I offer a few comments with some trepidation generated from two sources:
first, I have been following this interesting discussion only
sporadically; second, my approach to theory is somewhat more eclectic
than many (though certainly not all) of the contributors to this list.
I don't consider the latter to be a general handicap but will admit in
advance that it can certainly be read as such in specific instances. If
you don't read the world through a particular theoretical lens--a
failing which I may overcome (or succumb to) in time--you invariably
encounter inconsistencies. Here I console myself on two fronts: I am
not convinced that there is a theoretical framework which can truly
claim to escape all inconsistencies; and I am leaning toward the notion
that inconsistencies are an inherent part of reality--whether that
reality is socially constructed or not.
Richard K. Moore wrote:
>
> Capitalism is organized on a global scale. Hence resistance to capitalist
> domination must also involve a global strategy and global action. This
> much everyone here seems to agree with.
I am willing to accept the first claim regarding the global nature of
capitalism but must withhold judgment with respect to the third claim of
unanimity, given my acknowledged lack of familiarity with all the
previous postings. I do, however, take issue with the middle claim. It
is presented as though it follows with some logical necessity from the
first claim, which of course it does not. Moreover, even a cursory
survey of some other disciplines which entertain the notion of
non-linear dynamics--economics, evolutionary biology, physics, to name a
few--should surely raise the question of whether this claim has an
unassailable or even defensible empirical, contingent foundation.
I suggest that in journal after journal, across disciplines, we are
increasingly faced with examples of seemingly globally insignificant
quantitative disturbances effecting qualitative (global, systemic)
change. Why is it, then, that we insist that socio/political/economic
systemic change must occur through a global anti-systemic movement or a
variation of some Gramscian counter-hegemonic collaboration? I am not
summarily ruling these out but, at the same time, I am not convinced
that these are the only options.
I am not suggesting that 'social scientific answers' will be found by
grasping for the holy grail of the so-called 'hard sciences'. That
grail is largely illusory, in my opinion. In light of the accumulating
literature in the philosophy and history of science, the sociology of
knowledge, and so on, which clearly establishes the social, political,
cultural, and economic influences which impact various research
programmes, I do think it is worth reflecting upon the question of why
the social sciences--and especially those social scientists committed to
change--are so recalcitrant in developing new notions of social cause
and effect. Are we committed and theory-bound to the point of unhealthy
constipation?
> Our Western nation states, even though they have long been co-opted by
> capitalist forces, nonetheless offer us by far the most accessible and
> powerful platform from which to launch any kind of counter offensive.
I am not convinced that this is the case either. There are several
theoretically driven 'histories' of the emergence of the nation-state.
(Fortunately, most social sciences, including International Relations,
now recognize that nation-states do have a history.) This being the
case, I think it is fair to say that--whichever history you adopt--the
nation-state developed in response to spatially and temporally specific
circumstances. Since its inception, it has undoubtedly and profoundly
impacted social organization and modes of thought. It is by no means
clear to me, however, that the present historical juncture is such that
the nation-state is either 'the most accessible' (I have strong
reservations) or 'powerful' (some other organizations are more powerful
than some nation-states) platform from which to effect change.
Finally, and in a largely unrelated vein, I must admit that I am often
awed and generally strongly swayed by materialist arguments, and I have
encountered some of the most awing and swaying on this list. I remain
troubled, however, by the following--which I will no doubt put badly.
It seems to me that it would be impossible for us to build institutions
or social relations that reflect the material bases of our lives, or to
effect social change, in the absence of the conceptual apparatus to
recognize those material bases or to envision difference. Much has been
written and debated about systemic change but very little, in my
assessment, about conceptual change. I raise this issue out of a
genuine interest--and, of course, as another thrust at those who refuse
to step, even momentarily, out of the comfort of their theories.
Regards,
Clifford J. Larabie