
3,1
1778
3,1
1779
-5,9
1780
0
1781
-3,1
1782
19,4
1783
-2,7
1784
2,8
1785
18,9
1786
4,5
1787
2,2
1788
-2,1
1789
19,6
1790
-1,8
1791
1,9
1792
7,3
1793
-13,6
1794
3,9
1795
5,7
1796
7,1
1797
-8,3
1798
9,1
1799
18,3
1800
5,6
1801
-5,3
1802
5,6
1803
1,3
1804
2,6
1805
2,6
1806
1,2
1807
3,7
1808
-4,8
1809
2,5
1810
8,5
1811
5,6
1812
-6,4
1813
1,1
1814
1,1
1815
11,1
1816
0
1817
0
1818
20
1819
-8,3
1820
0
1821
0
1822
9,1
1823
8,3
1824
0
1825
7,7
1826
-7,2
1827
15,4
1828
6,7
1829
-6,2
1830
13,3
1831
0
1832
-5,9
1833
12,5
1834
5,6
1835
5,3
1836
10
1837
-9,1
1838
10
1839
9,1
1840
0
1841
0
1842
-4,2
1843
4,4
1844
12,5
1845
7,4
1846
0
1847
-3,5
1848
10,7
1849
0
1850
0
1851
9,7
1852
8,8
1853
8
1854
5
1855
4,7
1856
9,1
1857
-2,1
1858
0
1859
6,4
1860
6
1861
0
1862
-11,3
1863
8,5
1864
5,9
1865
1,8
1866
14,5
1867
-1,6
1868
8,1
1869
4,5
1870
-2,8
1871
8,8
1872
10,8
1873
-1,2
1874
0
1875
-2,5
1876
3,8
1877
1,2
1878
2,4
1879
2,3
1880
8,1
1881
5,3
1882
7
1883
3,8
1884
-2,7
1885
-1
1886
5,7
1887
8
1888
4,2
1889
8,7
1890
5,1
1891
1,4
1892
1,4
1893
-3,3
1894
3,5
1895
9,5
1896
2,5
1897
4,8
1898
9,2
1899
7,4
1900
0,5
1901
3,9
1902
8
1903
2,2
1904
0,4
1905
10,2
1906
4,6
1907
2,9
1908
-8,2
1909
9,7
1910
7,1
1911
1,7
1912
8,8
1913
4,8
1914
-8,9
1915
3,1
1916
7,6
1917
0,8
1918
-5,9
1919
-8,3
1920
5,8
1921
-14,1
1922
22,5
1923
5,2
1924
5,8
1925
8,1
1926
3,3
1927
6,6
1928
4,6
1929
7,3
1930
-12,3
1931
-13,2
1932
-14,4
1933
12,6
1934
11,2
1935
11,7
1936
12,7
1937
10,1
1938
-10,4
1939
17
1940
7,4
1941
19,4
1942
16,7
1943
13,9
1944
-5,1
1945
-30,7
1946
-14,9
1947
12,6
1948
7,5
1949
2
1950
13,7
1951
8,6
1952
2,4
1953
7,4
1954
0
1955
11,9
1956
4,9
1957
3,3
1958
-2,6
1959
11,3
1960
6,6
1961
3,6
1962
6,6
1963
5,1
1964
8,2
1965
7,4
1966
7,9
1967
1,5
1968
6,3
1969
7,4
1970
2,1
1971
2
1972
7,8
1973
9,1
1974
0,8
4) The dating schemes:
The turning points in the long waves between the ascents and decline phases
(B-phases) were always the beginnings of political decay in the region of
Eastern Europe as well, while the ascent phases were associated with
authoritarian modernization; time-lags between the Western cycle and the
Eastern semi-periphery and periphery have to be admitted. The
decisive-kairos-years are:
1509
1539
1575
1621
1689
1756
1832/48
1884
1933
1982
Source: our own compilations from Goldstein and our own data
interpretations after 1740, based on Goldstein. It should be recalled, that
there is another tradition - based on Braudel - to view the cycle, that
begins in 1689, as ending in 1747, to be followed by a 1747 - 1790 cycle,
and a 1790 - 1848 cycle (for a debate about these issues, see especially
Amin, 1997).
