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Le Monde Diplo October 1998/ Pravda 2001-11-07 on the 'sharia emirate' by Tausch, Arno 20 September 2002 08:58 UTC |
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HAZY OUTLINES OF AN ISLAMIST INTERNATIONAL Fundamentalists without a common cause ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---- On the fringe of the UN General Assembly, the representatives of the United States and Russia have been meeting those of Afghanistan's six neighbours to discuss the crisis caused by the Taliban offensive, the assassination of Iranian diplomats in Mazar-i-Sharif and the massacres of Afghan Shiites. With Iranian troops massing on the border, joint manoeuvres by the Russians and Tajiks, and the rumoured deployment of Russian soldiers in Uzbekistan, a regional war is on the cards. The increasingly isolated Taliban regime is still not in control of the whole country. At the UN, Iranian President Mohamad Khatami has accused the Taliban of genocide and turning Afghanistan into a base for terrorism and drug trafficking. But a war in the region could cost Iran dear and strengthen its hardliners. A new pattern of regional alliances is emerging. The Taliban are supported only by Pakistan and, according to several sources, by the Israeli government, which is obsessed by the "Iranian threat". Their links with Saudi Arabia have become strained and their once close relationship with the United States has deteriorated, as shown by the American bombing of Osama bin Laden's Afghan bases in August. On the other side, a grand alliance is taking shape, comprising Iran, Russia and the members of the Community of Independent States, apparently supported by India and even China, which is worried by the spread of Islamist propaganda within its own borders. The days of the "great game", when Moscow and London vied for control of Central Asia, are over. The new game which is developing is fraught with danger, both for Afghanistan and the whole region. - A. G. by OLIVIER ROY ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---- The West first felt the blast of Islamist radicalism in 1983, when hundreds of French paratroopers and US marines died in the Beirut barracks bombing. Iran raged against America, the "Great Satan". Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, Ronald Reagan's "evil empire", was raining bombs on Muslim Afghanistan, with the apparent connivance of radical Islamists. Washington conceived a plan to make Moscow pay the maximum price for its occupation of Afghanistan while turning Islamic radicalism against the communists and, as a spin-off, against the Iranian Shia. The idea was to encourage a specifically Sunni radicalism aiming at full application of the sharia but avoiding any hint of Islamic "revolution". This suited Saudi Arabia perfectly, since it was anxious to strengthen its Islamic credentials in opposition to Iran. As for the Pakistani intelligence services, they had (and still have) the wider aim of playing the Sunni Islamist card to gain control of Afghanistan and achieve a breakthrough in Central Asia (1). The operation was mounted jointly by the CIA, the director of the Saudi Intelligence Department, Prince Turki bin Feisal (who is still in office), and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI). However, only the Pakistanis were prepared to put men on the ground. The CIA had got its fingers badly burnt in Vietnam and Laos, and the Saudis were used to paying others to do any work, from national defence to driving their expensive limousines. So the job was given to the Arab Muslim Brothers and the Pakistani Islamist Party, Jamaat-i Islami, from which General Zia ul Haqq, Pakistan's head of state from 1977 to 1988, drew many of his advisors. Starting in late 1984, thousands of the Middle East's most militant Islamist activists made their way to Afghanistan. Their recruitment was coordinated by Osama bin Laden, a rich Saudi Arabian. In Peshawar they were taken in hand by the Mektab ul Khedamat, an office led by Abdallah Azzam, a Jordanian Muslim Brother of Palestinian origin who was assassinated in September 1989 in mysterious circumstances. Most of these volunteers, subsequently known as "Afghans", were members of opposition groups from all over the Middle East. The only non-dissidents among them were the Sudanese, who had been very active in Islamic welfare organisations. None of them, of course, were Shiites (2). Most were sent to the Hezb-i-Islami camps of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, but some were assigned to local commanders like Jellaluddin Haqqani, today a staunch supporter of the Taliban. The situation changed radically with the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan (February 1989), the