Alan Spector Wrote:
<Separating
the supposedly "moral" argument from the supposedly "scientific" argument is a
way of counterposing being "humanistic" (by which I mean anti-racist,
anti-sexist, compassionate, egalitarian etc. as opposed to other
definitions of "humanistic" that emphasize its nasty side) from
being "scientific" or "accurate". It allows those who want to legitimize their
anti-social behavior to assert that the "moral" position is admirable, but
impossible, since it is not based on science. That's why Marxism has
been such a threat to the mutually supportive seemingly opposite world views
of religion and "selfish-materialistic pro-capitalism". The first attacks it
as "immoral". The second attacks it as "unrealistic and religious and prone to
fanaticism". Then both sides unite in their attack against it because they
don't want to acknowledge that organizing the world on the basis of "from each
ac! cording to ability--to each according to need" might be the MOST REALISTIC
way to organize the world (acknowledging, of course, the enormous political
obstacles and cultural obstacles (especially short-sightedness and
cynicism) that would have to be overcome.>
Thanks, Alan, for your reply message, and I do see the
validity of your arguments.
However, aren’t such appeals as to the value of “socscience” (to use my
term for the concept) better handled through out-and-out “civics” and “social
studies” than through a “social science” that’s been adapted, in such a way,
as to be virtually identical with these other inquiries (except f/ the name
which purports to drive at the greater principles of human behavior)?
Let me put it
another way. So we say
“socscience” is an integral part of human activity and therefore an integral
part of studying it through social science. Fair enough! How do we square the results of human
behavior (ala socscience-related operations of people in groups) with the
larger frame of world history and natural phenomena when the laws of the
latter paint a very different picture of reality and the human condition than
“social awareness” and “consciousness” models do?
Must we throw up
our arms and say ‘Well. Social science is just a different kind of
science’ than the others in its method, knowledge type, and
object/subjects, or can we rather say there are distinct avenues of social
inquiry in an intellectual and communicative sense (with one being as good as
the other)(but that both are really distinct and separable according to means
and ends, operations and purposes)?
I’d say both
models are equally good in a qualitative, normative way; but if our end is
social awareness, then I think that clearly-defined, visible references to
social consciousness terms are the way to go (and we probably shouldn’t
confuse them with the conceptualization of social science). On the other hand, if our purpose is
driving at the greater terms of human social behavior in history, and seeing
how such principles interrelate with the laws of biology, physics, nature,
etc., then we focus instead on the units of “society-science” rather than the
colorful concepts of “socscience.”
To summarize the
problem; Citizens X, Y, and Z may be social “deviants”, and so we’ve described
them & their larger social environment in social consciousness terms. Now how do we reconcile such terms in
a contemporary/contemporaneous context of human experience with that of the
greater tapestry of world history and those areas of life touching on the
bigger picture of the natural world/cosmos? “Socscience” terms don’t mesh well
with the terms of what we know from SCIENCE and HISTORY. So if social awareness, et al, terms
are part and parcel of and inseparable from the principles of human behavior,
why the discrepancy among the rules of our social world and the rules/dynamism
of macro-history alongside the rules of nature? … That’s my question. Why aren’t these areas of knowledge
fitting better together? …
I welcome your
ideas/disagreements/criticisms … (Luke R.)
Luke
Rondinaro
Group Facilitator,
The Consilience Projects
www.topica.com/lists/consiliencep
----- Original Message -----
From:
Luke Rondinaro
To:
wsn@csf.colorado.edu
Sent:
Tuesday, July 01, 2003 10:02 PM
Subject:
Social Science - Is/Ought Reprise
The
development of social science (since its inception) has revealed two dominant
forms – one based in the systematic understanding of society and the
other based in general “social knowledge” (knowledge about society, living
and operating in society, & changing society in order to better
live/operate in it).
Now
traditionally, this difference has always been couched in
theory/praxis, “is”/”ought”, or in grounded techne/abstract
generalized episteme. We have social studies and we have
social science, we have social work/human services and we have
the science of society. We have social issues and we have
social systems.
The
trouble is these distinctions end up getting crossed. The
epistemological orientation of social systems is turned upside-down and we
talk about “the System” or “beating the system” and so
forth. Another illustration. “Organizational Behavior” is the
science of how organizations behave or operate, but it is also
understood as how to behave in an organization.
Clearly
we have a picture being painted of social science as its own kind of
science/ knowledge, a notion of social consciousness, and general social
understanding (on the one hand), while (on the other hand) we have a
SCIENCE whose object happens be human social phenomena (viewed in the
light of it existing on the same intellectual plane alongside other natural,
scientific phenomena). It’s all to easy to cough this up to
ethology/etiology dichotomization, but if we look closely both forms have
ethos/system, theory/praxis, techne/episteme elements to them.
Yet,
we’re missing something if we give this matter completely over to Max
Weber’s concept. We have all these descriptions but they do not zero-in
on the fundamental problem of social science’s dual character. All they
do is create a map of clustered scatter-plots around a general area of which
our understanding seems rather fuzzy … It seem to me that it is time we
triangulate these clusters and look at the pattern that emerges from their
juxtapositions.
It’s
apparent one form of social science (where the term is more openly
applied) centers on general social knowledge and understanding. ‘Larry lives
in the Bronx, he’s a cabby, and he pays high rent for a bad apartment.’
“Social” conceptually precedes “science” in this definition of social
science. Additionally, the atmosphere of the “social” is framed in its
own special grounded, pragmatic, and experientialist light of ethos, praxis,
and even materialistic value. The other form of social SCIENCE sees
human behavior as being in line with other processes of the natural world;
they exist together on the same continuum. Methodologically and
epistemologically they are all studied and considered in a scientific fashion;
the human social sphere while it’s somewhat unique and separable from the rest
cannot be considered as an islan! d unto itself.
So,
perhaps it would do us good to think about this other distinction
instead. The one form of social science seems to center itself on the
idea of social conscience and consciousness. We could call
this type of social knowledge “socscience.” And, the other form
of social science can be called “society-science” (as it deals with
social systems, general principles interspersed with factual content about
social phenomena, and the fundamental idea that these can be studied like any
other natural systems, since they are ultimately operable by the same
laws).
I
would appreciate your further input on this topic and my ideas about it.
Mostly, my question comes down to this ---> why do we have these two
different social sciences in the first place? Why not just have the one
as our social science? … because isn’t - when we come right down
to it - the second one based in a flawed, transient paradigm of our social
reality? … Isn’t the idea of “Larry the cabby from the Bronx” (with all the
social imagery that arises from such) shaped more by our present (and
passable)(cultural) system of meaning than anything substantial or lasting
about human behavior/social phenomena (via our knowledge or
science/epistemology) of it? …
That’s
the problem I’ve been mulling over the last year, and for the life of me, I
can’t quite figure out the import of, say, the sociology of an Andrew Greeley
when we have the better social science of an Immanuel Wallerstein (in both the
area of theory and praxis, generality and detail, abstraction and
concreteness)? What, frankly, is the use of the first model when we have
what seems to me to be a better social science of the second? I’d like to get
your ideas on this question. (Luke R.)