How can one transcend the "fact" of historicity? Why would someone want
to? The recognition of historicity is a plus, not a hindrance. To be aware
of the social construction process (and its roots in the larger world
construction process of the particular sociohistorical epoch in which that
awareness is embedded) involved in theorizing about scientific
constructions of theories and models (all social constructions) provides
the critical epistemology necessary for generating the most comprehensive
analysis of the sociohistorical forms under investigation. Luhmann, and
his mentor, Parsons, both proceeded in their construction of social
systems theory by simultaneously presenting a comprehensive (general)
theory of systems. Even though their systems are obviously functional (at
the theoretical level, it is difficult to substantiate analytical
categories and complexes of categories, such as systems, as explanatory in
the sense of cause and effect), their examples provide us with some useful
groundwork in the areas of systems analysis (or modeling). Habermas'
further modifications to both Parson's work, and his collaborations with
Luhmann, are even more productive. This is because Habermas, aware of the
hermeneutical processes of reality production (including theoretical and
empirical constructions), provides the necessary critical epistemology to
carry out the analysis in a self-reflexive manner.
I would argue, that it is not possible to transcend the "fact" of
historicity, for to do so puts one in a paradoxical position of holding
things independent of thought (or consciousness, ultimately a product of
society), which is an obvious impossibility. Even if we could exist in
this imagined ethereal realm, why would we want to step outside the
meaningful cognitive space we call knowledge?
AA