Gulf war (1990-91) and the fall of the Soviet Union (1991). The "Afghans" ceased to be of any use to Washington. Turning against the United States, they accused it of waging war on the Muslim world. Pakistan abandoned its protégé Hekmatyar, who had incurred the wrath of Saudi Arabia by supporting Saddam Hussein. In August 1994 it switched its support to the Taliban, who were just as Islamist but more conservative. Washington indulged the Taliban from 1994 to 1996 (3), but the situation changed once again when they gave refuge to Osama bin Laden, got involved in poppy cultivation and stepped up the repression of women. The State Department, in the person of Madeleine Albright, clearly distanced itself from them in the autumn of 1997. But the camps that had been set up in Afghan tribal areas to train anti-Soviet mujaheddin were never closed down. The international networks have continued to recruit for one jihad after another: an Islamic state in Afghanistan, Yemen up to 1994, Kashmir, Bosnia, and now the United States itself. A two-way traffic developed. While hunted militants took refuge in the camps, the fighters trained there returned to their home countries and are now to be found in all the most militant movements. These movements, of course, have histories of their own and are not simply creations of the "Afghans". A possible exception is Algeria, where the founding leaders of the GIA (Armed Islamic Group), Tayyeb al-Afghani (killed in November 1992), Jaffar al-Afghani (killed in March 1994) and Sherif Gousmi (killed in September 1994), were all Afghan returnees. They were also to be found in the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) with figures such as Said Mekhloufi, Kamareddin Kherbane and Abdallah Anas (real name Boudjema Bunnua, who arrived in Afghanistan in 1984 and married Abdallah Azzam's daughter). But in Algeria they figured most prominently in the GIA: Abu Messaab, a Syrian, and Abu Hazma al-Misri (Mustafa Kamel) from Egypt are the main ideologists of Al Ansar, the GIA newsletter published in London. Both men have lived in Peshawar. On the Egyptian front, Muhammad al-Islambuli, brother of President Sadat's assassin, has been living in Afghanistan for ten years or so. Fuad Qassim and Ahmad Taha, the leaders of the Egyptian Islamist group Gamaat Islamiyya, are both former "Afghans", as is Ayman al-Zawahiri, leader of the Egyptian Jihad, who co-signs Osama bin Laden's communiqués. The Kashmiri movement Harakat al Ansar has its training camp in the Afghan province of Khost. This camp was the main target of the American bombing raid on 21 August. Nevertheless, many Afghan returnees have difficulty in finding a place in current struggles. Uprooted, they tend to gravitate between Peshawar and, surprisingly, New Jersey, the latest Muslim "ghetto". Investigation of the explosion that almost destroyed New York's World Trade Centre in February 1993 led to a strange band of activists. The main suspect, the Egyptian Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, had spent time in Peshawar, and both his sons fought in Afghanistan, where they are still to be found on the side of the Taliban. The sheikh, who is known to have approved the assassination of President Sadat, is one of the founders of the radical Egyptian Islamist movement Gamaat Islamiyya. Despite this, he was given a visa by the American consulate in Khartoum in May 1990 and got a green card on arrival in New Jersey. The other suspects, Ramzi Yousef, a Pakistani brought up in Kuwait, Muhammad Salameh and Ahmad Ajjaj (both Palestinians) had also spent time in the Afghan camps. The attack on the World Trade Centre was not an isolated incident. In 1993 a Pakistani, Mir Aimal Kansi, opened fire on staff entering the CIA's headquarters in Langley. Both Yousef and Kansi were picked up by the FBI in Pakistan, Yousef in 1995 and Kansi in 1997. Ex-ISI Chief Hamid Gul was furious at the extraditions and called for the Pakistani officials responsible to be court-martialled. On 11 November 1997 four American employees of an oil company were assassinated in Karachi in reprisal for the sentence passed on Kansi in the United States. The assassination was claimed by Harakat al Ansar, a group which had its origins in the "Afghan" camps. Mehat Muhammad Abdel Rahman, suspected to be the leader of the group responsible for the massacre of European tourists in Luxor in September 1997, was also an "Afghan". And so is Said Sayyed Salama, whose extradition from Egypt in June of this year provoked a communiqué from Osama bin Laden threatening revenge. The two attacks against Americans on Saudi territory are a little more obscure. The first was the bombing of a National Guard training centre in Riyadh in November 1995. The accused, Hassan Abdel Rab Al