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Germany and Iraq by Elson Boles 16 October 2002 20:03 UTC |
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This article is taken originally from Le Monde. Is Germany trying to "get back into the fold." Is there a fold to get back into? Germany out on a limb over Iraq policy Daniel Vernet After dining with the French president, Jacques Chirac, on October 2, the German chancellor, Gerhard Schroder, confirmed that his country would not take part in any war against Iraq, with or without the backing of the United Nations - a stance that greatly riled the US administration. Ten days after his narrow victory in Germany's general election, Schroder could hardly have done a u-turn without dismaying his own Christian Democratic party, his allies the Greens, and German public opinion in general, which is hostile to military "adventures" - the word used by the chancellor when referring to US plans. But this official aspect of German policy is only half the story. The other involves delicate manoeuvres aimed at bringing Germany back into the fold. They began with a lightning visit by Schroder to Prime Minister Tony Blair. Feelers were then put out to the US by the foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, who suggested that Germany, while not taking part in a military operation in Iraq, did not rule out playing a role in the "nation-building" process that would follow Saddam Hussein's fall. Fischer, who will probably visit the Washington soon and meet the US secretary of state, Colin Powell, in a bid to ease tension between the two countries, has the advantage of having taken a more moderate stance on Iraq than the chancellor did during the election campaign. He knew that if the Christian Democrats won, he, as foreign minister, would be left to pick up the pieces. The Germans need to try to regain the trust of the Americans and to break out of their isolation in Europe on the Iraq issue. The position of the French, initially at least, is a godsend to Schroder. The refusal to include an automatic use of force in the first security council resolution is an area where a joint position could be hammered out. True, the French stance has caused difficulties for the Americans that they could have done without, but it does not prejudice the steps that will probably have to be taken if Iraq continues to violate UN resolutions. The French do not rule out the use of force if it is proved that Saddam is seeking to equip himself with weapons of mass destruction. During the German election campaign, the slogan "No war with Iraq" was effective because of its simplicity. In fact it conceals a more complex set of possibilities, which range from a rejection of any conflict with Iraq to a decision not to participate in it. That decision would be easier for the Germans to adopt if the US acted unilaterally than if the UN decided on a multinational operation. If the weapons inspectors are allowed to return to Iraq without the use of force, Berlin will simply need to cajole Washington into forgetting that the Germans had stepped out of line. If, on the other hand, Saddam does not obey the security council's recommendations, Germany will face a real dilemma, and will be forced to reconsider its response to a war with Baghdad. Schroder realises that France, as a permanent member of the security council, needs room for manoeuvre. He would be well advised to allow himself similar room, so as not to lock himself into a refusal that would isolate Germany. It is not yet certain whether the "red-green" coalition's stance on Iraq was dictated by electoral considerations, or whether it marks a profound change in Germany's foreign policy that means it no longer has any compunction in disagreeing with its most trusted allies. When Schroder came to power in 1998 he said Germany's foreign policy would be based on "enlightened self-interest". That was generally understood to mean that he would defend German interests within the European Union rather than accept unfavourable compromises as the price to pay for Berlin's guilty feelings about its past. If the international community, as represented by the security council, authorises an intervention against Iraq, the moment of truth will have arrived for Germany. It will not be forced to take part in the war if it believes that to do so would be contrary to its interests or beyond its capabilities. But a decision by Berlin to go it alone by disagreeing with the leading international powers - not just the US - would send out an alarming message. Everything suggests that this will not happen. Schroder seems determined, with Fischer's help, to get out of the hole he dug for himself in response to election campaign pressures. October 8 The Guardian Weekly 17-10-2002, page 29 Elson Boles Assistant Professor Dept. of Sociology Saginaw Valley State University University Center Saginaw MI, 48710
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