Dear WSN subscribers,
I've written out here some ideas on cycles of hegemony. I
would really appreciate any suggestions and/or comments that
you might be interested in offering. The posting is a
little longer than usual (c. 2000 words), so if you are
going to respond publicly via WSN, it would be a good idea
NOT to quote this entire posting in your reply (of course,
if you want to send your comments directly to me, quote
away!). Here it is:
An Endogenous Model of Hegemonic Cycles
Hegemonic processions are a recurring feature of world-
systems accounts of modern history. Wallerstein's "cycles
of hegemony," Arrighi's "systemic cycles of accumulation,"
and Modelski and Thompson's "long cycle of global politics"
are all roughly equivalent categorizations of the same basic
phenomenon. In all three accounts, a global war is followed
by the long-term commercial, political, and military
hegemony of a single state in the international system; as
the relative power of the hegemon wanes over time,
challenger states arise, which in turn provokes a new global
war. At least four such hegemonic cycles have been
identified in Western history: the Dutch (c. 17th century),
the first British (c. 18th century), the second British (c.
19th century), and the American (c. 20th century). It is
doubtless true that under the criteria established by each
author -- preponderance of world trade (Wallerstein),
control over world financial markets (Arrighi), global naval
dominance (Modelski and Thompson) -- hegemonic cycles have,
in fact, occurred. But driven by their interest in
discovering and substantiating the existence of hegemonic
cycles, these authors have left aside the problem of
*explaining* them. Instead, what Wallerstein, Arrighi, and
Modelski and Thompson have done is give accounts of the
cycles of hegemony that have historically occurred. As
history, cycles of hegemony must be accepted, but as
sociology, they are still a mystery to be explained.
At issue is not whether the events related by
Wallerstein, Arrighi, and Modelski and Thompson did in fact
occur, but whether they are regular, naturally-occurring,
predictable phenomena. Why should there always exist a
state powerful enough to exercise hegemony? Why should such
a state take on the duties of being a hegemon? Why should
that hegemon ever decline? Why should the decline of a
hegemon lead to global war? These questions can be
adequately answered only by means of an endogenous model of
the genesis, rise, decline, and eclipse of hegemons. The
model must be endogenous rather than exogenous because only
an endogenous model can give rise to recurring cycles: an
exogenous model could only be cyclical if the exogenous
variables were themselves cyclical; thus, positing an
exogenous model serves only to move the problem one step
back. Historical models are always exogenous -- every part
of history is inseparably the result of all of the rest of
history -- and, as a result, history can only be nomothetic
when hypothetical future values for all of the exogenous
variables are given. With all-endogenous models, however,
it is possible to make predictions without any assumptions
about variables in the future. In this paper, I attempt to
build such an all-endogenous model of cycles of hegemony.
The model will be presented with reference to global (sea-
power-based) hegemony; with the appropriate substitutions,
the model works just as well for more local, land-power-
based hegemonies. Several assumptions will be necessary.
First, it must be assumed that in peacetime the existence of
a hegemon carries with it benefits for all of the core
states. Second, it must be assumed that the exercise of
hegemony implies costs that must be borne by the hegemonic
state, to the extent that the maintenance of hegemony
implies a net loss for the hegemon. Third, it must be
assumed that only a state that possess a large financial
advantage (ability to finance wars) over all of the other
core states can act as a hegemon. I will examine each of
these assumptions in turn.
In evaluating the plausibility of these assumptions, it
must be kept in mind that a hegemon is not a nation, a
country, or a people, but a state. That is to say, the
entity that exercises hegemony is a government. Thus, in
order to understand the incentives and consequences
associated with hegemony and the decisions that affect
hegemony, it is the incentives and consequences for
governments or governing classes that must be considered,
and not those for the myriad private citizens of the
countries involved. It should also be kept in mind that the
prima facie test of an assumption in a causal model is that
of *plausibility*, not correctness. If, however, a model
that is built upon plausible assumptions turns out to make
correct predictions, that is evidence (but still not proof)
that the assumptions themselves are correct.
First -- do all core states benefit from the existence
of a hegemon? In times of peace, hegemons coordinate the
activities of the core states in attempts to suppress piracy
and enforce commercial laws. The existence of a hegemon
creates a stable global business environment, which
facilitates trade and investment flows across borders.
Trade flows bring with them increased tax revenues for all
states, and investment flows promote economic development,
which, in the long run, also leads to increased tax
revenues. On the other hand, a domineering hegemon may
close off some parts of the world to exploitation by a non-
hegemonic state and its citizens. However, this situation
must be contrasted to one in which no hegemon exists: in
the absence of a hegemon, no state will be able to
profitably expand overseas, since the competition of all-
against-all is bound to be more expensive than the profits
to be had from exploitation in competition with other would-
be exploiters. Put differently, when the seas are not
secure, overseas possessions are a liability, not an asset -
- Spain paid dearly in privateered silver whenever Europe
was at war. Overall, then, it is at least plausible to
assume that the existence of a hegemon caries with it
benefits for all core states.
