id <01BBC6A7.5AF0F700@amsterdam46.pop.tip.nl>; Wed, 30 Oct 1996 21:14:37 +-100
From: barendse <rene.barendse@tip.nl>
To: "'WSN@csf.colorado.edu'" <WSN@csf.colorado.edu>
Subject: AW: Eurocentrism & Capitalism
Date: Wed, 30 Oct 1996 21:11:40 +-100
Hithertoo I have been loitering a bit on the margin of
this august list - which I am loath to say is the only one
of various academic mailing lists I am recieving I always read
and enjoy reading. I wish there were more men's room like that.
I particulary like mr. Fosse's musing although I have to admit
I have often difficulties following his American colloquialisms - I
would like to urge everybody on this list to please, please remember
that not everybody who is reading this stuff is a native speaker of =
English.
Anyway - as some of you know - I have been working mainly on Indian =
Ocean history in the early modern period for a dozen years now; a =
major work ofm ine on this topic should appear with CNWS publications =
Leiden around march nextt year, so I have been following the discussion =
on Eurocentrism and capitalism with great interest; while there are =
many aspects of this argument which would merit long discussions, e.g. =
the long wave issue or the rationality issue in this posting I would =
only=20
like to concentrate on one aspect: the issue of European exceptionalism.
As Sherlock Holmes would have put it, dear Watson, if you have exhausted =
the obvious solutions look at the not-so-obvious-solutions; which =
translates to the following: if it is so difficult to find any precise =
moment or reason for European exceptionalism conpared to Asia in the =
nineteenth century then maybe our view of the nineteenth century is =
wrong. I know I am overstating but it sometimes appears to me with the =
argument about European exceptionalism is like trying to use the entire =
human history to explain a brief period wEurope d ominated world =
trade and industry. A brief period, furthermore, which is over by =
now,yet we are still shackeled to an ancient argument about European =
exceptionalism occuring somewhere around 1500 which is then necessary to =
explain the supposed European dominance of Asia and Africa in the =
nineteenth century.=20
Wouldn't it be more logical to say that the supposed European =
superiority over Asia in the nineteenth century is a mirage - largely =
derived from the e writings of the colonial adminstration anyway ? And =
how long did this whole period last ? Far from ruling India for two =
centuries - and the raj always appears to me the main argument for =
the supposed European dominance over Asia in the nineteenth century =
-dIndia wass slowly conquered by the British a conquest which from =
Plassey to the annexation of Awadh lasted a century and was then almost =
destroyed in1857. Again, it took the Dutch in Indonesia three centuries =
-from Ambon in 1632 to Bali in 1906 ((!) to conquer the entire =
archipelagoe and one could well argue the Dutch never dominated the =
state of Atjeh - of course in Indo China the French period lasted =
barely fifty years and the French never dominated the mountains. It =
would thus be possible to see European empires in Asia as an ephemeral =
empire of conquest - like that of the Napoleontic empiree which also =
lasted barely twentyfive years and was merely based upon some temporary =
military advantages rather than upon deep structural differences =
between say Loraine and the Rhineland. More to the point,
Russia dominated Poland for more than hunderd years and the Ukraine for =
threehunderd years but nobody would argue that this was because Russia =
was more highly advanced than Poland or the Ukraine.=20
A consideration of the period 1757-1854 will show that India was simply =
slowly conquered by a huge British army of around 1800 upto 250.000 man, =
that is as large as Napoleon's grand armee. Moreover - and this is a =
point which is of course downplayed in British accounts for very human
reasons - in only two of the many battles which it took to conquer India =
-Plassey and Buksar - were the British much inferior in numbers - and in =
the first case the Mughal force lost by treason, the other by =
incompetence- in all other battles the British were equally numerous or =
more numerous; the normal military tendency to vastly overrate the =
opponent's strength has led to a myth of British military invisibility =
in India which is almost certainly the main cause for the view that =
Europeans=20
were militarily superior in the early nineteenth century. They were not, =
and actually the equally persistent view that the Indians were badly =
equipped is a myth too - Indian armies were as well equipped as European =
armies - actually the army of the Marathas appears to have had more =
-anbd
often better artillery than most European armies in 1800. . This a was =
largely cast in Indian workshops- it is also a myth that Indian armies =
aways bought equipment. So what we have here is simply a military =
conquest - no technological superiority and even less organisational =
superiority.
