Crisis for U.S. allies in Arab world

Kind of an interesting article fleshing out the point Wallerstein made about a 
month ago that this war may result in the destruction of the West's allies in 
the MidEast.

Steven Sherman


<DIV></DIV>> THE COMING ARAB CRASH
<DIV></DIV>>
<DIV></DIV>> If the Saudi and other pro-western
<DIV></DIV>> regimes are lined up against
<DIV></DIV>> Bin Laden, they will fall
<DIV></DIV>>
<DIV></DIV>> The popularity of the pro-west [Arab]
<DIV></DIV>> leaders is so thin that any material
<DIV></DIV>> move to hitch their fate to the anti-
<DIV></DIV>> Bin Laden coalition will create an
<DIV></DIV>> irreversible march towards disaster.
<DIV></DIV>>
<DIV></DIV>>
<DIV></DIV>> By Said Aburish*
<DIV></DIV>>
<DIV></DIV>> [Thursday October 18, 2001 - The Guardian, London]:
<DIV></DIV>> The west's most important friends in the Arab Middle East - Fahd 
of Saudi
<DIV></DIV>> Arabia, Abdullah of Jordan, Mubarak of Egypt and the PLO's Yasser 
Arafat -
<DIV></DIV>> are probably the world's most vulnerable political quartet. It is 
likely
<DIV></DIV>> that endemic problems and the Islamic fundamentalist tide 
gripping their
<DIV></DIV>> countries will bring an end to their regimes within the next five 
years.
<DIV></DIV>> Though Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinian Authority 
have many
<DIV></DIV>> problems in common, the likelihood is that Saudi Arabia will be 
the Middle
<DIV></DIV>> East's next trouble spot among the pro-western countries. This is 
because
<DIV></DIV>> King Fahd, 79, is ailing and his death is likely to produce 
several
<DIV></DIV>> contenders for the kingship at a time of mounting economic 
problems and
<DIV></DIV>> growing Islamic opposition.
<DIV></DIV>>
<DIV></DIV>> For now, all might seem outwardly quiet in Saudi Arabia. But a 
closer look
<DIV></DIV>> reveals serious problems. Since Fahd bin Abdel Aziz, fifth king 
of modern
<DIV></DIV>> Saudi Arabia, succeeded to the throne in 1982, the economy has 
shrunk
<DIV></DIV>> drastically. Even by historical standards corruption is 
completely out of
<DIV></DIV>> control. With oil income down to $40bn, most of the country's 
people are
<DIV></DIV>> suffering. In 1993, annual per capita income was $5,000, barely 
one third
<DIV></DIV>> of what it was in the early 1980s. By some estimates, it has 
since fallen
<DIV></DIV>> still further. And politically, all this has aided Islamic 
fundamentalism,
<DIV></DIV>> which has grown at an alarming rate because it is the only 
popular
<DIV></DIV>> movement which the government cannot outlaw. Widespread 
anti-western
<DIV></DIV>> feeling means there is a danger of internal unrest and more 
violence
<DIV></DIV>> against western interests.
<DIV></DIV>>
<DIV></DIV>> Corruption and the suffering of the average Saudi provide a 
fertile
<DIV></DIV>> background for the emergence of a popular Islamic opposition and 
the
<DIV></DIV>> coming of age of a generation of educated Saudis who reject the 
absolute
<DIV></DIV>> ways of the monarchy. Fahd and his family are identified with the 
west.
<DIV></DIV>> The misdeeds of the royals, including allowing the stationing of 
American
<DIV></DIV>> forces on holy Muslim soil, is doing the west more harm than 
good. These
<DIV></DIV>> elements combined are driving more and more Saudis to join 
militant
<DIV></DIV>> Islamic movements and reducing the monarchy's already small 
popular base.