Second -- do the costs of maintaining hegemony outweigh
the direct benefits of being a hegemon? A hegemonic state
must bear alone all of the costs of policing the seas, plus
the ad hoc costs of maintaining world peace: bullying
trouble-maker states into toeing the common line,
maintaining diplomatic posts far and wide, rescuing the
citizens of other core states who get into trouble in
foreign lands, etc. In return, hegemons get their pick of
all of the opportunities for exploitation in the wider
world. However, unless hegemon possesses a truly
overwhelming military advantage over the rest of the core,
it cannot parcel out the world however it wishes. No
hegemon has ever been strong enough to challenge the rest of
the core powers simultaneously. In addition, a hegemon may
be forced to forgo the choicest opportunities for
exploitation and parcel them out to other states in attempts
to "keep the peace." Thus, although a hegemon has some
ability to allocate overseas spheres of exploitation to core
powers, it may or may not itself come out ahead in that
allocation. On the other hand, the costs of maintaining
hegemony are unambiguous. Thus, it is at least plausible
that the costs of maintaining hegemony may outweigh the
benefits of being a hegemon.
Third -- must a state possess a large financial
advantage over all of the other core states in order to be a
hegemon? A hegemon may act to maintain peace, but it does
so by implicitly threatening war. Although a hegemon may
not be able to challenge all other core powers
simultaneously, it must at least give the impression of
being able to defeat any one of the other core powers
easily, or it could not keep the other core states in line.
In practice, a hegemon must not only be able to defeat any
one other core power in competition overseas, but also be
able to defend itself against any combination of other core
powers likely to be formed against it. Without the respect
that comes with overwhelming power, no state could hope to
act as a hegemon, and power, especially naval power, comes
with money. It is certainly more than plausible that in
order to be a hegemon a state must possess a large financial
advantage over the other core states.
Given these three assumptions, the model is simple.
Any situation in which a hegemon does not exist is a
situation of world war, the war of all-against-all (Modelski
and Thompson's "macrodecision" phase). This must be so,
since in the absence of a hegemon, no state has the power to
enforce its will among the other core states. Such a
situation may go on indefinitely until one state emerges
with enough of a power differential over the other core
states to qualify as a potential hegemon. Note that this
process does not compromise the endogeneity of the model:
there is no postulated exogenous event that will assuredly
lift one state into a position of potential hegemony; there
is just a stochastic likelihood that eventually one state
will stand out from all of the others. In the case of sea-
power hegemony, that a hegemon will emerge is all the more
likely, given the all-or-nothing outcomes typical of battles
at sea. Still, there is no assurance that a hegemon will
emerge, only a likelihood that increases with time.
Once a state emerges that possesses the resources which
would enable it to act as a hegemon, that state must make a
choice as to whether or not it will take up the mantle of
hegemony. Under the first assumption above, if the state
exercises hegemony, it will be the beneficiary of a stable
global order, but under the second assumption above, it will
be forced to pay the costs of being a hegemon. If in the
state's judgement the costs of exercising hegemony outweigh
the benefits to be gained from a stable global order, then
the state will not become a hegemon, and the world will
remain in a state of war until circumstances change to make
hegemony more attractive. This approximates what happened
when the United States declined global hegemony after World
War I: the wars continued until the U.S. finally did take
up the mantle of hegemony after World War II. However, if
in the state's estimation the benefits of global order do
outweigh the costs of hegemony, then the potential hegemon
will opt to become an actual hegemon (Modelski and
Thompson's "execution" phase). As hegemon, the state will
be able to set many of the parameters under which the world
operates (Modelski and Thompson's "agenda-setting" phase).
The ramifications of hegemonic stability do not,
however, benefit only the hegemonic state; the other core
states benefit as well. As a result, the initial advantage
of the hegemon erodes over time, since all of the core
states share in the benefits of hegemony, while the hegemon
bears all of the costs. Over time, the other core powers
gain on the hegemon to the point where the hegemon must seek
partners to help it keep the peace (Modelski and Thompson's
"coalition-building" phase). Eventually, the hegemon's
initial advantage will disappear entirely, and it will be
unable to act as a hegemon at all. This initiates a new
period of wars, which lasts until another hegemon arises,
starting a new hegemonic cycle.
-----------------
I would welcome any comments that anyone on the list would
like to make. If you would like to respond privately,
please direct your correspondence to sbabones@jhu.edu.
Thanks for taking the time to consider my ideas, and I look
forward to hearing from the list.
Salvatore J. Babones
Johns Hopkins University