If you look at the map of Europe, there's patches of fertile littorals
around the Mediterranean, Atlantic coast, North Sea, Baltic, and one dear
to the inhabitants of Britain which is a continuation of that across the
Channel into the Midlands. (Considring the affective loadnings on "home"
which, I have read, are opaque to North Armenians, it may be more noteworthy
than I know that these are the Home Counties. This region, Champion and
Champagne alike, was just large enough to constitute the agricultural, hence
political core area of feudalism. Inland from the littoral strips is the
odd alp, Else the tediously insular patchwork valleys of a jutting peninsula
or actual island, ie, of the type surrounded by water, which may have, at
times, been politically unified, though at others, the scrounging of the
several valleys' separate surpluses, then aggregating them, has seemed "too
big of a hassle," as the young people used to say when I was too old to know
what they were talking about. Even in the center of Central Europe, which
nonEurocentrists know is merely a matter of perspective, there hunkers behind
a crescent of megahills or minimounts, called Sudeten by those who would be
kept out, within which lies the wholly landlocked peninsula of Bohemia, not
to be confused with Bohemianism since the days of Charles IV of Luxembourg
(1334-1378). Tis said that during the Plague-era apocalypse fad Bethlehem
Chapel in Praha was the in place to go for End of the World sermonizing,
and Charles caught a scorcher. The ascetic, whose name I forgot, but may
be looked up in Kaminsky's Hussite Revolution, scourged himself with iron
rods, drawing blood over his rags, clotted with common filth hitherto. Inter
alia he called the Holy Roman Emperor "Antichrist" to his face, which Charles,
radical-chic liberal that he was, laughed off, but the ascetic's superiors
did not, kwowing full well how important chastisement and retribution was to
the poor fellow.
This illustrates both the prevalent smugness of elites all over Europe,
subsuming thereunder everything covered by Int Hist West Civ, and the fearful,
trepitation-laden unthinkability of shaking said smugness (where not absolute
serenity) which has persisted next-to-forever in takenforgrantedness, this
by East Asian standards.
The exception which proves the rule is South-Russia/Ukraine. Part of the
nomad-steppe zone, a continuation of Central Asia, into Early Modern times,
it is a vast flatness whereonto huge peasant wars march in and, once the
cumbrous Russian Imperial bureaucracy has been sent into gearspinning partial
efficacy, fleeing out again yet, withal, Caught: noplace to hide. So Razin,
so Pugachov.
East Asia exhibits on the Atlas two agricultural zones of vast extent, the
North China Plain, as populous in Chinese Classical Antiquity as the Roman
Empire, and the Yangzi Valley ecosystem, by the European Mediaeval period even
more densely populated than, and outnumbering, the North. Each of them is,
nevertheless, also a corridor. The river-valley ecosystems are canyons of
vast girth, on either side being located rough terrain which, in the pinch
of famine, which is chronic, is cultivable ie terraceable; yet is, frankly,
"a bitch," if you are are the security forces, to catch aught in what might
get away from you or get you first.
The practical consequences of all this are, somehow, that in Europe each
country has had a maximum of one social revolution; the same is true of the
Near East. Egypt, for instance, was the beneficiary of the only social
revolution in its history in 968, when Fatimids, or Isma'ilis, who had,
unbeknownst to them, invented the vanguard revolutionary party, called
al-Dawa, whose relentlessly-disciplined professional-revolutionary agents,
da'is, called each other, Hodgkin says, "Comrade," combined military pressure
from without with subversion within to pull off the classic Third International
fantasy of How It Should Be Done which never was, in the 1930s, I mean. Though
the broad masses understood as little of Party Doctrine, esoteric meanings of
letters and numbers, as their latter-day counterparts under Actually non-
Existing Socialwasm, they did obtain the most efficient and honest government
in Egyptian history, which Communism never matched whilst in power; and the
latter epoch, for Communism, was all of 74 years for the Fatimids, compared
to 124 years if you follow one reckoning; or 203 years, if another. Party
splits are part of the game. Shi'a, of course, means Party, and what else is
new. (The foregoing was included, irrelevant as it seems, as it is something
it is felt you should know for your own good and characterological development,
having spoiled yourselves by somehow evading knowing it.) Iran leads the Near
East with two, 747-750 and 1979-1982?.
China has had four full-fledged social revolutions, whose most dramatic
social-conflict manifestations have been peasant wars.
Objection.
Overruled; how Theda Skocpol defines her terms cannot be my problem; I
suggest she mortify the flesh with fasting and prayer until she fits her
definition to the observed data. Two of these revolutions, at the very
least, have had *bobkes* to do with the capitalist world market. Excuse
me, I didn't mean to use such language.
<ahem>.
Numerous other peasant wars have lasted for years, in some cases developing
highly, uh, novel or innovative social institutions, such as indefinite
celibacy by the device of assignment of husband and wife to different work
units; eg, Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. I'm sure that the female subject
population had a Meaningful Celibacy Experience, considering the quality of
life alloted to Chinese wives prior to the Taiping, and afterward. The
abolition of footbinding, under the circumstances, was a mixed blessing, as
we have been apprised, of late, of the white-racist bias in the interpretation
of this admittedly weird Chinese fetish, succeeding eyebrow-fixations in the
tenth century.
