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Emerging Bush Doctrine by Contamine 26 February 2002 02:01 UTC |
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http://www.stratfor.com/standard/analysis_view.php?ID=203273
Emerging Bush Doctrine Reshaping U.S. Strategy Summary Although the Bush administration has seemed to be without a clear strategy for fighting groups like al Qaeda, a doctrine is slowly emerging that will reshape the global U.S. strategy. The defense of the United States is Washington's top priority, with all other foreign policy interests taking a back seat. Any nation that does not act against terror groups within its borders will be in a virtual state of war with Washington. Analysis Since the fall of the Taliban last year, the United States appears to have become rudderless in its war against terrorism. Washington's strategy has consisted of chasing down rumors about the location of al Qaeda and making vague threats about Iraq and insinuations about Iran and North Korea. It looks like the United States doesn't really know what to do next. But looks can be deceiving. If you examine carefully, you can see both a doctrine and a strategy emerging. This is all framed by the Bush administration's view of the situation. From where it sits, there is every reason to believe that the United States will be attacked by al Qaeda again. Even more important, the possibility that al Qaeda or some other anti- U.S. organization has obtained weapons of mass destruction cannot be excluded. If that turns out to be true, then millions of Americans may possibly be killed in the coming months or years. The most important goal for Washington must be to make absolutely certain that no further attacks, especially nuclear, chemical or biological, can be launched on the United States. There is no other comparable interest. The Bush Doctrine is based on the notion that the defense of the homeland from attacks represents an interest so fundamental that all other foreign policy interests must be completely subordinated. We might summarize the Bush Doctrine this way: The United States faces an extraordinary danger. Washington is therefore prepared to take any action anywhere in the world to defend itself from this threat. The defense of the homeland cannot be reduced to only defeating al Qaeda. The Bush administration has studied the lessons of the Israeli wars on Black September and other Palestinian groups and has drawn this conclusion: the defeat of any single group can disrupt and delay future attacks, but it cannot by itself eliminate them. Even if the United States were to utterly destroy al Qaeda, a new group would likely emerge. Therefore, the United States has three strategic goals: 1. Disrupt and defeat al Qaeda in order to buy time for a more thorough solution. 2. Prevent the emergence of follow-on groups by denying them sanctuaries in states where they can organize, train and plan. 3. Limit the threat posed by al Qaeda and follow-on groups by systematically eliminating weapons of mass destruction being held or developed by regimes that are favorably inclined toward them or in states where there is substantial sympathy for them. Beginning with the last goal, there are a finite number of nations that have intensive programs underway to develop weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems and that also might be prepared to aid al Qaeda. Three were named by U.S. President George W. Bush during the State of the Union: Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Another unnamed nation is Pakistan. It must be assumed by the United States that the first three of these countries are developing WMD and/or delivery systems. It cannot be ruled out that either their governments or powerful factions within their borders might be inclined to provide al Qaeda or other groups with these weapons for use against the United States. Washington requires that these and other nations that are identified demonstrably and verifiably abandon all attempts to build weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems. They should also convince the United States that they will under no circumstances transfer any technology to al Qaeda or any other group that intends covert action against the United States. In the case of Iraq, for example, no assurances that might be made by Baghdad could possibly carry any weight. It would therefore follow that it is the intention of the United States to identify and directly attack any Iraqi facilities that might be developing WMD. The recent announcement that the United States reserves the right to use nuclear weapons if needed fits clearly into this strategy. If it is determined that there are facilities that cannot be destroyed by conventional means, Washington is prepared to use nuclear weapons on them. Intelligence is always imperfect. It is possible that sites will be hit that do not produce WMD. This is something the United States is prepared to accept. More serious is the possibility that all WMD sites are not identified. So in order to minimize the risk the United States intends to destroy the Iraqi regime by overthrowing its leadership through a variety of military means, obviously including air strikes and special operations. If Iraqi President Saddam Hussein is in a hardened facility, even the use of nuclear weapons is not out of the question. A secondary and highly desirable outcome will be replacing the Hussein regime with one that is prepared to both abandon the development of WMD and deny sanctuary to groups planning to attack the United States. All other considerations, both humanitarian and geopolitical, are completely secondary to the primary goal. Iran, North Korea and Pakistan are all in a different class from Iraq, but still represent fundamental threats to the United States either because their governments' actions are unpredictable or because the governments' control over WMD facilities are uncertain. Assurances from these various regimes cannot be taken at face value. Therefore Iran and North Korea have been publicly warned, and we assume that Pakistan has been privately warned, that the threat presented to the United States by the diffusion of weapons of mass destruction, delivery systems or partial technologies is intolerable. Each country is being given opportunities to convince Washington that it is either not developing such weapons or that it is prepared to put into place inspection protocols that will guarantee non-diffusion. Barring a satisfactory