Against post-modernism, against science as culture

1.   "The end of knowing"  Reply to Fred Newman

In this book, Newman challenges modern dualism, especially concept '
relation'

Replacing this with practical-critical, revolutionary activity, he believe
that he can overcome modern dualism, modern epistemology.

But, In citing Marx's" 'Theses on Feuerbach'', he omits one pronoun.

Marx wrote in ' Theses on Feuerbach' that the philosophers have only
interpreted the world, in various way; the point is to change it. Newman
omits this 'it'

What is this 'it'? Clearly this 'it' is 'the world'. He emphasize change,
and revolutionary action, but this action works without the world. In
reality, human act on the world, and change it.

If I reintroduce this 'it', For Newman it seems to means to reintroduce
modern dualism, and modern epistemology, but rather, his ' practical,
revolutionary action' is itself his way of seeing( sorry, engage in) the
world, i.e. one epistemology.

In reality, Newman created important 'development community, and its
significance is invaluable. But in theory(although he refuses theory) he
introduces alternative epistemology, i.e. practical, revolutionary activity
without the world .

And if so, how to overcome modern dualism?  Its answer lies within ' "these
on Feuerbach'" which Newman cites. In this "these", Marx wrote that the
chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism(that of Feuerbach
included) is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the
form of the object or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity,
practice, not subjectively.

 This " sensuous human activity" is in other word " objective activity"
which means activity toward world, or circumstances as Marx defined.  Newman
reduces  this practical activity  to subjectivistic (not subjective)
activity, thus leads to revolutionary activity without revolutionalized
world except for performed conversation. This results in fetishism of
activity. 

Rather, because human objective activity as a part of practical world is
itself able to be objective as well as its circumstance,  we can grasp them
in its united form as practical theory( although Newman refuses this term).
And theorizing them precipitated in Capital  which aim  was to critique
other socialists such as Prohdon,  to prove the ability of working class to
radically change the world, and to pinpoint a guide to practice of working
class.  Newman describes "later Marx" as that bought in on the objective
hegemony of the scientific. As such, they continued within the Greek/modern
scientific tradition of epistemology, the knowing tradition of Western
culture. He can't understand Capital' s practical significance, because he
neglects "objective" activity and reduces it to activity without world. For
Marx practical theory is very more important than other socialists or
anarchists such as Bakunin. As Lenin put it, " Without revolutionary theory,
there are no revolutionary act" .

 2. Reply to John Shotter's " Conversational  realities"

 

 In this book, he proposes constructing life through language.

For this, he adopts rhetorical-responsive version of social
constructionalism.

Firstly, he defines psychology as moral science, and secondly, he rejects
the myths of mind and realism, in other word, instead of inner dynamics of
the individual psyche(romanticism and subjectivism),or the already
determined characteristics of the external world(modernism and objectivism),
he adopts vague, only partially specified, unstable world , open to further
specification as a result of human, communicative activity,  and he argues
that neither are any extralinguistic entities whose significance is
linguistically clear prior to talk about them; there are no extralinguistic
something in the world merely awaiting precise or accurate description.
Thirdly he propose to build new civil society through rhetorical-responsive
communication.

 His refusal of subjectivism and objectivism is valid. And instead of that ,
communicative relationship as building realities is emphasized.  Also he
correctly defines psychology as moral science, in other word, he defines
language as normative means.

 But  he does not raise basic premise for building communicative relation.

To communicate each other, it is necessary to survive, and to survive we
need to eat, sleep, have house, produce means of production.  Secondly he
refuses concept of truth, but in daily activity, we judge truth of matter,
for example, when rain falls, we judge that raining  is true, and clear
weather is false. 

In other word, it seems necessary to add one more communicative dimension
extralinguistic he refuses to judge matters. To build new civil society is
good idea, but to build this, extralingustic entity is needed. Because, to
build a society, we must judge whether something is true, and others are
false.  It does not mean to accept so-called realism.

Rather his communicative practical activity needs two dimension,
i.e.intralinguistic and extralingustic.  If only intralinguistic activity
creates realities, how to understand universe before humankind appears.

So-called realism argues that consciousness reflects reality.  But it is
incorrect.

Manifestation by word only express usefulness of things for satisfying human
needs, in other word, it express practical relation, rather than things.

We must not afraid to use concept 'true' that postmodern discouse often
refuses.  Marx said in Feuerbach these that "the question whether objective
truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is
practical question.

Man must prove the truth-i.e. the reality and power, the this-sideness of
his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of
thinking that is isolated from practice is purely-scholastic-question.

 


 

 In this book, he proposes constructing life through language.

For this, he adopts rhetorical-responsive version of social
constructionalism.

Firstly, he defines psychology as moral science, and secondly, he rejects
the myths of mind and realism, in other word, instead of inner dynamics of
the individual psyche(romanticism and subjectivism),or the already
determined characteristics of the external world(modernism and objectivism),
he adopts vague, only partially specified, unstable world , open to further
specification as a result of human, communicative activity,  and he argues
that neither are any extralinguistic entities whose significance is
linguistically clear prior to talk about them; there are no extralinguistic
something in the world merely awaiting precise or accurate description.
Thirdly he propose to build new civil society through rhetorical-responsive
communication.

 His refusal of subjectivism and objectivism is valid. And instead of that ,
communicative relationship as building realities is emphasized.  Also he
correctly defines psychology as moral science, in other word, he defines
language as normative means.

 But  he does not raise basic premise for building communicative relation.

To communicate each other, it is necessary to survive, and to survive we
need to eat, sleep, have house, produce means of production.  Secondly he
refuses concept of truth, but in daily activity, we judge truth of matter,
for example, when rain falls, we judge that raining  is true, and clear
weather is false. 

In other word, it seems necessary to add one more communicative dimension
extralinguistic he refuses to judge matters. To build new civil society is
good idea, but to build this, extralingustic entity is needed. Because, to
build a society, we must judge whether something is true, and others are
false.  It does not mean to accept so-called realism.

Rather his communicative practical activity needs two dimension,
i.e.intralinguistic and extralingustic.  If only intralinguistic activity
creates realities, how to understand universe before humankind appears.

So-called realism argues that consciousness reflects reality.  But it is
incorrect.

Manifestation by word only express usefulness of things for satisfying human
needs, in other word, it express practical relation, rather than things.

We must not afraid to use concept 'true' that postmodern discouse often
refuses.  Marx said in Feuerbach these that "the question whether objective
truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is
practical question.

Man must prove the truth-i.e. the reality and power, the this-sideness of
his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of
thinking that is isolated from practice is purely-scholastic-question.

 MIYACHi TATSUO