Dear Jason and All,
the case with US and Japan fits my generalization that
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any core-country
which is at the same time world-power never begins a large war herself until
her life-interests (security of own territories, trade routes and
major investment loci) are directly attacked or threatened.
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the main strategy of such core-world-powers is to wait for or provoke
conflicts between main challenger and his enemies
England/ France vs
Germany,Austria,Russia in 1799-1815,
England/ Russia vs Turkey in 1853-56,
England(+USA)/ Germany vs France,Russia in 1914-1945
i would be grateful for falsificating example from world history of this
generalization
Extrapolation of this logic suggests that US will wait for conflicts
(wars) between China and Southern 'Chinese Economics', mayby then India,
mayby then Russia for later grasping of maximum geopolitical-geoeconomic
dividents, but never will begin large war with China themselves .
best,
Nikolai
From: Jason Brooks <jbrooks2@LIB.DRURY.EDU>
To: PHILOFHI@YORKU.CA
On Fri, 11 Apr 1997, Mark K. Gardner wrote:
> Donald K. Routh wrote:
> >
> > I thought the U.S. entry into WW II was initiated by the Japanese attack on
> > Pearl Harbor. That was not a Western initiative.
> >
> Therefore he wanted to provoke the Axis into attacking first.
> His opponent in the 1940 Presidential contest
> Wendell Wilkie accused Roosevelt of these very tactics, since
> Roosevelt's platform was 'no U.S. involvement unless the U.S. were
> attacked.' When Hitler could not provoked into declaring war on the
> U.S. after Lend-Lease and other very non-neutral attempts at
> provocation, Roosevelt and Cordell Hull did everything possible to
> provoke the Japanese diplomatically at the negotiating table and
> economically via strangling Japanese trade and making the proud Japanese
> jump through more and more diplomatic hoops.
While what you say is true regarding our provokation of Japan, I am not
certain that it was because Roosevelt was unable to entice Germany into a
war declaration. In his _A People's History of the United States_, Howard
Zinn points out that the US was little concerned with the activities of
Japan, until Japan threatened US economic interest in China and Southeast
Asia. Only then did the US respond to Japan with iron and oil embargos in
1941. From here, the attack on Pearl Harbor can be seen as a result of
antagonistic exchanges between the US and Japan, again resulting from
Japan's threat to US economic interests in China and Southeast Asia.
In addition to Russett's book, I might also suggest Akira Iriye's book
_After Imperialism_ (sorry, can't find the publication info). Hope this
helps.
Jason Brooks
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Nikolai S. Rozov # Address: Dept.of Philosophy
Prof.of Philosophy # Novosibirsk State University
rozov@cnit.nsu.ru # 630090, Novosibirsk
Fax: (3832) 355237 # Pirogova 2, RUSSIA
Moderator of the mailing list PHILOFHI
(PHILosophy OF HIstory and theoretical history)
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