The logic of the Kondratieff waves from 1756 onwards are given as follows:
social process cycle 1756-1835/41
basic project defeudalization
prosperity reform compulsory education,
conscription; American and
French Revolution;
Joseph II (Austria)
mid-cycle conflict wars of the French Revolution,
Napoleonic wars
Poland: 1807 Duchy of Warsaw
technological change
basic industrial steam engine (end 18th century)
projects 'Spinning Jenny' (J. Stargreave, 1770)
new technologies steam locomotive 'Puffing Billy'
emerging during (W. Hadley, 1813)
prosperity re-
cession
Unresolved problem freedom of association
crisis of the model revolution 1830
Poland: rebellion 1830/31
international regime
A-phase British naval
dominance (George III)
B-phase 'congress of Vienna'-regime
dominant economic
theory A. Smith, 1776
political economy of
world system D. Ricardo, 1817
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------
social process cycle 1835/42-83 1884-1932 1933-81
basic project freedom of market enlargement welfare
and enterprise of participa- state,
tion corporatism
prosperity reform freedom of asso- social secu- educational
ciation rity, parlia- reform,
mentarism civil
rights,
emancipation
of women
mid-cycle conflict wars and civil Eastern Europe: Vietnam war,
wars Revolution world student
Poland: revolution 1905 rebellion
1863/64 1968
strikes,
terrorism
Polish
Winter 1970
technological change
basic industrial railway, steel, oil,
inputs and steamship electricity, synthetics,
technological electric automobile
projects motor
new technologies steel petrochemicals chips
emerging during
prosperity re-
cession
unresolved prob-
lem enlargement relationship basic income
of participation capital, la- environment
bour, state unequal
exchange
crisis of the
model revolution revolution contestation
1871 1917 of the model
Poland: Poland: from 1968
socialist strikes onwards
movement peasant
1880s uprisings Poland:
1936/37 Summer 1980
international regime
A-phase liberal mercantilism Bretton
world trade Woods
B-phase -"- hypermercan- neo-
tilism protectio-
nism
dominant eco-
nomic
theory J. St. Mill, A. Marshall, J.M. Keynes,
1848 1890 1936
political economy
of
world system K. Marx, 1867 R. Hilferding, K. Polanyi,
1910 1944
The danger is of course, that the Cold-War structure will be substituted by
a new power rivalry between the former members of the winning coalition of
World War II:
Hegemonic wars in the world system from 1495 onwards
Role in War Thirty Years War Napoleonic WW I+II
losing hegemonic
contender Hapsburgs France Germany
new hegemony Netherlands Britain USA
newly emerging
challenger: eco-
nomically deci-
mated member of
winning coalition France Germany China+
Russia
past
contender for
systemic hegemony,
joining the war
effort of the
winning coalition Sweden Hapsburgs France
Portugal
The former hegemonic contenders slowly slide into an acceptance of their
status in the international system. The real power struggle erupts already
soon after the great hegemonic war, and through the ups and downs of the
history of the system evolves slowly into the hegemonic challenge. Seen in
such a way, not 1989, but Korea and Vietnam could become rather the
benchmarks of the future W-structure of conflict in the international
arena. For the foreign policies of the European Union, it is also important
to notice the following tendency: German-Russian alliances tend to happen
during depressions, and they break up during the economic upswings of the
world system, when, especially during waning hegemonies, re-colonization
phases set it (Amin, 1997, partially based on Bergesen):
Khol + Gorbi/Boris 1985 ff.
