Well whether Arnoor I are right or wrong about the future , IT will
tell. But about the past, he is wrong at least on Kondratieffs - if any
-since the last ones were DOWN 1913-40/45, UP till 1967, DOWN since 1967,
and the question comes whether the mid 1990s or early 2000s represent the
BEGINNINGS or not of another UP [ which does not aboviate cyclical
recession.financial crises, such as 1907 in the US as it was moving up
in the 1997-1913 UP, or the 1949,1953,1958, etc recessions that startred
in the US [except 1967 was attenuated there by Vietnam war] while it WAS
up - and not incidentaly each - till now! - has generated a US military
escalation and/or war in EACH redcessioon since WW II, including notably
the second cold war in 1979 [Nato 2 track, Nato 3% real expenmditure
increase, China card vs USSR and dumping Nixon's detente BEFORE the Sov
Union invaed Afghanistan in Decemvber 79 - and initiated by CARTER
[who also appointed Paul Volker to the Fed in 79] and only continuied by
Ronal Reagan nad hbis star war military keynseanism - which is what kept
all THE EST afloat during the 80s, and sunk the USSR. Of course in the
89-92 recession Bush started the Gulf War. Is the Clinton's sabre
rattling vs Iraq again now a sign that the US is facing another recession?
Dear Arno, Peter too!: you have some historical perspective, so USE it! =
oh, and the original/real POINT is that East Asia is moving OUT of the periphery into
the 'center' which the US is obliged to vacate
respectfully submitted
gunder frank
On Tue, 25 Nov 1997, Austrian Embassy wrote:
> Date: Tue, 25 Nov 1997 12:34:13 +0100
> From: Austrian Embassy <austria@it.com.pl>
> To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK <wsn@csf.colorado.edu>
> Subject: Re: Asian Miracle Meltdown
>
> Dear Peter and all colleagues -
>
> this is a most interesting argument. As always, Samir Amin has something
> fundamental to offer. I think, on this point, our friend Samir is right,
> and our friend Andre Gunder is wrong - the semi-periphery is under a
> constant threat of a long-run current account deficit.
>
> I agree with you Peter on your diagnosis about South Korea, but not on
> Japan. Japan will recover, and Japan is a centre.
>
> However - folks, this is not a melt-down either, but the beginning of
> either a Jugar or Kuznets-cycle low, and, according to my calculations, not
> at any rate connected with a Kondratieff (the last one was from 1932 to
> around 1982). Chris put up my empirical recent stuff at the archive for you
> all to read - I think the evidence is clear on this point.
>
> Kind regards from Warsaw
>
> Arno Tausch
>
> ----------
> > From: Peter Grimes <p34d3611@jhu.edu>
> > To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK <wsn@csf.colorado.edu>
> > Subject: Asian Miracle Meltdown
> > Date: Dienstag, 25. November 1997 10:20
> >
> > List Folk;
> >
> > I am no expert on either SE Asia or high finance, but I do have some
> > knowledge of basic economics. As Jackson Browne once wrote:
> >
> > "I've been waiting for something to happen,
> > For a week or a month or a year...
> >
> > You might ask what it takes to remember,
> > When you know that you've seen it before..."
> >
> > Samir Amin pointed out in 1976 ("Accumulation on a World Scale")
> that
> > inflows of foriegn investment produce temporary high growth rates for the
> > recipient country, but those growth rates collapse once the investment
> matures
> > (e.g--stops purchasing local contractors for constructing the local
> factories)
> > and assumes its intended function of exporting products to the intended
> > markets of the core. Remember the "Brazilian Miracle"? The "Japanese
> > Miracle"? Granted, there were important differences in the roles that
> the
> > Asian states played in handling the distribution of the incoming capital,
> and
> > there is no doubt that the cold war encouraged the US govt to provide
> grants
> > and loans to Japan and S. Korea that were on terms far easier than would
> have
> > been imaginable elsewhere. But the bottom line for upward mobility in
> the
> > world-system applies equally harshly to all: WITHOUT THE DEVELOPMENT OF
> AN
> > INTERNAL MARKET (local effective demand), EXPORT-LED DEVELOPMENT IS
> DEPENDENT
> > ON CORE MARKETS. Hence down-turns in the core translate into free-falls
> for
> > the exporters.
> > The collapse of the banks, currencies, and stock markets are
> > epiphenomena, SYMPTOMS of the real problem. Failures by influential
> debtors
> > to make good on their loan payments is--however distantly--attached to
> their
> > failure to sell real products, whether locally or abroad. They are
> caught in
> > a double-bind: successful export promotion depends not only on the
> presence
> > of markets in the core (read high wages for the core working classes),
> but on
> > suppression of high wages at home. Yet, at the same time, true upward
> > mobility in the world-economy depends precisely on the development of a
> > vibrant home market that in turn requires high local wages. Clearly
> there is
> > a contradiction here: one cannot have both. For a time, both Japan and
> Korea
> > seemed to evade this contradiction by the erection of trade barriers. It
> > allowed them the luxury of permitting some real democracy and consequent
> hikes
> > in wages. But this could only be a transient solution, at best. In the
> Brave
> > New World of the WTO, this protection is becoming increasingly
> non-viable.
> > Now that they are becoming increasingly exposed to the harsh glare of
> genuine
> > competition from imports, the demand for locally produced commodities is
> > dwindling, capitalists must therefore default on their loans, banks must
> fail,
> > and currency devaluation is the only way to fight back.
> > One final note. The defeat of labor in the core has compelled that
> > outlet for exports from Asia shrink, while the difference between the
> > shrinking core wages and their continued willingness to purchase is made
> up
> > entirely by consumer credit-card debt. In essence the effective demand
> of the
> > core is constructed entirely of credit-card debt with interest rates near
> 20%.
> > This cannot last forever. Pending some form of income re-distribution, I
> am
> > reminded of the words of Marx in Vol III: "The real barrier to the
> expansion
> > of Capital is Capital itself". --Peter Grimes
> >
>
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Andre Gunder Frank
University of Toronto
96 Asquith Ave Tel. 1 416 972-0616
Toronto, ON Fax. 1 416 972-0071
CANADA M4W 1J8 Email agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca
Some Home/Web Pages:
http://www.chass.utoronto.ca:8080/~agfrank/gunder97.html
http://csf.colorado.edu/wsystes/archive/bios/gunder/gunder97cd.html
http://csf.colorado.edu/authors
gopher://csf.colorado.edu/11/psn/authors/frank.gunder
gopher://csf.colorado.edu/11/wsystems.pubs
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