[no subject]

IW's latest. Interesting to note that he points out that even if the US wins 
easily, it won't be a winner globally and that the prospects for peace and a 
Palestinian state will be diminished.  Interesting because Bush just announced 
his new initiative for the creation of a Palestinian state within five years.

He concludes: 
"In early 2004, where will all this leave the Bush regime? It will leave it 
facing a rapidly growing antiwar movement in the United States, which might 
actually swing the Democratic Party into a real opposition to Bush's global 
policies. Not easy, but quite possible. If so, the Democrats could probably win 
the elections."

But if the Democrats do win, then does this mean that US power will decline 
more gracefully?  Certainly, the genie let out of the bottle by Bush (states 
and organizations willing to oppose the US) won't be going back in, and that 
definitely takes us further in the direction of further systemic breakdown in 
the interstate system.


Commentary No. 109, Mar. 15, 2003

"Bush Bets All He Has"

The United States is in deep trouble. The President of the United States has 
taken an enormous gamble, and done it from a fundamentally weak position. He 
decided a year ago or so that the U.S. would make war on Iraq. He did this in 
order to demonstrate the overwhelming military superiority of the United States 
and to accomplish two primary objectives: 1) intimidate all potential nuclear 
proliferators into abandoning their projects; 2) squash all European ideas of 
an autonomous political role in the world-system.

Thus far, Bush has been magnificently unsuccessful. North Korea and Iran (and 
perhaps others as yet unobserved) have actually speeded up their proliferation 
projects. France and Germany have shown what it means to be autonomous. And the 
United States is not able to get any of the six Third World countries on the 
Security Council to vote a second resolution on Iraq. So, like a reckless 
gambler, Bush is about to go for broke. He will launch a war in a very short 
time, and bet that he can achieve an overwhelming and rapid victory. The bet is 
very simple. Bush believes that if the U.S. does achieve this kind of military 
result, both the proliferators and the Europeans will repent of their ways and 
accept U.S. decisions in the future.

There are two possible military outcomes: the one Bush wants (and expects), and 
a different one. How likely is it that Bush achieves the rapid capitulation of 
the Iraqis? The Pentagon says they have the weaponry and will do it rapidly. A 
long list of retired generals, both American and British, have voiced their 
skepticism. My guess (and for me that is all it is) is that the outcome of 
rapid, total victory is not very likely. I think that a combination of the 
desperate determination of the Iraqi leadership plus an upsurge of Iraqi 
nationalism plus the announced unwillingness of the Kurds to fight Saddam (not 
because they don't hate him but because they distrust profoundly U.S. 
intentions with regard to them) will make it extremely difficult for the U.S. 
to end the war in a matter of weeks. It will probably take many months, and 
once it takes many months, who can predict where the winds will blow, first of 
all in British and then U.S. public opinion?

Nevertheless, suppose the U.S. wins quickly. I would say that, at that point, 
Bush comes out merely even - not a winner, but not a loser. Why do I say that? 
Because a victory will leave the geopolitical situation more or less where it 
is today. First of all, there is the question of what happens in Iraq the day 
after victory? The least one can say is that no one knows, and it is not at all 
clear that the U.S. itself has a clear vision of what it wants to do. What we 
do know is that the interests at play are multiple, diverse, and totally 
uncoordinated. That is a scenario for anarchic confusion. For the U.S. to play 
a significant role in the postwar decision-making will require a long-term 
commitment of troops and a lot of money (really a lot of money). Anyone who 
looks at the U.S. economic situation and the internal politics of the U.S. 
knows that the Bush administration would have a very hard job leaving troops 
there very long and an even harder job obtaining the money it would need to 
play the political game.

In addition, all the other problems facing the world would remain intact. First 
of all, there would be even less likelihood than now that there could be any 
progress towards the creation of a Palestinian state. The Israeli government 
would take a U.S. victory as vindication for its tough line, and simply make it 
tougher. The Arab world would get even angrier, if that's possible. Iran 
certainly will not stop its drive for nuclear proliferation. Iran will 
probably, on the contrary, be feeling its oats in the region with Saddam 
Hussein out of the way. North Korea would step up its provocations, and South 
Korea would get even more uncomfortable with its U.S. ally and the latter's 
penchant for military action. And France is likely to dig in for the long haul. 
So, as I say, a rapid U.S. military victory in Iraq would leave us with the 
geopolitical status quo - which is certainly not what the U.S. hawks intend.

But suppose the military victory is not rapid. What then? In that case, the 
whole operation is a geopolitical disaster for the U.S. Pandemonium will break 
out, and the U.S. will have as little influence on its future outcome as say 
Italy, which is to say not very much at all. Why do I say that? Think of what 
will happen, first of all in Iraq itself. Iraqi resistance will turn Saddam 
Hussein into a hero, and he will certainly know how to exploit that sentiment. 
The Iranians and the Turks will both send their troops into the Kurdish north, 
and probably end up fighting each other. The Kurds may side for the moment with 
the Iranians. If that happens, the Shiite groups in the south of Iraq will keep 
their distance from the U.S. military efforts. The Saudis may offer themselves 
as unwelcome mediators, and will probably be rejected by both sides.

Elsewhere in the region, the Hezbollah will probably attack the Israelis, who 
will riposte and probably try to occupy southern Lebanon. Will the Syrians then 
enter that war, to try to save the Hezbollah and, more generally, their role in 
Lebanon? Quite possible, but if so, the Israelis will bomb Damascus (maybe with 
nuclear weapons). Will the Egyptians then sit still? And oh yes, there is that 
fellow, Osama bin Laden, who will no doubt be doing the usual thing he likes to 
do.

And Europe? There will probably be a major revolt in the Labor Party in the 
U.K., which might end up with a split in the party. Blair might take his rump 
out and form a national emergency coalition with the Tories. He would still be 
Prime Minister, but there would be great pressure for new elections, and Blair 
would probably lose, and lose badly. And then there is the little matter of the 
warning Blair received from legal advisors that, if the British went into Iraq 
without U.N. explicit endorsement, he could be brought up on charges before the 
International Criminal Court. Aznar's electoral prospects in Spain have become 
similarly doubtful, given extensive opposition within his own party to Spain's 
position. Berlusconi and the East/Central Europeans will start to get very cold 
feet.

Meanwhile, in Latin America, one will say goodbye to the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA, or in Spanish ALCA). Instead, Lula will press for the 
reinvigoration of Mercosur as a trade and currency structure, and might even 
get Chile to come into it. Fox will be in deep trouble in Mexico. In Southeast 
Asia, the two largest Muslim nations (Indonesia and Malaysia), both of which 
presently have governments essentially friendly to the U.S., may try to emulate 
Europe in creating a zone of autonomous action. There will be great pressure on 
the Philippine government to send the U.S. military home. And China is likely 
to tell Japan that it had better loosen its political ties with the U.S. if it 
expects to continue to have an economic future in the region.

In early 2004, where will all this leave the Bush regime? It will leave it 
facing a rapidly growing antiwar movement in the United States, which might 
actually swing the Democratic Party into a real opposition to Bush's global 
policies. Not easy, but quite possible. If so, the Democrats could probably win 
the elections.

If all this happens, Bush will indeed have achieved regime change - in Great 
Britain, Spain, and the United States. And the United States will no longer be 
regarded as an invincible military superpower. So, to resume, if Bush wins, he 
faces a geopolitical status quo, which is far less than he wants. And if he 
loses, he really loses. I would say the odds are not very promising. The 
historians will record that there was no need for the U.S. after September 11 
to put itself in this impossible position.

Immanuel Wallerstein