On Wed, 29 May 1996, A. Gunder Frank wrote:
> I would be happy to send to Bruce something of mine that calrifies my
> position on the related questions he raises. but in brief
> 1. yes the tech innovation does come from the periphery/margin - but
> not from outside the system.
This gets straight at the heart of the complex of questions:
obviously, if with different notion of the intensity and variety of
interactions required to identify a world system, then on a stringent
criteria what looks like a peripheral world system developing
transportation innovations that permit it to link up with a more advanced
world-system is, on less stringent criteria, a peripheral area *in* a
world system improving its connection to the core. And there is always
the question whether saying this is 'either/or' is false reification: one
could well see a fractal pattern, where 'the core' and 'the peripheral
area', at a more global scale, turn out to be composed of their own cores
and peripheries when you look at more local scale.
> 2. the periph/margin is pressureds into the tech innov by and takes
> advantage of crisis in the center to make its NIE move like east asia
> today. thats waht West Europe did around 1800.
Does this presuppose that among the peripheral areas there is one
with a superior capability to exploit this crisis, or is it just
happenstance?
> 3. that means the "system" was long pre-existing, and both Asia and
> Europe were in it, only in different positions, and these poistions
> within the system changed after 1800 - temporarily!
Here is a point where there may be a difference between the
historical narrative and an argument based upon that narrative. If "that
means" is intended to means that points 1 and 2 themselves imply that the
system was long-existing -- I don't see that they do. The system could
well be relatively novel; the peripheral area concerned could well be a
relative newcomer; and dealing with the new configuration could wel be the
source of the crisis. I would be highly skeptical that one could draw
that specific conclusion on the basis of the first two observations. But,
of course, 'that means' could be intended to convey the assertion as a
clarifying elaboration, and 'long-existing' refer to historical evidence
regarding the duration of the system.
> 4. but thats not because Europe had different or better "institutions"
> that grew up there between 11/13/1500 and 1800, and still less for
> "exceptionalist" European reasons, and to call these "capitalist" does
> not clarify , but instead obscures what happend on a world economic
> level, and THAT it happend on a world econ level but within Europe and not
> IN europe and spread to elsewhere. THAT is why what happend in China and
> India before 1800 is relavant to this story, which was Bruce's first
> question.
Obviously, the most significant innovations for Europe in the
three hundred years preceding have to be the transportation innovations,
because that's where the Americas come in. And perhaps the boom in
agricultural productivity from the potato, maize, the tomato, new legumes,
etc. is not explained very successfully in terms of 'capitalism'. But
this seems to lead into the same question: if the crisis due to the rise
of European power, or is European power due to the crisis? Or both? Or
neither?
Virtually,
Bruce R. McFarling, Newcastle, NSW
ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au