Re: Misleading Indicators: "Mirror" Metaphor/"Real Principles

Francesco Ranci wrote: (My comments follow his bracketed points)

[My problem with the mirror metaphor is that, as the skeptical tradition pointed out repeatedly, we cannot compare the results of our mental activity with anything else than other results of mental activity.]

Why would this be so? ... If we can’t compare anything else to the results of our mental activity (besides other results of mental activity), then how can we possibly – even in an empirical way – determine and judge what is real as opposed to what isn’t?  How could we possibly even determine the validity of the senses to correctly perceive things and not have such results be skewed by the ability of the mind to fashion and create its own reality, and create its own “perceived” facts and truth as an island unto itself?  Taking the Vedic interpretation of the cosmos for the moment, how does respond, then, to the argument that the mind is making up its own data-input and its own metaphysical schema?

[The "mirror" metaphor implies a comparison of two(sets of)items - one "outside" and the other "inside" our mind/brain(s). We would have, for example, a "real" horse versus a "representation" of a horse and we would be sure that we are in front of a horse only

when comparing our representation with the real thing, and find them similar enough. This is an undue and impossible spatial duplication of the items of which our knowledge is made (of the horse, in this case) - that puts us in the unhappy situation of never knowing if what we perceive is "real" or "unreal".]

I see your point here, but just to make a few clarifications I would put it this way; we have an integrative set of phenomena taking place in the outside world in this thing we call a “horse”, yet this phenomena and the “thing-called-horse” are not equivocal or synonymous.  The interactive, integrative phenomena tend to energetically and organically form a systematic whole that is the “thing-called-horse” in the outside world.  These force-energy-matter bundles that seem to bond and glue together physical substances in our world would themselves be the equivalent of actual “Real Principles” of Aristotelian and Thomistic parlance.  Aside from these actual interlocking phenomena in the outside world that come together to form the “thing-called-horse, the ideas we form about “horse” (and the transformations we make in shaping our sense impressions about the “thing-called-horse) form the basis of “Intellectual Principles.” What would you say to this? And, how would you respond to these three fundamental axioms of Scholastic philosophy, (1) The Principle of Non-Contradiction, (2) The Principle of Intelligibility, and (3) The Principle of Explanation (also known as the principle of Accountibility)?

[What I argue, instead, is that we compare memorized items with currently perceived items: so that the comparison is actually between two results of mental activity.]  The discovery of how this happens is, and will be I hope, a fascinating enterprise. Language, scientific activity and many other topics are involved, but I would stop this letter here for now and wait for your comments before continuing. I may already be on a wrong path of thoughts.]

 I like this statement you made here.  Could you elaborate on it some more?  Also, I’m wondering, given your conclusions and premises on this topic, how can one possibly get from the interlocking, integrative phenomena of the real world to a basis of “memorization”, if the mind’s ability to ‘discern’ and arrive at an understanding of real things is itself, more or less, a closed circle?  (That is to say, if the mind can only compare the results of two sets of mental activities, between what one “knows” about this versus one’s “question” about that, then where does the memorizing function come into play?  Is the knowledge of sense impressions also a product of such ‘comparative’ mental activity?) Also, I’d be interested in your response to this; when you’re talking about mental activity, with respect to the processing of sense impressions in the mind, and then the ‘memorization[al]’ and comparative functions, would you see this as being more a matter of the Subconscious or the Conscious directing such processes?  I look forward to your response.

Best!

Luke R.

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