Sarihi, was a 35-year-old Saudi Arabian living in Pakistan, who was alleged to have spent time in Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's training camps. To Washington's chagrin, the Saudis executed him without giving the Americans a chance to debrief him. The bombing of the Khobar Towers military housing complex in Dhahran in June 1996 is still the subject of intense controversy. For a year the American press pointed the finger at Iran and accused the Saudis of covering up the Iranian connection so as not to jeopardise their rapprochement with Tehran. However, it was the Iranians, not the Saudis, who had been seeking a rapprochement, with a view to the Islamic summit in Tehran in December 1997. And it is rather strange that there has been no more talk of an Iranian lead since the only suspect (Hani al-Sayegh, a Saudi Shiite who had spent some time in Qom) was extradited to the United States. This brief survey shows that most of the attacks on Western interests can be traced to a network of radical Sunni movements based in the Pakistan-Afghanistan borderlands. What is striking about these new movements, of which the Taliban are the prototype, is the contrast between their political radicalism and their ideological conservatism. It is this which distinguishes them from large Islamist movements like Khomeinism. The mudslinging of the Western media should not blind us to the fact that the Taliban arouse a sympathetic response in a sector of Muslim public opinion (4). Their sole point of reference is the sharia, and their outlook is uncompromisingly conservative and profoundly Sunni in character. The social content of the Islamic revolution is foreign to them. In Egypt, for example, the Gamaat Islamiyya approved the agrarian counter-reform carried out by Mubarak last autumn. The goal of the radical Sunni movements is the sharia, the whole sharia, and nothing but the sharia. What is more, the sharia itself is very narrowly defined, with the term "sharia emirate" preferred to "Islamic state". This outlook is partly explained by the militants' social base. They stem mostly from the private religious schools (madrasas) that have mushroomed in certain Muslim countries, particularly those like Pakistan where state schooling is blatantly inadequate. The private madrasas have received funding from Saudi Arabia and are exposed to the propaganda of conservative governments that are pushing the sharia in an attempt to cut the ground from under the radicals' feet. They are flooding an already saturated market with thousands of preachers who have no skills other than a vague knowledge of the sharia and for whom the Islamisation of society offers the only hope of social advancement. Against this background, Osama bin Laden does not appear as the "mastermind" behind radical Islamist movements throughout the world. He should rather be seen as a trainer of militants who subsequently choose their own fields of action or mount spectacular symbolic operations within the framework of his organisation Al Qaida. These militants are connected by networks of personal relations and supported, in Pakistan, by a group of parties that have been in existence for a long time and include the traditionalist, conservative Jamiat Ulema-i Islami, which, like the Afghan Taliban, follows the teachings of the Deoband School (5), and the Islamist movement Jamaat-i-Islami. Both of these organisations have sprouted more violent splinter groups. In the first case, the Sipah-i-Saheban (Army of the Companions of the Prophet), whose mission is war against the Shiites. In the second case, the Dawat-ul-Irshad, set up in 1987, which is very active in Kashmir. Private madrasas, like the one in Akora Khattak, near Peshawar, which is run by Pakistani Senator Sami ul Haqq (a member of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islami), have sent thousands of students to Afghanistan to join the ranks of the Taliban. While the new movements brandish the traditional banner of "anti-imperialism", the American flag is now being burnt in the name of the sharia. What is "radical" about these movements is their choice of violence and their visceral hatred of "Crusaders", Jews and Shiites, a hatred fed by all the frustrations of the last ten years (notably the Gulf war and America's indulgence of Binyamin Netanyahu). The tone is exemplified by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri's announcement, earlier this year, of the creation of a World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders. The Shiites are regarded as heretics (6). The exacerbation of inter-communal strife in Pakistan and the blockade of Shiite areas by the Taliban in Afghanistan are symptomatic. This is a considerable setback for Iran, which posed throughout the 1980s