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Wallerstein-the next 5 years by Boris Stremlin 15 January 2002 15:35 UTC |
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Lots of fodder for discussion here... ---- Fernand Braudel Center, Binghamton University http://fbc.binghamton.edu/commentr.htm Commentary No. 81, Jan. 15, 2002 "The 21st Century - The Next Five Years" The next five years are crucial ones for the geopolitical position of the United States. In Washington these days, they apparently think that all the significant decisions about the next five years are being made in Washington. Washington's program seems to be the assertion of U.S. military invulnerability everywhere. The present U.S. government believes that, once this is established, the basic economic interests of U.S. enterprises will thrive, and that attacks on U.S. citizens and installations will come to an end - that is, that the U.S. will once again be invulnerable. The fact is, however, that three kinds of basic decisions are being made outside the United States, and each can affect Washington's self-interested scenario quite drastically. The first is being made in Europe. The launching of the euro currency has been incredibly smooth, to the surprise of many people. Indeed, it has gone so well that now Sweden and Denmark will probably join in 2003 and Great Britain in 2004. At that point, others will clamor to join the euro-club, although they may not be admitted immediately. This has both economic and political consequences. The economic consequence is that the euro will become a world reserve currency alongside the dollar. The fact that the dollar has been the only reserve currency since the ending of a fixed dollar-gold ratio 35 years ago has been of enormous economic benefit to the U.S. and has permitted it to live far beyond its means. The geopolitical consequences of having a second reserve currency in the world seem obvious. Financial dominance has always been the last stronghold of an erstwhile hegemonic power. Can Europe be derailed? Maybe, but at this point it would be difficult. The European Union (EU) has decided to hold a Convention to engage in the revision of its cumbersome structure. It has confided the leadership of the preparatory work to Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, who is probably the ideal choice for the job. He believes in his task; he has prestige throughout Europe; and he has great political and diplomatic skills. He is unlikely to be intimidated by the U.S. government in pursuing his task. What Europe needs to do, obviously, is to create a structure that has a minimum of two features - a politically responsible central decision-making authority; and the end of national vetoes of basic decisions. No doubt, this will take a lot of hard negotiations, as each government, fearing being outvoted in the future, seeks to use its present power in the EU to preserve its long-run interests. But strengthening the EU structure is quite doable, and the atmosphere is quite favorable at the moment. The odds are that, in five years, there will be a restructured EU, and one that has enlarged itself as well. For the first time, furthermore, the East/Central European states will come to believe that being part of the EU is more important and more useful to them than being part of NATO. The second major locus of decision-making is in the world market. While I do not believe that the "market" is some magically autonomous entity, I do believe there are limits to the ability of particular states, even ones as powerful as the United States, to control what will happen. The big question is whether the present recession will be a passing blip, ending within a year, or will turn into a significant world deflation, lasting at least five years. Everyday, the newspapers across the world are publishing the views of government officials, bankers, economists, and other assorted pundits. I have been reading a lot of these opinions in the last year, and all I can say is that they go in every conceivable direction. There is no consensus whatsoever. For what it's worth, I think we are much more likely to see a serious world deflation than to see a quick resumption of stock market inflation. If this is right, everyone will feel its effect. The question for the Triad (the United States, EU, and Japan) is not whether each will feel it, for this is obvious, but how each will do relative to the other. I suspect the U.S. will fare the worst, for two reasons. One is that the U.S. boom of the last decade was based, more than that of any other part of the world, on the psychology of confidence about the future. And once that confidence is pierced, I believe that the pendulum will swing more in the U.S. than in Europe (which in the past decade didn't show the same kind of irrational confidence), and Japan (which has had a decade to shed its own psychological folly). The second reason is those "underlying economic variables" to which economists like to point. It is always being said that the U.S. is particularly strong in this regard. I do not believe it, for one central reason. I consider that the U.S. sustains the largest drain on its capital accumulation by the size of its "cadres" and the income levels of its top managerial strata. Europe and Japan are far leaner in this regard. If there is a serious deflation, serious cuts will have to be made in this domain. And the political consequences of "demoting the yuppies" will wreak havoc with the U.S. political system. Then there is the third arena of decision-making - the poorer regions of the world. By this, I mean essentially everywhere outside the Triad, including South Korea and Taiwan, including India and Israel, including Brazil and Mexico, including Canada. For all of them, Argentina is the face that haunts them today. Will we see cacerolazos in other countries? Let me remind you what has happened in Argentina. As "collateral damage" of the world economic downturn, Argentine workers are hungry and unemployed, and the Argentine middle class is justifiably terrified that all its savings are disintegrating (a bit like the pensions of the employees of Enron). It is this combination of despairs that has created the volatile and almost anarchic situation in Argentina today. If it were just a matter of Argentina, the U.S. would shrug its shoulders, and so would the world. (Actually, that's what seems to be happening at the moment.) But this sort of upheaval is contagious amidst an economic deflation. Indonesia might be a good next location for such a development in terms of its economic situation. And the political consequences are most unpredictable, not least in Indonesia. Everywhere that such breakdowns occur, we shall probably have a populist upheaval whose character (left or right) may be unclear, at least at first. We may get military coups, of uncalculable stability. We may get governments clinging to power by dictatorial means that are ugly. But whatever we get, we will surely not find ourselves in a world free from "terrorism." So, actually, the picture looks fairly gloomy from the perspective of Washington. Washington has not yet woken up to that. Immanuel Wallerstein __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Send FREE video emails in Yahoo! Mail! http://promo.yahoo.com/videomail/
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