Rapallo 1922
Bismarck's Three Emperor Alliance 1873
Holy Alliance 1815
Alliance Russia-Germany 1764
Nordic War 1700-1721
The relationship of the Kondratieff and Kuznets cycles with Russian history
is the following:
Reforms
KONDRATIEFF Perestroika, Lenin's NEP,
OR KUZNETS Great Reforms 1861,
DOWNSWING Katharinas Assembly 1775
Nobility's Victory 1730,
Split of the State Church 1653,
Boris Godunow 1598-1605
Repressive Modernization
KONDRATIEFF Joseph Stalin,
OR KUZNETS Imperialistic Expansion
UPSWING and Repressive Industria-
lization at the end of 19. th century
Nikolas the
Gendarme of Europe,
Elisabeth's expansionist
policy,
Peter the Great,
Michael III,
Iwan the Terrible
Reform Repression
<----------------------------------------------------------------->
1985 'Gorbi' <--------------> 1928 Stalin
57 Years
64 Years 47 Years
1921 NEP <--------------> Alexander III
40 Years
60 Years 56 Years
1861 Great Reforms <--------------> Nikolas I 1825
36 Years
86 Years 84 Years
1775 Constituent <--------------> Elisabeth's expansionist rule
Assembly 34 Years 1741
45 Years 52 Years
1730 Victory of <--------------> Peter I 1689
Nobility 41 Years
77 Years 76 Years
Church Split 1653<--------------> Michael III 1613
40 Years
55 Years 48 Years
Boris Godunow 1598 <--------------> Iwan's 'Oprichina' 1565
33 Years
Average periods of Russian history:
Perestroika <--------------> authoritarian modernization
40 Years
64.5 Years 60.5 Years
_____________________________________________________
Seen in such a way, there is even little that the West seems to be able to
do to stabilize democracy in Russia. However, the return of East Central
Europe towards a 'middle of the road' and sensible philosophy - whatever
the color of the government (Orenstein, 1996) - seems to be an urgent
necessity, after the ups and downs of central planning and 'the central
market principle'.
------=_NextPart_000_01BCFFE6.728F82E0
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I hope this message comes through in a =
technically acceptable manner.
Kind regards
Arno =
Tausch
(technical note: use as a print-out font Courier 8 or =
Times Roman 8 point)
Dear AGF and colleagues,
I thank you =
for your interest in the long cycle/Asian-melt-down debate. Let me =
emphasize here - in case that my recent posting did not come through - =
how similar my own (Bornschierean) results are to colleague Thompson's =
dating scheme, known especially from his superb piece published in =
Internat Organization in 1990. To make matters more transparent still, I =
include here my growth rate data series as well as details on =
calculation method from Joshua Goldstein's classic publication in 1988, =
as well as my dating scheme, adapted and expanded from Bornschier's 1988 =
German language publication, available to you now via Transaction =
(1996/97) in an expanded and extended version. This piece of European =
sociology should be known to you all, and I am sure it will will =
influence the course of the future debate. Note that Goldstein's series =
1740 to 1975 is all about world industrial production.
As to =
Andre Gunder: new social contracts determine the upswing, while protest =
movements start (1917, 1968 etc.) more or less at the middle of the long =
cycle, when the new technologies (productive forces) are already ripe, =
while the productive relationships are still determined by the old =
cyclical and societal contract. (That sounds like orthodox Marxism, but =
since Giovanni's - I think correct - re-interpretation of the =
G-W-G' formula in a cyclical fashion everything should be possible). =
Bornschiers excellent data series about protest strikes suicide etc. =
along cycles further could refine that argument.
So again, what =
is the beef (I hope without BSE): no long cycle melt down, but an =
Arrighean semi-periphery 1 against 2 (possibly East Asia substituted by =
India, possibly Tigers substituted China, possibly East Asia substituted =
by Eastern Europe) ascent/decline process in the hierarchical world =
economy, plus a pretty strong Juglar/Kuznets low. The upswing, dear =
friends, - and this is where Arno Tausch the pessimist comes in - will =
be severely constrained, though, by phenomena of the environment - =
which, are more glaring than ever before (el Nino effect =
etc.).