Among the earliest was the Red Eyebrows war, which slew the usurper Wang
Mang as he sat in his throne room, AD 23, surrounded by magic tricks to ward
off harm. In 184, the simultaneous revolts at opposite ends of the country
of the Great Peace (Shandong) and Five Pecks of Rice (Sichuan) Daoists held
out till 189, ensuring the rise of a dictator killed the same year in a coup
led by Cao Cao and a few of his friends, offering slightly better manners
instead. The Han dynasty was finished; by 196, Cao Cao was the Septimus
Severus of North China.
In 399, Sun En, a Daoist pirate-guerilla, launched his "dragon soldiers,"
possibly psychedelically drugged, against the Southern Empire along the
Fujian coast. Those profiting, General Huan and General Liu, fought for
power, with the latter victorious. The next occasion for social upheaval,
however, spelled doom for the ruling Great Families of the Southern Empire.
This was the revolt of Hou Jing, who soon lost control of the movement, having
had no prior intention to exterminate the ruling class from whose funds he had
expected to get paid. The aristocracy, emperor and all, were nailed in their
palaces from the outside, bereft of slaves and serfs, and left to starve in
floral finery. Survivors fled to blueblood relatives in the North.
I haven't included the foregoing in the count of four social revolutions,
as it had no effect on the Turco-Mongol ruled North.
In previous posts, I have related the obscure class wars of the ninth and
tenth centuries, coeval with the introduction of footbinding. Briefly, Tang
tomb sculpture shows lance-knights in plate armour, pennons flying; ladies of
this class are shown, also on horseback, playing polo. Stories were told, with
the explicit purpose of arousing disgust not unmingled with contempt for the
pedigreed aristocracy, to the effect that, when a nobleman got home from work,
so to speak, and his wife wanted to go out for a ride, she borrowed his boots
along with his horse. Feet, the larger the better for stabilizing oneself on
a horse, became class-enemy-affect-loaded. Pari-passu, eyebrow preoccupations
disappeared.
Discussion of Buddhism has been omitted for oversimplification purposes.
The White Lotus, the longest-lived of the subversive sects, was reportedly
or allegedly (by historians) founded "before 1133," which is of course "after
1127," the year the Song dynasty took refuge in Hangzhou, its "temporary camp,"
not "capital," you understand, unless you suppose the Guomindong creative
innovators, following the loss of the North to the Jurchet or Ruzhen (*Jin*
dynasty, 1126-1234), de facto inaugurating the feeble Southern Song (1127-
1279). That is, 1127 was an End of the World occasion, and it was not yet
certain that Yangzi mud would halt the steppe cavalry; the front was not
restabilized till 1142, this all during the reign of Gaozong, 1127-1162.
It is quite important for historical sociogists to persevere with the
rote memorization of lists of dead kings, those whose names ending in -zong
as much as those ending in Roman numerals, for the development of character
and nimbleness in modelbuilding. All historical-sociological grand theories
originated as bricolage, and those who got buffaloed early by memorizing dead
king lists never got to suspect they were as good as us.
"Dad, what did you learn in school in Krakow?"
"Names of Polish kings."
This should give you enough of the picture.
The dirty secret of Confucianism is hysterical fear of social revolution.
This is made explicit in the Book of Xunzi, d. 265 BC, whose work is a complete
functionalist sociology, replete with all the repressive, terroristic implica-
tions you always suspected were immanent, or just plain lurking, subtextually.
But there is no pussyfooting around in Xunzi. Each chapter commences with the
refrain, "The nature of man is evil; his goodness is acquired training." So
much for the socialization process. It might have been wonderful, some of us
used to think, wistfully, had Emile Durkheim or, far better, Talcott Parsons
been ghostwritten by Henry Kissinger or Samuel P. Huntington or Herman Kahn.
Yet there it is. All Confucian scholars know it; nearly all politely ignore
it. Xunzi did not make the Four Books; Mencius did, instead. The latter you
were Responsible For on the Tests; Xunzi, They Took Points Off for.
Which is how I got to read it in college, Homer Dubs trans, and found it
refreshing compared to standard sociogibberish of the day. In first year of
grad school, I translated Talcott Parsons into Xunzi, which got published by
my advisor who, next only to my mother, spoiled me rotten to my utter Later
Life discomfiture, which both mama and Maurice R. Stein figure had nothing
to do with them but Evil Drugs or something. Xuzni was, I think, write about
both of *them*. Anyhow, the article, called colloquially "the Parsons article,"
made me famous for ten minutes, which made me feel shortchanged by five, so
here I still am.