solution, the United States is prepared to take extreme military measures in each of these countries to guarantee the elimination of threats. Simultaneously, the United States is putting forces into place for a direct, global attack on al Qaeda. U.S. intelligence is in the process of identifying locales in which al Qaeda is operating, and to the extent possible identifying precise facilities and individuals. Under the Bush Doctrine and according to clear statements by the administration, the United States will at a suitable time attack each of these facilities regardless of where they are located. If they have the support of the host government, that will be welcomed. If the host government cannot provide support but does not hinder operations, the United States will enter that country unilaterally. If the host country is actively hostile to the entry of the United States, that country will be regarded as an enemy aiding al Qaeda and its military forces will also be subject to attack. Washington has been allied with many countries since World War II. Historical relationships are of significance only to the extent that the ally is prepared to materially aid the United States in defending its physical security. If, for example, European allies cannot countenance an attack on an Iraq, then what will they support? If even the destruction of Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction appear to be too extreme a measure, then clearly the Europeans don't understand or are indifferent to the threat to the United States. The Bush administration will question the use of an ally who opposes steps essential to the physical safety of the United States. Thus, embedded in the emerging Bush Doctrine is a fundamental redefinition of the U.S. alliance. During the Cold War, U.S. allies were judged on their willingness to stand with the United States against the Soviets. Now they are judged by their willingness stand with Washington not only against al Qaeda, but the range of threats that now physically threaten the United States. The strategy that results from this appears to be a massive onslaught on multiple levels against al Qaeda, against countries that are intentionally or unintentionally enablers of al Qaeda and, above all, against countries that might be in the process of giving al Qaeda access to weapons of mass destruction. The key to understanding this U.S. strategy is its limitlessness. Embedded in the Bush Doctrine is the operational principle that there is no measure too extreme given the threat that exists to the United States. The Bush administration thinks that extreme and limitless responses are what is needed to prevent the emergence of follow- on organizations. Building an organization like al Qaeda has taken years, a great deal of resources and above all physical sanctuary. For al Qaeda, there were several bases of operation, but Afghanistan was the most recent and best known. A certain weakness has been identified in Washington's stance on previous anti-U.S. groups. In the past, the United States and others treated support for and hosting of such groups as one strand in a bilateral relationship. It was certainly a black mark, but it was also not a reason for decisive action. So in spite of the fact that the Syrians supported and hosted extremists groups, the United States did not regard this by itself as a reason to launch military action. Quite the contrary, Washington maintained a complex and varied relationship with Syria in which it would fight to undermine these groups while simultaneously working with the government on other matters. In short, support for militant groups was not a threshold, but simply another strand in the relationship. Clearly, Bush intends to change that. Under the emerging Bush Doctrine, if a nation supports or hosts a group that intends to attack the United States, or if it deliberately fails to act against such a group, then that nation is in a de facto state of war with the United States. The act of supporting or hosting such groups is a threshold that renders all other aspects of a bilateral relationship of no consequence. At a time and place of its choosing, the United States will act against both the group and the state. In order to prevent the emergence of follow-on al Qaedas, the central feature must be to deny them sanctuary. Ideally, as some have suggested, the United States could work to abolish the poverty and misunderstanding that have given rise to al Qaeda. Unfortunately, even if this were possible, there is no time. The threat, in the eyes of the Bush administration, is a matter of months and the abolition of poverty is a matter of generations. Therefore, if the carrot is impossible, then the stick will be used. It is not clear that the Bush Doctrine will ever be formalized. But it is increasingly apparent that the United States is moving to adopt this strategy. It is a complete reshaping of U.S. global strategy based on the assumption that the interests of the United States have been fundamentally redefined by al Qaeda. An extraordinary threat has been posed. An extraordinary solution will be implemented. In one sense, this seems to play into al Qaeda's hands. The group's strategy was to force the United States into a war with the Islamic world, so that its vision of Washington as the "crusader" enemy of Islam would be validated. The Bush strategy accepts such a risk for two reasons. First, there is no choice. If the United States refuses to attack al Qaeda everywhere out of fear of perceptions, then al Qaeda will be a perpetual menace. Second, al Qaeda envisioned a series of broad attacks that were neither devastating nor decisive. The United States is indeed launching a broad attack, but intends to make it so stunningly decisive that it will impose a reality that will render perception immaterial. The Bush strategy also plays to the core strengths of the United States. The United States is a global power and this is a global strategy. It is heavily dependent on military power and not particularly dependent on complex diplomatic solutions. The last aspect is critical because, in this mode of thinking, time is of the essence. Al Qaeda is already deployed and other attacks will happen. If it does not yet have WMD, it is certainly trying to get them. Therefore, every day's delay increases the possibility of catastrophe. It follows then, that there is not an infinite amount of time available for action. |
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