as the leader of a world Islamic revolution transcending the Sunni-Shia divide. The murder of Iranian diplomats by the Taliban and the assassination of Iranian cadets and diplomats in Pakistan last winter show that Iran is now as much of target as America. Tehran did not join the Arab League in protesting against the American bomb attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan, and is now on the verge of war with the Taliban. The new situation is also a setback for the United States and Saudi Arabia. The Saudi model of alliance between conservative Islamic fundamentalism and the West has failed. The problem for Washington is that it has no alternative political strategy vis-à-vis the Muslim world. On the Saudi side, the double talk of Prince Turki, a convinced pro-American who has always supported the radical Sunni movements and was still with the Taliban in the spring of this year, is reaching its limits (7). Riyadh is spending large sums of money to fund Islamist networks that actually feel nothing but contempt for the emirs and their petrodollars and think the Islamic State of Saudi Arabia would be even more Islamic without the Saud dynasty. In Pakistan, however, the radical Sunni movements enjoy solid support within the state apparatus. They are an integral part of the country's regional strategy of guerrilla warfare in Kashmir, control of Afghanistan, and Islamic agitation in Central Asia. The former head of the ISI, General Hamid Gul, spoke out fiercely against the United States after the bomb attack on 20 August. One of his successors, General Javed Nasir, was sacked in 1994 for Islamist sympathies. The new president is himself an Islamist sympathiser. In September this year, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced full Islamisation of the legal system. While handing over from time to time the people most directly implicated in anti-American attacks (Yousef, Kansi and Odeh for the Nairobi bombing), Pakistan is still playing the Taliban card to the full. The question for the Americans is whether Pakistan itself has become a rogue state, and a nuclear one to boot. It would appear that the United States was fighting the wrong enemy in 1995 when it introduced sanctions against Iran through the D'Amato bill, just as Tehran was ceasing to be involved in anti-Western violence. Given the weakness of the Executive and the incompetence of Congress in matters of foreign policy, the United States is drifting like a ship without a captain, loosing Tomahawk missiles at random (8). The Sunni fundamentalist movements are capable of spectacular attacks and portray themselves as the vanguard of struggle against the United States. But in fact they are largely disconnected from the real strategic issues of the Muslim world (except in Pakistan and Afghanistan). Their distinctive feature is their internationalism and lack of territorial base. Their activists wander from jihad to jihad, generally on the fringes of the Middle East (Afghanistan, Kashmir, Bosnia). They are indifferent to their own nationalities. Some have several. Ramzi Yousef calls himself a Pakistani by birth and a Palestinian by choice (9), and Muhammad Sadiq Odeh is said to be a Palestinian born in Jordan and married to a Kenyan. Others, like Osama bin Laden, whose Saudi nationality has been revoked, have none. They all define themselves as Muslim internationalists and link their militancy to no particular national cause. Their "centres" are located in the no-man's-land of the Afghan-Pakistani tribal areas. They are thus disconnected not only from existing states (especially Iran), but also from the large Islamist movements, which have disowned their offspring. The whole of the FIS, for example, including the tendency led by Abdallah Anas, has condemned the GIA. The large Islamist movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the FIS, Refah in Turkey and Hamas in Palestine, place their struggles in a national framework and claim full recognition as protagonists in the political process. This approach, which is shared by Iran, might appropriately be described as Islamic nationalism. It is a far cry from the imaginary umma which Osama bin Laden and his associates invoke. These are more like the urban guerrillas of Sunni fundamentalism which, without a genuine political project, recruit on the social and geographical fringes of the Middle East, where tensions are exacerbated by the political deadlock (10). ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---- * Director of Research at the CNRS (1) The Pakistani army has always seen the Afghan affair as an opportunity to achieve strategic depth with respect to India and to open a corridor to Central Asia. As a corollary of this policy, Pakistan expects its support for the Afghan mujaheddin to result in a virtual Pakistani protectorate in liberated Afghanistan, to be established in the name of Islam and, more subtly, by means of Pashtun ethnic connections on both sides of the border. An interesting testimony, though heavily slanted and highly tendentious, is the book by ISI General Mohammed Yousaf, The Bear Trap, Jang, Lahore, 1992. (2) Iran did send a few pasdaran (revolutionary guards) as advisors to the Afghan Shia, but nothing on the scale of the "Afghan" phenomenon. The Iranian activists of the 1980s learnt the art of war in Lebanon, not in Afghanistan, one of the reasons being to avoid antagonising the Soviets. (3) See Olivier Roy, "Avec les Taliban : la charia plus le gazoduc", Le Monde diplomatique, November 1996. (4) See, inter alia, http://www.taliban.com, a pro-Taliban Website run by the newspaper Dharb ul Mumin. (5) A traditional religious school founded in the 19th century to combat the influence of Hinduism on Islam on the Indian sub-continent. (6) The current obsession with Iran as the mastermind behind all Islamic terrorism obscures the violently anti-Shia aspect of Sunni radicalism. There is whole body of anti-Shia literature on the Pakistani market which is little known outside the country. See for example Khomeyni, Iranian revolution and the Shia faith, by Maulana Nomani, a follower of the Deoband School, with an introduction by Sayyed Nadwi. On 2 August 1998 Dharb ul Mumin, a newspaper closely associated with the Taliban, published on the Taliban Website some khutba (sermons) by Sheikh Hudaybi, imam of the Masjid-e Nabavi mosque, in which, after an attack on Christians and Jews, he describes the Shia as kuffar (ungodly), rafawiz (heretics) and monafiqin (hypocrites). (7) The Saud dynasty is obliged to make concessions to the anti-Western current that is gaining strength not only in certain parts of the country but also at the very heart of the Wahhabite religious establishment, which has up to now been a pillar of the monarchy. (8) The theory behind the US Congress' outlook has put formulated by an "expert", Ken Timmerman, who endeavours to demonstrate that Iran is behind all terrorist action. In a article in The Wall Street Journal on 11 August 1998, he states categorically, without any attempt at proof, that Iran was responsible for the attacks on the embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. (9) Washington Post, 5 June 1995. (10) See Olivier Roy, The failure of Political Islam, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1994. Translated by Barry Smerin Pravda.RU:World:More in detail 15:20 2001-11-07 BEFORE 1990 BIN LADEN WAS NOT A MONSTER Up to the year 1990, Osama bin Laden made an impression of a "well-mannered, gentle young man, not daring to express his opinion in a conversation". This was told by ex-chief of Saudi intelligence, prince Turki Al-Feisal, who met with bin Laden three times (twice in Saudi embassy to Islamabad, and once - in the kingdom, where bin Laden returned in 1990). In his interview to Saudi TV station MBC, the head of general intelligence of the kingdom, who resigned this August, noticed, that bin Laden had been an ordinary man, one of the not many Saudi volunteers fighting in Afghanistan. According to prince Turki, bin Laden tried to appear with anti-American announcements in schools and religious organizations, though he was not noted of undermining actions, so after a strict reprimand, he was allowed to leave the kingdom. After Soviet troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, organization created by bin Laden in 1989, did not have any concrete tasks, except a very indistinct aim of "restoration of justice", the prince said. Though, according to him, in 1990, bin Laden proposed Er-Riad to use the army of Muslim volunteers instead of US troops to deliver Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. He was against foreign troops' presence in Saudi Arabia, where Islam had been born and where the two main Muslim sanctuaries were situated, RIA 'Novosti' reports. Bin Laden was in opposition to fetva of Saudi ulems, who admitted acceptance of military help from the West to be possible for deliverance of the neighbouring country. Prince Turki supposes, that since that moment, Osama bin Laden has changed and has become so, as we know him now. In 1992, bin Laden went to South Yemen, where he recruited youth for military training in Al-Qaida's camps. Read the original in Russian: http://pravda.ru/main/2001/11/07/33516.html ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---- ALL RIGHTS RESERVED © 1997-2002 Le Monde diplomatique PS: The respected President's Mohamad Khatami's statement can be read at: http://www.ishipress.com/un-iran.htm Arno Tausch
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