The Eastern part of Europe and the long Kondratieff wave: historical and
macroquantitative evidence
Just as during the world depression of the 1930s, democracy could not survive in
the region (Polanyi, 1944), today the danger arises, that instability and not
democratisation will triumph in the end, especially in countries like those of
the former USSR. The turning points in the long waves between the ascents and
decline phases (B-phases) were always the beginnings of political decay in the
region as well, while the ascent phases were associated with authoritarian
modernisation; time-lags between the Western cycle and the Eastern
semi-periphery and periphery have to be admitted. The decisive-kairos-years are:
1509
1539
1575
1621
1689
1756
1835/42
1884
1933
1982
The logic of the Kondratieff waves from 1756 onwards are given as follows:
social process cycle 1756-1835/41
basic project defeudalization
prosperity reform compulsory education,
conscription; American and
French Revolution;
Joseph II (Austria)
mid-cycle conflict wars of the French Revolution,
Napoleonic wars
Poland: 1807 Duchy of Warsaw
technological change
basic industrial steam engine (end 18th century)
projects 'Spinning Jenny' (J. Stargreave, 1770)
new technologies steam locomotive 'Puffing Billy'
emerging during (W. Hadley, 1813)
prosperity re-
cession
Unresolved problem freedom of association
crisis of the model revolution 1830
Poland: rebellion 1830/31
international regime
A-phase British naval
dominance (George III)
B-phase 'congress of Vienna'-regime
dominant economic
theory A. Smith, 1776
political economy of
world system D. Ricardo, 1817
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------
social process cycle 1835/42-83 1884-1932 1933-81
basic project freedom of market enlargement welfare
and enterprise of participa- state,
tion
corporatism
prosperity reform freedom of asso- social secu-
educational
ciation rity, parlia- reform,
mentarism civil
rights,
emancipation
of women
mid-cycle conflict wars and civil Eastern Europe: Vietnam war,
wars Revolution world
student
Poland: revolution 1905
rebellion
1863/64 1968
strikes,
terrorism
Polish
Winter
1970
technological change
basic industrial railway, steel, oil,
inputs and steamship electricity,
synthetics,
technological electric
automobile
projects motor
new technologies steel petrochemicals chips
emerging during
prosperity re-
cession
unresolved prob-
lem enlargement relationship basic
income
of participation capital, la-
environment
bour, state unequal
exchange
crisis of the
model revolution revolution
contestation
1871 1917 of the
model
Poland: Poland: from 1968
socialist strikes onwards
movement peasant
1880s uprisings Poland:
1936/37 Summer 1980
international regime
A-phase liberal mercantilism Bretton
world trade Woods
B-phase -"- hypermercan- neo-
tilism
protectio-
nism
dominant eco-
nomic
theory J. St. Mill, A. Marshall, J.M.
Keynes,
1848 1890 1936
political economy
of
world system K. Marx, 1867 R. Hilferding, K.
Polanyi,
1910 1944
from E. de Boer and Arno Tausch 'The Imperative of Social Transformation'
The danger is of course, that the Cold-War structure will be substituted by a
new power rivalry between the former members of the winning coalition of World
War II:
Hegemonial wars in the world system from 1495 onwards
Role in War Thirty Years War Napoleonic WW I+II
losing hegemonic
contender Hapsburgs France Germany
new hegemon Netherlands Britain USA
newly emerging
challenger: eco-
nomically deci-
mated member of
winning coalition France Germany China+
Russia
past
contender for
systemic hegemony,
joining the war
effort of the
winning coalition Sweden Hapsburgs France
Portugal
The former hegemonic contenders slowly slide into an acceptance of their status
in the international system. The real power struggle erupts already soon after
the great hegemonic war, and through the ups and downs of the history of the
system evolves slowly into the hegemonic challenge. Seen in such a way, not
1989, but Korea and Vietnam could become rather the benchmarks of the future
W-structure of conflict in the international arena. For the foreign policies of
the European Union, it is also important to notice the following tendency:
German-Russian alliances tend to happen during depressions, and they break up
during the economic upswings of the world system:
Khol + Gorbi/Boris 1985 ff.
Rapallo 1922
Bismarck’s Three Emperor Alliance 1873
Holy Alliance 1815
Alliance Russia-Germany 1764
Nordic War 1700-1721
The relationship of the Kondratieff and Kuznets cycles with Russian history is
the following:
Reforms
KONDRATIEFF Perestroika, Lenin’s NEP,
OR KUZNETS Great Reforms 1861,
DOWNSWING Katharinas Assembly 1775
Nobility's Victory 1730,
Split of the State Church 1653,
Boris Godunow 1598-1605
Repressive Modernisation
KONDRATIEFF Joseph Stalin,
OR KUZNETS Imperialistic Expansion
UPSWING and Repressive Industria-
lisation at the end of 19. th century
Nikolas the
Gendarme of Europe,
Elisabeth’s expansionist
policy,
Peter the Great,
Michael III,
Iwan the Terrible
Reform Repression
<----------------------------------------------------------------->
1985 'Gorbi' <--------------> 1928 Stalin
57 Years
64 Years 47 Years
1921 NEP <--------------> Alexander III
40 Years
60 Years 56 Years
1861 Great Reforms <--------------> Nikolas I 1825
36 Years
86 Years 84 Years
1775 Constituent <--------------> Elisabeth's expansionist
rule
Assembly 34 Years 1741
45 Years 52 Years
1730 Victory of <--------------> Peter I 1689
Nobility 41 Years
77 Years 76 Years
Church Split 1653<--------------> Michael III 1613
40 Years
55 Years 48 Years
Boris Godunow 1598 <--------------> Iwan's 'Oprichina' 1565
33 Years
Average periods of Russian history:
Perestroika <--------------> authoritarian
modernisation
40 Years
64.5 Years 60.5 Years
_____________________________________________________
Seen in such a way, there is even little that the West seems to be able to do to
stabilise democracy in Russia. However, the return of the East Europeans towards
a more ‘middle of the road’ and sensible philosophy - whatever the colour of the
government (Orenstein, 1996) - seems to be an urgent necessity, after the ups
and downs of central planning and ‘the central market principle’.