On Tue, 30 Jul 1996, chris chase-dunn wrote:
> thanks to all who have contributed to the discussion of the world party
> and the world state.
> i agree with warren wagar, except for a few details. there needs to
> be a world state to sort out the problems that capitalism and human
> social evolution have created. a state is a monopoly of legitimate
> violence. governance, commonwealth, federation, all these words will be
> needed but fundamentally the problem is to create a monopoly of
> legitimate violence. this because one of the main unsolved and cyclical
> products of capitalism is warfare. and warfare under modern
> technological conditions is species suicide.
Two points come to my mind here. First, my own query was focused
on the feasibility of a one world state *as specified* by Wagar. If
*that* one world state is not feasible, the above argument would indicate
a necesity to work toward a one-world state as a first priority, and as
the next priority struggle toward the type of one-world state we desire.
On the other hand, I don't see any movement more likely to lead to
a dramatic escalation in the current level of warfare than an effort to
build a one-world government and wrest sovereignty from the nation-state.
And in order for the less centralized multi-lateral institutions implied
by the 'community of communities' alternative to be effective, the
constituent communities cannot be as large as the present day US, Russia,
China, India, etc. So either way, whichever is feasible and/or
desireable, some fundamental changes at the level of the present-day
nation-state may be necessary, in order to effectively manage the
problem that Chris Chase-Dunn identifies.
> in this regard things are somewhat worse than wagar imagines. because he
> accepts the position that world wars occur during Kondratief downswings
> he thinks the likely time for the next one is 2044. unfortunately
> goldstein has shown that world wars are most likely to occur at the end
> of k-wave upswings. that would be some time in the 2020s.
And the above line of argument would only reinforce this conclusion.
> some see the possibility of global ecological disaster within a similar
> time frame.
[As an aside, not dlj, who recently surfaced on wsn to troll against the
use of long-cycle theory in World-System theory, but has been trolling on
ecol-econ (ecological economics) against the idea that ecosystemic crises
are a threat that must be taken seriously. I've got my fingers crossed
that WSN list members won't rise to take the bait.]
Even more problematic, on the time scales of higher-level
ecosystem processes, global ecological disaster could occur within this
time frame while it takes much longer for its full effects to be felt.
An interstate system in which a clear and present danger is necessary (and
even then often not sufficient) to provoke effective multi-lateral action
is a serious obstacle in addressing problems with delayed onset of the
most severe effects.
> the second problem is this. the world party cannot simply wait for
> the capitalist world-system to destroy itself and most of the people
> on earth. it must act to prevent that from happening.
> even though a world state is the best solution as an instrument for
> creating a more just and sustainable world society (call it socialism,
> call it democracy, call it a collectively rational and democratic global
> commonwealth, call it strawberry jello) there is not likely to emerge
> a world state strong enough to prevent a war among core states in the
> next twenty five years even if we try very hard, which we should do.
So, while I am not persuaded of the premise, I mostly agree with the
assertion.
> given the high probability of nuclear annihilation, that means looking
> hard at possible substitutes for the world state. one possibility,
> though it may not be much more likely than a world state, is a renewed
> US hegemony. yes folks. that is what i said. this is a hard conclusion
> for someone who spent his youth opposing US imperialism. talk me out of
> it.
OK, I'll have a go at it. Renewed hegemony would only prevent war
if it was successful and preemptive. And in a sense, that is precisely
how hegemony works: it is not a static structure that makes for a dominant
power, but the effective exercise of its advantages in a way that
successfully renews its advantages. The re-emergence of tri-polar trading
bloc structures that Tieting Su wrote of in last year's JWSR tells us of
the growing ineffectiveness of US efforts to renew its dominant
advantages.
Is increasingly intense conflict between the US and rival nation-
states, in an effort to re-impose US dominance, a strategy that reduces
the likelihood of war? I don't think it is. This may be simple-minded,
but I would see a strategy that reduces the intensity of conflict between
the US and rival nation-states as a strategy that would be more likely to
reduce the likelihood of war. That calls for a rethink of the economic
Life Space of the US as originally envisioned in the 1930's. Consider
when North and South America was considered to be insufficient as a an
economic 'Life Space' for the US, one reason to look to the Western
Pacific Rim as adding the missing element was the distance of the Western
Pacific Rim from Europe as opposed to the West Coast of the US. At the
time the strategy underrated the dangerousness of conflict with Japan.
However, the only other direction in which to push, eastward across the
South Atlantic to Africa, would have immediately involved the US in
conflicts with European powers -- and even worse, would have immediately
entangled the US in conflicts among European powers.
But today? The US is focused on the Pacific Rim and conflict with
Japan over overlapping trade blocs in the Pacific Rim -- while Africa is
uncontested. Of course, pursuit of a South Atlantic strategy would require
the US to re-think its relationship with both South American and African
nations -- and in particular, the difference between economic interests
of the US and the economic interests of those trans-national corporations
that have their flagship headquarters in the U.S. This intersects with
the question I raised in a different thread, as to whether it is sensible
to view the current multi-national economic institutions as potential
resources for development. In any event, *if* the US trade bloc could be
re-oriented to reduce the overlap between the core of the US trade bloc,
the core of the Japanes trade bloc, and the core of the German trade
bloc, that seems to me to be a more promising strategy to reducing the
threat of substantially expanded warfare than a drive by the US to
re-assert itself as global hegemon.
Virtually,
Bruce R. McFarling, Newcastle, NSW
ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au