So here are the details
1) the =
calculation method:
Let Xtn+1 be the index value of world =
production for tn+1; Xtn index value of world production for =
tn
DYN =3D =
((Xtn+1)/Xtn))-1
Post-1975 data: UN ECE; Fischer Weltalmanach, =
IMF. X is the time axis.
2) the data post =
1975:
1975
-0,7
1976
4,8
1977
3,7
1978
4,1
3
1980
0,4
1981
1,5
1982
-0,3
1983
2,8
4,9
1985
3,4
1986
2,6
1987
3,4
1988
4,3=
1989
3,6
1990
2,5
1991
0,8
1992
1,7
1993
0=
,9
1994
2,8
1995
2,1
1996
2,3
1997
2,5
ple=
ase note that Goldstein's data series ends in 1975.
1740 - =
1975
1741
-4,8
1742
10,1
1743
-4,6
1744
1=
4,3
1745
-4,2
1746
4,4
1747
4,1
1748
8,1
1749<=
br>-11,1
1750
12,5
1751
0
1752
0
1753
3,7
1754=
-3,5
1755
3,7
1756
-10,7
1757
4
1758
0
175=
9
-3,9
1760
0
1761
4,8
1762
0
1763
-3,9
176=
4
8,1
1765
0
1766
14,8
1767
0
1768
-3,2
176=
9
6,6
1770
-3,1
1771
0
1772
9,7
1773
-5,9
1=
774
-6,2
1775
3,3
1776
3,3
1777
3,1
1778
3,1
-5,9
1780
0
1781
-3,1
1782
19,4
1783
-2=
,7
1784
2,8
1785
18,9
1786
4,5
1787
2,2
1788
1789
19,6
1790
-1,8
1791
1,9
1792
7,3
1=
793
-13,6
1794
3,9
1795
5,7
1796
7,1
1797
-8,3=
1798
9,1
1799
18,3
1800
5,6
1801
-5,3
1802
1803
1,3
1804
2,6
1805
2,6
1806
1,2
1807<=
br>3,7
1808
-4,8
1809
2,5
1810
8,5
1811
5,6
18=
12
-6,4
1813
1,1
1814
1,1
1815
11,1
1816
0
=
1817
0
1818
20
1819
-8,3
1820
0
1821
0
1822=
9,1
1823
8,3
1824
0
1825
7,7
1826
-7,2
182=
7
15,4
1828
6,7
1829
-6,2
1830
13,3
1831
0
=
1832
-5,9
1833
12,5
1834
5,6
1835
5,3
1836
10<=
br>1837
-9,1
1838
10
1839
9,1
1840
0
1841
0
-4,2
1843
4,4
1844
12,5
1845
7,4
1846
0<=
br>1847
-3,5
1848
10,7
1849
0
1850
0
1851
9,7<=
br>1852
8,8
1853
8
1854
5
1855
4,7
1856
9,1
-2,1
1858
0
1859
6,4
1860
6
1861
0
18=
62
-11,3
1863
8,5
1864
5,9
1865
1,8
1866
14,5<=
br>1867
-1,6
1868
8,1
1869
4,5
1870
-2,8
1871
=
8,8
1872
10,8
1873
-1,2
1874
0
1875
-2,5
1876<=
br>3,8
1877
1,2
1878
2,4
1879
2,3
1880
8,1
188=
1
5,3
1882
7
1883
3,8
1884
-2,7
1885
-1
188=
6
5,7
1887
8
1888
4,2
1889
8,7
1890
5,1
189=
1
1,4
1892
1,4
1893
-3,3
1894
3,5
1895
9,5
=
1896
2,5
1897
4,8
1898
9,2
1899
7,4
1900
0,5
3,9
1902
8
1903
2,2
1904
0,4
1905
10,2<=
br>1906
4,6
1907
2,9
1908
-8,2
1909
9,7
1910
7=
,1
1911
1,7
1912
8,8
1913
4,8
1914
-8,9
1915
1916
7,6
1917
0,8
1918
-5,9
1919
-8,3
19=
20
5,8
1921
-14,1
1922
22,5
1923
5,2
1924
5,8<=
br>1925
8,1
1926
3,3
1927
6,6
1928
4,6
1929
7,=
3
1930
-12,3
1931
-13,2
1932
-14,4
1933
12,6
1=
934
11,2
1935
11,7
1936
12,7
1937
10,1
1938
-1=
0,4
1939
17
1940
7,4
1941
19,4
1942
16,7
1943<=
br>13,9
1944
-5,1
1945
-30,7
1946
-14,9
1947
12,6=
1948
7,5
1949
2
1950
13,7
1951
8,6
1952
2,=
4
1953
7,4
1954
0
1955
11,9
1956
4,9
1957
3=
,3
1958
-2,6
1959
11,3
1960
6,6
1961
3,6
1962<=
br>6,6
1963
5,1
1964
8,2
1965
7,4
1966
7,9
196=
7
1,5
1968
6,3
1969
7,4
1970
2,1
1971
2
197=
2
7,8
1973
9,1
1974
0,8
4) =
The dating schemes:
The turning points in the long waves =
between the ascents and decline phases (B-phases) were always the =
beginnings of political decay in the region of Eastern Europe as well, =
while the ascent phases were associated with authoritarian =