<DIV></DIV>>
<DIV></DIV>> A fight over the succession could produce an alliance between 
Muslim
<DIV></DIV>> fundamentalists and the army against the royals - or some 
dissident royals
<DIV></DIV>> forging an alliance with the army or security forces against 
their
<DIV></DIV>> relations. This is a difficult time for the House of Saud to join 
the west
<DIV></DIV>> against fellow Muslims: there is no direct threat to Saudi Arabia 
and Bin
<DIV></DIV>> Laden's criminal actions appeal to many Muslims.
<DIV></DIV>>
<DIV></DIV>> In Jordan, the situation is no better. Young and untried King 
Abdullah is
<DIV></DIV>> in serious trouble. More than two thirds of his country's 
population is
<DIV></DIV>> Palestinian and sympathise with any anti-American action because 
of
<DIV></DIV>> America's support for Israel. King Abdullah's open support for 
action
<DIV></DIV>> against Bin Laden and his militant supporters has done nothing 
but
<DIV></DIV>> diminish his popularity. At present the opposition to Abdullah is
<DIV></DIV>> unorganised and no groups are openly asking for his overthrow. 
But there
<DIV></DIV>> is a strong and vocal Islamic fundamentalist opposition, which at 
one
<DIV></DIV>> point controlled a quarter of the seats in the Jordanian 
parliament. As in
<DIV></DIV>> Saudi Arabia, there are very few who favour supporting the west 
against
<DIV></DIV>> fellow Muslims. Even those who do blame Abdullah for maintaining 
the peace
<DIV></DIV>> treaty with Israel and attempting to please the west at the 
expense of
<DIV></DIV>> local feeling.
<DIV></DIV>>
<DIV></DIV>> Jordan's troubles have a regional component in them. Syria, 
traditionally
<DIV></DIV>> anti-west, has considerable influence with the Jordanians. 
Jordanians
<DIV></DIV>> approve of Syria's hard line against Israel and are full of 
admiration for
<DIV></DIV>> the semi-socialist politics of their northern neighbour. 
Moreover, Saddam
<DIV></DIV>> Hussein is extremely popular in Jordan. Seen as a modern day 
Saladin who
<DIV></DIV>> stood up to the west, his popularity is widespread.
<DIV></DIV>>
<DIV></DIV>> Overall, the anti-western feeling of the Jordanian people, be 
they secular
<DIV></DIV>> or Islamist, is extremely strong. Any Jordanian help for the 
west, even if
<DIV></DIV>> strictly diplomatic, is likely to backfire and exacerbate King 
Abdullah's
<DIV></DIV>> chronic problems. Yet, Jordan's dependence upon America's 
economic aid has
<DIV></DIV>> already forced its government to adopt this unpopular stance.
<DIV></DIV>>
<DIV></DIV>> In Egypt, economic conditions are much worse than in Saudi Arabia 
and
<DIV></DIV>> Jordan. The damage to tourism brought about by the September 11 
disaster
<DIV></DIV>> is likely to be severe. Tourism is the country's major industry 
and top
<DIV></DIV>> foreign currency earner. Moreover, lower oil tanker traffic 
through the
<DIV></DIV>> Suez canal will make the situation worse. This comes at a time 
when the
<DIV></DIV>> fever of opposition to President Mubarak is catching.
<DIV></DIV>>
<DIV></DIV>> Until recently, opposition to Mubarak's army-backed regime was 
confined to
<DIV></DIV>> Islamic fundamentalism. This is no longer the case. The press 
reacted
<DIV></DIV>> angrily to laws aimed at restricting its freedom. The bourgeoisie 
accused
<DIV></DIV>> Mubarak of spending too much on foreign and regional affairs and 
not
<DIV></DIV>> enough on Egypt's internal problems. Stories about corruption and 
nepotism
<DIV></DIV>> abound. The growing impatience with Israel and the US has meant 
Mubarak's
<DIV></DIV>> popularity is at an all time low. Egypt's economic decline - 
interrupted
<DIV></DIV>> by the cancellation of billions of dollars of debt during the 
Gulf war in
<DIV></DIV>> return for an anti-Saddam stand - has resurfaced as the country's 
major
<DIV></DIV>> problem. Egypt owes more than $30bn, its population is increasing 
by more
<DIV></DIV>> than a million a year and money sent back from workers in 
oil-producing
<DIV></DIV>> countries issharply reduced as countries need fewer guest 
workers. And
<DIV></DIV>> Egypt cannot expect a debt-cancellation bonus this time.
