Re: culture ... (aka there are/no cultures)

Yes, culture is not a “thing” if by “thing” we are referring to an actual sociologic entity or substantiality. Yet, instead of calling it a “process” I would deem it a quality or characteristic of a social group, analogous to the concept from mathematics of taking a function of a function of X (i.e., G(F(X)).

Its primary basis is not in change from one state of meaning within a society to another, but in the dimensionality of values that a people consistently possess. Humanistically speaking, it is a vision more than a process. It’s similar to a computer program; but its basis isn’t in running like a set of operations as much as it is in characterizing the “software” and “hardware” of the social system.

Yes, I can agree with this. “Structure” itself is characterized by its systematic linkages and inherent operations. Thus we have the social equivalent here of the wave/particle from physics. It is a wave or is a particle?; it’s both. And thus, also, we can consider social structure in terms of its dynamisms, while dynamisms can also be further analyzed in terms of their structures in the greater social domain.

No doubt. Of course they are. But that is why such studies can’t be completed just with the tools of world systemists and/or other standard social science models (used by world historians, sociologists, and economic theorists). Other input in the form of complexity studies, psychohistory, and systematic philosophy (ala the epistemologies of Kant, Hegel, and even older the Medieval/Classical models ala Abelard, Aquinas, Aristotle, Plato, Heraclitus, et al) is essential to working through these complications of culture from past and present “world systems”

I do agree with you. “Culture” as a system of meaning complicates our understanding of societies and history. Yet, not impossibly so or beyond the point where we can highlight common criteria by which all history and all human communities can be explored. The strange thing is: yes the threads of society and values are incredibly varied, and seemingly beyond a pt. of convergence. But similar (and even common) patterns emerge in history despite cultural divides and even geographical ones over time. John Landon’s Eonic Effect confirms this through its exposition of “Axial Age” data; In addition, PH’er Paul Ziolo’s research into transcultural monasticism concurs. Thus, it’s not an impossible barrier to understanding that is created by cultural variation. Science (social and natural) and epistemology can and does cut through the fog. Perfectly, no. But to a relative degree, yes.

Culture does not create absolute social diversity; only somewhat can it do such, and not completely beyond the tendency towards human institutional systematization, commonalities, and integration. (I'm not sure it even has to be a mechanism of social separation/distinction of people by necessity; culture also can help bring people together.) Otherwise the traditional Classicists/Humanists would be totally on target. The variation created by culture and free human activitity would be inhospitable to patternization of social behavior and the systematic integration of peoples' actions. “Social science” wouldn’t be possible; history and social life would only be the purview of ethics and no systematic understanding of human experience would be able to be accomplished.

That's my own perspective on the matter. I welcome your's. (Luke R.)