Transcendence is not the removal of cognition for a behavoral aesthetic.
Transcendence is the removal of fact so that others who do not exist
historically or geographically (in time and space) can understand and
use the resulting theory or system described. Facts are only locii to a
specfic cognition or behaviorism. Nothing more, nothing less. Knowledge
can be practiced in theory. Knowledge can be studied in history.
Ed Brown II
On Mon, 27 May 1996, Andrew W. Austin wrote:
> How can one transcend the "fact" of historicity? Why would someone want
> to? The recognition of historicity is a plus, not a hindrance. To be aware
> of the social construction process (and its roots in the larger world
> construction process of the particular sociohistorical epoch in which that
> awareness is embedded) involved in theorizing about scientific
> constructions of theories and models (all social constructions) provides
> the critical epistemology necessary for generating the most comprehensive
> analysis of the sociohistorical forms under investigation. Luhmann, and
> his mentor, Parsons, both proceeded in their construction of social
> systems theory by simultaneously presenting a comprehensive (general)
> theory of systems. Even though their systems are obviously functional (at
> the theoretical level, it is difficult to substantiate analytical
> categories and complexes of categories, such as systems, as explanatory in
> the sense of cause and effect), their examples provide us with some useful
> groundwork in the areas of systems analysis (or modeling). Habermas'
> further modifications to both Parson's work, and his collaborations with
> Luhmann, are even more productive. This is because Habermas, aware of the
> hermeneutical processes of reality production (including theoretical and
> empirical constructions), provides the necessary critical epistemology to
> carry out the analysis in a self-reflexive manner.
>
> I would argue, that it is not possible to transcend the "fact" of
> historicity, for to do so puts one in a paradoxical position of holding
> things independent of thought (or consciousness, ultimately a product of
> society), which is an obvious impossibility. Even if we could exist in
> this imagined ethereal realm, why would we want to step outside the
> meaningful cognitive space we call knowledge?
>
> AA
>
Edward K Brown II
BROWNII@hal.hahnemann.edu