The development of
social science (since its inception) has revealed two dominant forms – one
based in the systematic understanding of society and the other based in
general “social knowledge” (knowledge about society, living and operating
in society, & changing society in order to better live/operate in
it).
Now traditionally, this difference
has always been couched in theory/praxis, “is”/”ought”, or in
grounded techne/abstract generalized episteme. We have social studies and we
have social science, we have social work/human services and we
have the science of society.
We have social issues and we have social
systems.
The trouble is these distinctions
end up getting crossed. The
epistemological orientation of social systems is turned upside-down and we
talk about “the System” or “beating the system” and so
forth. Another illustration. “Organizational Behavior” is the
science of how organizations behave or operate, but it is also
understood as how to behave in an
organization.
Clearly we have a picture being
painted of social science as its own kind of science/ knowledge, a notion
of social consciousness, and general social understanding (on the one
hand), while (on the other hand) we have a SCIENCE whose object happens be
human social phenomena (viewed in the light of it existing on the same
intellectual plane alongside other natural, scientific phenomena). It’s all to easy to cough this up to
ethology/etiology dichotomization, but if we look closely both forms have
ethos/system, theory/praxis, techne/episteme elements to
them.
Yet, we’re missing something if
we give this matter completely over to Max Weber’s concept. We have all these descriptions but
they do not zero-in on the fundamental problem of social science’s dual
character. All they do is create
a map of clustered scatter-plots around a general area of which our
understanding seems rather fuzzy … It seem to me that it is time we
triangulate these clusters and look at the pattern that emerges from their
juxtapositions.
It’s apparent one form of social
science (where the term is more openly applied) centers on general
social knowledge and understanding. ‘Larry lives in the Bronx, he’s a cabby,
and he pays high rent for a bad apartment.’ “Social” conceptually precedes
“science” in this definition of social science. Additionally, the atmosphere of the
“social” is framed in its own special grounded, pragmatic, and experientialist
light of ethos, praxis, and even materialistic value. The other form of social SCIENCE sees
human behavior as being in line with other processes of the natural world;
they exist together on the same continuum. Methodologically and epistemologically
they are all studied and considered in a scientific fashion; the human social
sphere while it’s somewhat unique and separable from the rest cannot be
considered as an island unto itself.
So, perhaps it would do us good to
think about this other distinction instead. The one form of social science seems
to center itself on the idea of social conscience and
consciousness. We could
call this type of social knowledge “socscience.” And, the other form of social science
can be called “society-science” (as it deals with social systems,
general principles interspersed with factual content about social phenomena,
and the fundamental idea that these can be studied like any other natural
systems, since they are ultimately operable by the same
laws).
I would appreciate your further
input on this topic and my ideas about it. Mostly, my question comes down to this
---> why do we have these two different social sciences in the first
place? Why not just have the one
as our social science? … because isn’t - when we come right down
to it - the second one based in a flawed, transient paradigm of our social
reality? … Isn’t the idea of “Larry the cabby from the Bronx” (with all the
social imagery that arises from such) shaped more by our present (and
passable)(cultural) system of meaning than anything substantial or lasting
about human behavior/social phenomena (via our knowledge or
science/epistemology) of it?
…
That’s the problem I’ve been
mulling over the last year, and for the life of me, I can’t quite figure out
the import of, say, the sociology of an Andrew Greeley when we have the better
social science of an Immanuel Wallerstein (in both the area of theory and
praxis, generality and detail, abstraction and concreteness)? What, frankly, is the use of the first
model when we have what seems to me to be a better social science of the
second? I’d like to get your ideas on this question. (Luke R.)
Luke Rondinaro, Group Facilitator,
The Consilience Projects
www.topica.com/lists/consiliencep