Xunzi made it explicit as you can get that the purpose of good government,
if there is any distinctive purpose to the latter, is prevention of social
revolution. What's more, it is the foundation of social morality and, if the
clever prince can pull it off, there will be economic growth, "the ten thousand
things will increase," and the opposite of class war, which is translated
harmony, but loses absolutely nothing in the translation when rendered
"social integration." If we have time, this class, we will go into the theory
of the division of labour and the argument for monogamy (related to the fact
that, when the PLA was recruiting en masse during 1947-1949, the Communists
promised wives to the usual 20% of the young male population too poor to get
married: "If the strong oppress the weak, the weak will not obtain any sex
relation." Pretty raw stuff, hey.
Here is the argument for good government, the core of Xunzi's social theory:
"When his horse is uneasy harnessed to a carriage, a gentleman *zhunzi*,
"son of a lord," later Prince, hereditary nobleman, appointed high official,
or any member of the ruling class in whatever capacity, Superior Man. is
not comfortable in his post. When a horse is uneasy harnessed to a carriage,
nothing is as good as calming it; just so, when the common people are uneasy
under an administration, nothing is as good as being kind to them. Recruit
the worthy and the respectable. Appoint the sincere and respectful. Promote
filial piety and brotherliness. Care for the orphaned and widowed. Aid the
impoverished. If such is the case, the common people will be comfortable
under the administration. If the common people are comfortable under the
administration, only then will the gentleman be comfortable in his post.
*It is traditionally said* my emphasis--daf, "The ruler is like a boat;
the common people are like water. It is water that supports the boat, and
it is also water that overturns the boat." This is my point. Therefore, if
a ruler of men desires contentment, nothing is as good as governing peace-
fully and loving the people; if he desires glory, nothing is as good as
promoting ritual and respecting his officers; and if he desires esteem,
nothing is as good as honoring the worthy and employing the capable. These
are the great principles of the true gentleman." (Fragment cited for rhythm
of prose style ! by Charles O. Hucker, China's Imperial Past, 1975; cited
by me for its nails-in-your-head paranoid-horror-inducing quality.
Cursory sideways glances, it will not bear too hard a stare, at the passage
above reveals the injunction to the practice of the governmental art as if one
were being constantly watched by one's social inferiors. An Entity is Out There
and it is Everywhere, with Infinite Eyes; Never Misses a Thing. Slack off, and
it Kills. You say, hey, I'm not a boat, I'm a fish; the fish lives in the water
and *does not ever* float on top of the water doing nothing; the water goes,
*boat*, sink you!
On at least two occasions in Chinese history, there has been a two party
system, with alternation in office: one party, the activists, has advocated
beneficent intervention in the economy, benefiting the lowest classes, in
particular, and conspicuoulsly, howbeit large boodle may, and of course always
did, accrue to the already-privileged. The Opposition, called Conservatives,
argued that the level of taxes entailed by the activists was an explicit
invitation to social revolution or class war.
Activists took the form of Wang Anshi's New Policies, in effect 1068-1085
and 1102-1126. When Wang Anshi, learned commentator on the *Yijing* I Ching,
was appointed Prime Minister by Shenzong of the Northern Song, Sima Guang,
commentator of the ancient Book of History and author, during the Wang
Administration, of the Mirror For Aid In Government, a history of China from
404 BC to his own day, told him, "You take office to save the people. I step
down to save them from you." Upon Wang's death, Sima Guang was appointed Prime
Minister, repealing every last single reform. The reformers argued that state
finances, the armed forces, and the entire economy was in danger of ruin, with
foreign wars (against steppe-nomad empires) looming. Conservatives, while the
reformers were in power under Huizong, 1102-1125, argued that the ruin was
caused by the inauguration of reform in the first place. Huizong was famed
for painting bird pictures, which were truly quite lovely; and he was rather
conspicuously complacent in executing three leaders of National University
student riots in 1125; these had called for patriotism and, by implication,
impugned that of the emperor, who was a slacker and soft on barbarism. He
ended his days in Jurched ie Ruzhen (*Jin*) captivity. The Southern Song,
after this, would allow no dangerous drivel about what is called, these days,
interference with the free market or even "unleashing the awesome power of
free market forces."
There are downsides to this, of course.
Does anyone out there want me to actually tell you what it was that Zhu
Yuanzhang *did* that knocked China off the capitalist block (or finished off
what Plague and civil war had started), and how-wherein he was Mao Zedong's
role model, as is reported by Li Zhisui, whom nobody asked about this, so
to this extent is credible?
I say this because it would take lots of writing, who knows, book length,
which is beyond my powers. So you will I fear be required to *watch* me write
it, screwing up while I do so. More likely, not write it, decide that I was
Wrong at an earlier stage, the way I have, this week, repudiated what I wrote
for WSN on related and overlapping matters in 1992. Truth *and* consequences.
Or, you can continue to believe the congenial baloney you do already. Rise
of capitalism, why. Rise of capitalism, illusion. Why China could not develop
capitalism even though capitalism is illusory. You know exactly what I'm
talking about, you, plural. Which is it going to be.
BUILDING COMING DOWN.
EVERYTHING MUST GO.
Daniel A. Foss
<so long for a while and smile if you have teeth>