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opposition to war? (two articles) by Boris Stremlin 20 August 2002 20:27 UTC |
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Think the plans for war against Iraq are getting bogged down in the face of opposition within Bush's own party and among allies abroad? Think again... --- The 'doubts' of GOP elders on Iraq attack have been overstated By Thomas Oliphant, 8/20/2002 WASHINGTON IF THE GHOSTS of national security advisers past are what President Bush has to worry about as he stumbles toward a decision about Iraq, then he has nothing to worry about. Through a combination of press oversimplification and partisan spin from opponents (and, ironically, proponents) of war, the impression has been created of widespread disagreement with the administration on the part of Republican and Democratic predecessors, including senior policy makers in the administration of Bush's father. Nothing could be further from the truth. The people who have sat where Condoleezza Rice sits have questions and challenges for Bush. They do not, however, step forward as opponents of war but instead as advocates of war as a last resort, as opponents of war without allies, without laborious preparation of public opinion in this country and abroad, of war without careful planning for the rebuilding of Iraq. Opponents of an attack on Iraq have attempted to portray Bush as beset by broad disagreement from within the Republican Party's foreign policy establishment. And hard-line proponents of war have portrayed those who have raised questions as appeasing naysayers, presumably allied with such other right-wing betes noires as Secretary of State Colin Powell. Rubbish. Most attention has been focused on the spoken and written words of Brent Scowcroft, Father Bush's national security adviser and a central architect of the Gulf War. While pseudo-Freudian babblers attempt to speculate about father-son relations, they overlook the fact that Scowcroft is anything but an opponent of military action. What Scowcroft has actually said is that if Saddam Hussein were to block a renewed, intrusive inspections program under UN auspices, his rejection could provide the persuasive reason for war that many claim the United States does not have. Compelling evidence that Saddam has acquired nuclear weapons capability could have a similar effect. Those just happen to be the two most likely scenarios that could lead to war - with overwhelming public support, Scowcroft's included. His so-called objections are much more like cautions - that we must make sure the Middle East isn't further destabilized, that support for our worldwide struggle against terrorism is not diminished. He argues, in other words, for a comprehensive policy that includes a response to Iraq; what he opposes is a sudden, Iraq-only fixation. Similarly, the cautions articulated by such figures as former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and retired General Wesley Clark, who led the campaign against Yugoslavia, emphasize the importance of a vigorous effort to recruit support from fellow members of the NATO alliance - both for any eventual war and for a multilateral approach to reconstruction after a war. The most egregious misportrayals, however, involve former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and the retiring House majority leader, Dick Armey of Texas. In his spoken and written words of late, Kissinger's only skeptical comments have involved the folly of going forward toward war without a clear commitment to a possibly lengthy and expensive nation-rebuilding effort inside Iraq. Beyond the postwar obligation, the bulk of Kissinger's commentary has consisted of an argument that preemptive war to block the potential use by a tyrant of a weapon of mass destruction is just and even prudent. Even Armey's point has been misconstrued. He has concentrated on making a case that a sneak attack out of the blue will properly earn widespread condemnation abroad and at home - that even in the presence of modern, mass-killing weapons, such strikes go against American values. Yet the administration has been a driving force behind the scenes for the very public discussion about war in which Americans are now engaged. The chances of a sneak attack could be rated at virtually zero. It is possible to argue that Bush should be more of a participant in this vital discussion than he has been to date, that the international conversation needs his voice trying to make the case in detail. But the White House has a point that Bush's full participation would imply that a decision to go to war had been made when it clearly has not been. As the discussion proceeds, it is tempting to get shrill, but this topic is too important. And as it proceeds, it is also important not to mischaracterize other people's views to fit one's own. Bush has obstacles ahead, but the notion he has serious opponents in his own party on Iraq is simply inaccurate. Thomas Oliphant's e-mail address is oliphant@globe.com This story ran on page A19 of the Boston Globe on 8/20/2002. © Copyright 2002 Globe Newspaper Company. ----- Bush May Get Un Support For His War An anti-war strategy that relies on the security council will fail ZNet Top VisionStrategy Home VISIONSTRATEGY Opponents of an assault on Iraq assume that the US will not try to get endorsement from the UN security council. In fact, not only is the US likely to ask for security council support, but it will probably get it. To avoid being wrong-footed by such a move, opponents of the war need a much more comprehensive policy for containing American fundamentalism. Just saying "Stop the war" is not enough. The Bush team has a long history of managing international opinion and getting its own way. Key officials including Dick Cheney, Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice were in office when the Soviet Union collapsed, Germany was unified and the Gulf war was won. Nowadays they see their duty as being to eliminate the axis of evil. Even under President Clinton's weak leadership in foreign policy, the US was able to bring its allies into line over bombing in Bosnia and Kosovo, and neither China nor Russia used their veto powers. This is how the US "playbook" for managing international opinion runs. At first, US policy appears lonely and extreme. The debate is constructed around the idea that the US does not want to be restricted by the UN, which is indeed true. When the US magnanimously decides that it will accept some form of UN blessing, there is a carefully orchestrated sigh of relief that America is returning to the multilateral fold. Britain will be first in line to agree. Russia, which has no interest in a direct confrontation with the US and needs its economic support, including membership of the World Trade Organisation, will quickly follow. Without Russian opposition, France will not want to use its veto. China has a consistent policy of abstention. It is never quite this simple and events can upset the best laid plans, but on issue after issue the US has managed to strike deals and intimidate other states into supporting UN resolutions. Some of the non-permanent members of the security council will be keen to help the US. Bulgaria wants Nato membership; Colombia is reliant on Washington in its civil war; Norway has a conservative government and is anxious not to upset its guarantor against neighbouring Russia; Mexico and Ireland have strong economic dependence on the US. This leaves Syria, Cameroon, Guinea and Singapore. The US will therefore be able to find a majority of positive votes with a few abstentions. Indeed, of the total of 15 security council members (five permanent and 10 temporary) the US may even now be able to count on eight votes just by dragging the weak temporary members into line. Further pretexts for action may be found. UN inspectors may go in, may have full access and may let everyone off the hook. However, it is likely that some real or exaggerated facts will be brought out, or enough of a provocation made to Iraq that it expels the inspectors. Many commentators and politicians will be so grateful for some kind of UN resolution that they will pay little attention to what is in it. Some voices will point out that it will doubtless fall far short of the traditional UN language authorising war. In this circumstance many people who oppose the attack on Iraq and are generally opposed to the havoc the Bush administration is wreaking with the international system will be left high and dry. MPs who have signed Alice Mahon's carefully moderate early day motion calling for UN support as a prerequisite to any attack will have found that they have trapped themselves into support for a UN-sponsored war. I hope I am wrong. But at a minimum Labour supporters accustomed to the most arcane politics of resolutions and procedures should begin, as no doubt the Russians and Chinese are already, to calculate what price Washington must pay for its war. A good start will be to insist that the UN resolution at the time of the 1991 Gulf War ceasefire is adhered to in full. The ceasefire resolution stated the importance of "all available means" being used to achieve a wide-ranging list of objectives including a nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East, control of armaments in the region, a stronger biological weapons convention, universal adherence to the chemical weapons convention and the obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. In short, the ceasefire resolution of 1991 placed further action against Iraq in the context of a global system for the management and elimination of armaments. That objective has been discarded. It should remain the basis of a modern international security strategy. There are many in the US who oppose the fundamentalist policies of the present White House team. We need to forge stronger links with them to begin to craft a strategy of containment. Dan Plesch is the senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies. __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? HotJobs - Search Thousands of New Jobs http://www.hotjobs.com
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