modernization; time-lags between the Western cycle and the Eastern =
semi-periphery and periphery have to be admitted. The =
decisive-kairos-years =
are:
1509
1539
1575
1621
1689
1756
1832/48
18=
84
1933
1982
Source: our own compilations from Goldstein =
and our own data interpretations after 1740, based on Goldstein. It =
should be recalled, that there is another tradition - based on Braudel - =
to view the cycle, that begins in 1689, as ending in 1747, to be =
followed by a 1747 - 1790 cycle, and a 1790 - 1848 cycle (for a debate =
about these issues, see especially Amin, 1997).
The logic of the =
Kondratieff waves from 1756 onwards are given as =
follows:
social process cycle =
1756-1835/41
basic =
project defeudalization
prosperity =
reform compulsory =
education,
conscription; American =
and
French =
Revolution;
Joseph II =
(Austria)
mid-cycle conflict wars of the French =
Revolution,
Napoleonic =
wars
Poland: 1807 Duchy of =
Warsaw
technological change
basic =
industrial steam engine (end 18th =
century)
projects 'Spinning Jenny' (J. Stargreave, =
1770)
new technologies steam locomotive 'Puffing =
Billy'
emerging during (W. Hadley, 1813)
prosperity =
re-
cession
Unresolved problem freedom of =
association
crisis of the model revolution =
1830
Poland: rebellion =
1830/31
international =
regime
A-phase British =
naval
dominance (George =
III)
B-phase 'congress of =
Vienna'-regime
dominant =
economic
theory A. Smith, =
1776
political economy of
world system D. =
Ricardo, =
1817
---------------------------------------------------------=
----------------------------------------
social =
process cycle =
1835/42-83 1884-1932 1933-81
basic =
project freedom of =
market enlargement welfare
and =
enterprise of =
participa- state,
tion&=
#009; corporatism
prosperity reform freedom =
of asso- social =
secu- educational
ciation �=
9;rity, =
parlia- reform,
mentari=
sm civil
&#=
009;rights,
eman=
cipation
of =
women
mid-cycle conflict wars and =
civil Eastern Europe: Vietnam =
war,
wars Revolution wor=
ld student
Poland: =
revolution 1905 rebellion
1863=
/64 1968
&#=
009; strikes,
�=
09; terrorism
�=
09; Polish
=
Winter 1970
technological change
basic =
industrial railway, steel, oil,
input=
s =
and steamship electricity, synthetics,
projects motor
new =
technologies steel petrochemicals chips
eme=
rging during
prosperity re-
cession
unresolved =
prob-
lem enlargement relationship &#=
009;basic income
of participation capital, =
la- environment
bour, =
state unequal
�=
09; exchange
crisis of =
the
model revolution revolution =
;contestation
1871 1917 =
of the =
model
Poland: Poland: from =
1968
socialist strikes o=
nwards
movement peasant =
1880s uprisings Poland:=
1936/37 Summer =
1980
international =
regime
A-phase liberal mercantilis=
m Bretton
world =
trade Woods
B-phase &#=
009;-"- hypermercan- neo-
=
; tilism protectio-
�=
9; nism
dominant =
eco-
nomic
theory J. St. Mill, A. =
Marshall, J.M. =
Keynes,
1848 1890 =
1936
political economy
of
world =
system K. Marx, 1867 R. Hilferding, K. =
Polanyi,
1910 194=
4