<DIV></DIV>>
<DIV></DIV>> Meanwhile the calm surface concealing Islamist activity is 
deceptive -
<DIV></DIV>> infiltration of the army is at an all time high. Because Mubarak 
has
<DIV></DIV>> failed to create a popular base for his government, there are no 
political
<DIV></DIV>> movements to oppose the Islamists. Joining the west in an 
alliance against
<DIV></DIV>> fellow Muslims is so unacceptable to Egyptians that it could well 
lead to
<DIV></DIV>> upheaval and Mubarak's eventual departure.
<DIV></DIV>>
<DIV></DIV>> Arafat, the west's newest friend, confronts the same political 
and
<DIV></DIV>> economic problems as Fahd, Abdullah and Mubarak. His Islamic 
opposition is
<DIV></DIV>> armed and willing to wage a guerrilla war against both him and 
Israel. He
<DIV></DIV>> has failed to create a political entity acceptable to his people. 
Because
<DIV></DIV>> the Oslo peace accord and the subsidiary agreements which 
followed it have
<DIV></DIV>> failed to satisfy Palestinian aspirations, the people of the 
occupied
<DIV></DIV>> territories are turning to Hamas, Islamic Jihad and smaller 
Islamic
<DIV></DIV>> groups. Totally opposed to the west and disparaging of Arafat's
<DIV></DIV>> subservient behaviour, these groups have made no secret of their 
tacit
<DIV></DIV>> approval of Bin Laden's actions.
<DIV></DIV>>
<DIV></DIV>> With nothing to show after years of depending on the US to play 
honest
<DIV></DIV>> broker, Arafat has never been this unpopular and his use of the 
secret
<DIV></DIV>> police has already inflamed the Palestinians. Along with press 
censorship,
<DIV></DIV>> it has eroded his credentials. He no longer speaks for the 
Palestinians
<DIV></DIV>> and the Islamists are likely to add to his problems.
<DIV></DIV>>
<DIV></DIV>> It is difficult to see what could save Arafat. The standard of 
living
<DIV></DIV>> among Palestinians is at an all time low. Unemployment is over 
30% and
<DIV></DIV>> higher among university graduates. Arafat's inner circle has been 
tainted
<DIV></DIV>> with corruption and nepotism. Given that the Sharon government is 
unlikely
<DIV></DIV>> to be generous enough to save Arafat, the prospects for a 
Palestinian
<DIV></DIV>> civil war are growing by the day. The unthinkable may come to 
pass, an
<DIV></DIV>> Arafat-Israel alliance against Hamas and other Palestinian 
Islamic groups.
<DIV></DIV>>
<DIV></DIV>> The threats to Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt and Arafat are real. 
What makes
<DIV></DIV>> the present situation worse than ever before is America's 
determination to
<DIV></DIV>> involve Arab leaders in an alliance against fellow Muslims. The 
popularity
<DIV></DIV>> of the pro-west leaders is so thin that any material move to 
hitch their
<DIV></DIV>> fate to the anti-Bin Laden coalition will create an irreversible 
march
<DIV></DIV>> towards disaster.
<DIV></DIV>>
<DIV></DIV>> * Said K Aburish, is a well-known and respected Arab political 
analysis
<DIV></DIV>> living in London. He is author of The Rise, Corruption and Coming
<DIV></DIV>> Fall of the House of Saud (Bloomsbury); and A Brutal Friendship,
<DIV></DIV>> The West and the Arab Elite (St. Martin's Press).
<DIV></DIV>>
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV></DIV>> ----------------------------------
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<DIV></DIV>> Phone: 202 362-5266
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<DIV></DIV>> Fax: 815 366-0800
<DIV></DIV>
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