How did the British achieve this ? The answer is obviously that they =
were using a mercenary army which was recruited in India - it is odd to =
remember that the use of mercenary armies is normally seen as a sign of =
of backwardness in India - while even the grande armee was in its heyday =
also mainly a mercenary army as was of course the British peninsular =
army, or for that matter Cornwallis' army at Yorktown. Simply put- the =
British were able to raise and - a terrific logistic feat of the banjara =
oxen-drivers accompanying the British army - not the least to feed a =
huge mercenary army not becausee Iit was backward but because India =
was forward - without an intricate network of bankers throughout the =
subcontinent the British would never have been able to pay their army. =
Or, indeed, how could the British have stationed garrisons throughout =
the Indian Ocean without a network of shroffs and munshis ? Indian =
merchants or as C.Bayly would call them `portfolio capitalists' who had =
an
intricate network of connections throughout the Indian Ocean. Thus, it =
was not India's backwardness which made it a tempting bait for the =
British conquerors, just like in Europe it was not Lumbardy's =
`backwardness' which enticed conqueror upon conqueror. With some =
modifications the same applies to Java.
Were there any `structural advantages' of the British ? Yes - but - and =
therefore this is an argument with which many of the readers are sure to =
have difficulties - this necessitates that we shed two ingrained habits =
of thinking about India. First, we need to shed the notion that a =
`colonial state' is substantially different from another state. Just =
remember the British collector would be as alien to the inhabitants as =
would the officials of other large military/bureaucratic states such as =
the Romanov or the Habsburg empire. Two, we need to remember that India =
was a class society and consider Indian history in terms of class rather =
than function or caste as is normal. It is this obsession with caste and =
with function which in my view has obscured the nature of what =
historians call the crisis of the eighteeenth century. I would argue =
that in the eighteenth century Indian states were struggling with =
similar problems as European states. A deep fission in the countryside =
between the peasants and rural `gentry' and the nobility, a rise of a =
hungry and disenfranchised urban population and the rise of large =
`multinational' banking and trade concerns which increasingly escaped =
the control of the state call them as you like - but in Indian studies =
it is nowadays normal to call them capitalist, furthermore like in =
Europe banking and merchant capital was increasingly penetrating rural =
production which was increasingly causing noble resentment. Now, like in =
Europe this caused what IW would call `struggle in the centre' with =
states trying to use the resources of the multinational concerns to =
contain both the unruly nobility and the rising class of the rural =
gentry. The central mechanism thereto was, like in Europe, the tax-farm. =
Basically, these are the same occurences like in Europe - obviously, =
because they both participate in the same world-wide system; meanwhile =
these states are also involved in an internecine struggle among =
themselves, three contenders among them have links to Europe: the =
Compagnie des Indes, Portuguese Estado da India and the East India =
Company. Now, in this long struggle the East India Company finally =
emerged as `top dog' for many reasons but the main reason was probably =
that tthe East India Company had a source of collateral in American gold =
and silver -and a direct link to the British state- of which the other =
competitors did not dispose. The EIC was therefore a highly attractive =
investment to Indian bankers active on the political market this credit =
allowed the EIC to raise a more powerful army than its competitors. =
Furthermore, just like the Habsburg or th Romanov state the raj had a =
definite class-base in the Indian countryside with the raj increasingly =
alining itself with the nobility. In fact, whereas the raj had started =
as a close ally to the Indian capitalists it increasingly turned to an =
ally of the landed nobility - like the Habsburg or the Romanov state. =
Somewhat the same development seem to have occured in Indonesia although =
in the literatrure on Indonesia it is even rarer to find analysis in =
class or economic rather than in broad cultural terms.
For in spite of its -frankly very efficient - propaganda in which it =
propagated that it was there for the good of the inhabitants -which alas =
was swallowed by most European intellectuals including Marx or Multatuli =
- both the raj and the Dutch gouvernement were simply military =
dictatorships behind a civilian facade which were only interested in =
paying themselves by levying taxes. This stiffled, partly, the =
development of a bourgeoisie in India or Indonesia.. India and =
Indonesia were thus to some extent thrown back after the Dutch and =
British conquest. from a position where they were about equal to Europe =
to a position where they were backward compared to Europe. . Obviously =
the British were simply collecting their loot as most conquering armies =
do - as the yurt-o-centrics on the list would put it - sometimes this =
list gets too highbrow for me.
Greetings
Dr.R.J.Barendse
Instituut Kern
Rijksuniversiteit Leiden
The Netherlands
Rene.barendse@tip.nl