The danger is of course, that the Cold-War structure will be =
substituted by a new power rivalry between the former members of the =
winning coalition of World War II:
Hegemonic wars in the world =
system from 1495 onwards
Role in War Thirty Years =
War Napoleonic WW I+II
losing =
hegemonic
contender Hapsburgs France =
Germany
new =
hegemony Netherlands Britain USA
=
newly emerging
challenger: eco-
nomically deci-
mated member =
of
winning =
coalition France Germany China+
=
; Russia
past
co=
ntender for
systemic hegemony,
joining the war
effort of =
the
winning =
coalition Sweden Hapsburgs France
�=
09; Portugal
The former hegemonic =
contenders slowly slide into an acceptance of their status in the =
international system. The real power struggle erupts already soon after =
the great hegemonic war, and through the ups and downs of the history of =
the system evolves slowly into the hegemonic challenge. Seen in such a =
way, not 1989, but Korea and Vietnam could become rather the benchmarks =
of the future W-structure of conflict in the international arena. For =
the foreign policies of the European Union, it is also important to =
notice the following tendency: German-Russian alliances tend to happen =
during depressions, and they break up during the economic upswings of =
the world system, when, especially during waning hegemonies, =
re-colonization phases set it (Amin, 1997, partially based on =
Bergesen):
Khol + Gorbi/Boris 1985 ff.
Rapallo =
1922
Bismarck's Three Emperor Alliance 1873
Holy Alliance =
1815
Alliance Russia-Germany 1764
Nordic War =
1700-1721
The relationship of the Kondratieff and Kuznets =
cycles with Russian history is the =
following:
Reforms
KONDRATIEF=
F Perestroika, Lenin's NEP,
OR =
KUZNETS Great Reforms =
1861,
DOWNSWING Katharinas Assembly =
1775
Nobility's Victory =
1730,
Split of the State Church =
1653,
Boris Godunow =
1598-1605
Repressive =
Modernization
KONDRATIEFF Joseph =
Stalin,
OR KUZNETS Imperialistic =
Expansion
UPSWING and Repressive =
Industria-
lization at the end of 19. =
th century
Nikolas =
the
Gendarme of =
Europe,
Elisabeth's =
expansionist
policy,
�=
9; Peter the Great,
Michael =
III,
Iwan the =
Terrible
Reform Repression<=
br><-----------------------------------------------------------------&=
gt;
1985 =
'Gorbi' <--------------> 1928 =
Stalin
57 Years
64 =
Years 47 Years
1921 =
NEP <--------------> Alexander =
III
40 Years
60 =
Years 56 Years
1861 =
Great Reforms <--------------> Nikolas I =
1825
36 Years
86 =
Years 84 Years
1775 =
Constituent <--------------> Elisabeth's =
expansionist =
rule
Assembly =
;34 Years 1741
45 =
Years 52 Years
1730 =
Victory of <--------------> Peter I =
1689
Nobility 41 =
Years
77 Years 76 =
Years
Church Split =
1653<--------------> Michael III =
1613
40 Years
55 =
Years 48 Years
Boris =
Godunow 1598 <--------------> Iwan's 'Oprichina' =
1565
33 Years
Average periods of =
Russian =
history:
Perestroika <--------------> &#=
009;authoritarian modernization
40 =
Years
64.5 Years 60.5 =
Years
_____________________________________________________