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Wallerstein on Bush's speech
by Boris Stremlin
02 October 2001 05:47 UTC
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Wallerstein issues a reminder to analyze the current situation in terms of
multiple temporalities, a practice sorely lacking today in most (including
leftist) political circles...

----
Fernand Braudel Center, Binghamton University
http://fbc.binghamton.edu/commentr.htm


 

Commentary No. 74, Oct. 1, 2001

"The Outcome Could Not Be More Uncertain"

In his speech to the U.S. Congress and to the world, President Bush said, in
asserting what the U.S. intended to do, that there were many difficulties
ahead, "yet its outcome is certain." This could not be more untrue. If his
statement was meant as hortatory rhetoric, it may be considered normal
discourse for a leader of a nation besieged. But if it reflects the analytic
view of Bush and his principal deputies, then it is a dangerous
misperception.

Of course, the first obscurity is to which outcome Bush is referring. He may
mean the destruction of Al-Qaeda, which is a possible albeit extremely
difficult objective. He may mean the elimination or defanging of all groups
anywhere that the U.S. will designate as "terrorist," in which case the
possibility of success seems extremely dubious. He may mean a restoration of
the belief of the American people and the world in general in the military
prowess of the United States government, which is, as of this point, an
objective whose success is quite uncertain. He may mean sustaining the
interests of the United States as a country and of its enterprises, an
objective whose likelihood of success is at best shaky.

It is important in thinking about "outcomes" to give oneself different time
lines. I propose three: six months, five years, 50 years. The picture for
Bush looks rosiest within a six-months perspective. Consider what he has
already gained in the short period since Sept. 11. Before that day, the Bush
administration was subjected to opposition, of varying degrees, from just
about everywhere, and notably from the Democrats in Congress; the allies in
Europe; Russia and China; the governments and populations of most of the
countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America; and a worldwide
"anti-globalization" movement. That's a formidable list, and almost all of
this opposition has either disappeared or been greatly muted since the
attack on Sept. 11. The Democrats in Congress and the allies in Europe have
rallied round the U.S. under siege. Russia, China, and most of the
governments of Asia, Africa, and Latin America have given some kind of at
least qualified support to a U.S. response to the attack. The
"anti-globalization" movement has been relatively quiet and is wondering
whether it should transform itself into a "peace" movement.
Of course, Bush is not the only one to derive some immediate political
advantage from the attack. Since the U.S. is so anxious to line up everyone
everywhere on its side, at least minimally, it has been ready to pay a
diplomatic price in exchange, and others have not been hesitant to ask,
especially those further away from the inner core of "friends." The
Democrats in Congress and the allies in western Europe have not yet dared to
demand anything. But Russia, China, Pakistan, Sudan, the various Arab states
(and who knows whom else Powell has been promising things) have been less
bashful. And soon the Democrats and the allies in western Europe may join in
the game. So, for the moment, it sounds like a win-win game for everyone
whom Usama bin Laden doesn't appreciate.

However, the bill comes due in six months. By then, the U.S. will have had
to do something, something military. What it is we don't know for sure, and
it seems that even the U.S. government may not know for sure. This is
because, as has been widely admitted, there are no good options. A surgical
strike against bin Laden by special troops parachuting into Afghanistan runs
the risk of the U.S. fiasco in Iran in 1980, which lost Carter his
reelection. Bombing Afghanistan, the most probable single act, has multiple
limitations: few plausible targets, likelihood of great civilian carnage
plus a refugee flood into Pakistan, great political discomfort in Muslim
states, and a low likelihood that bombing alone would end Taliban control of
central Afghanistan.

There are some in the U.S. administration who want to bomb Iraq, which at
least has plausible targets. The problem is that Saddam Hussein is not an
ally of Usama bin Laden, more plausibly one of the bin Laden's future
targets. And bombing Iraq would not only undo all of Powell's efforts to
create a grand coalition but also place the U.S. before the same dilemma it
faced in 1991: would it dare assume the burden of a land invasion and
occupation?

And when the U.S. decides which of these doubtfully effective alternatives
to choose, then what? If it "fails" militarily, this will reinforce bin
Laden's point that the U.S. is a paper tiger, and we all know how fickle
allies become when a great power demonstrates military weakness. If it
doesn't fail in its actions per se, but gets embroiled in a long military
confrontation, any of the following may occur: significant loss of U.S.
lives (bringing on all the internal U.S. debates about escalation that
pervaded the Vietnam war); great civilian destruction in Afghanistan (which
might make the world think that the 7000 lives lost in the Sept. 11 attack
did not justify such a massive response); great political turmoil in some
Muslin countries - Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Egypt, Algeria,
Lebanon, Palestine, and others less obvious.

None of this would look too good for the U.S. government. Suddenly, there
might be a vast "peace" movement in the world. And George W. Bush might
reflect, like Lyndon Johnson, that it would be prudent not to run again.

Of course, perhaps this picture is exaggerated. Perhaps the U.S. could in
fact pull off a surgical strike. Perhaps the Taliban would collapse
conveniently by themselves. Perhaps Bush would come out as a victorious
hero, as his father did in 1991. At that point, he would still face two
other hurdles. 

One hurdle would be domestic. His father went from victory and incredible
poll ratings to an electoral defeat within 18 months because, as the saying
went then, "It's the economy, stupid." Just this week, the Wall Street
Journal, the incarnation of economic conservatism in the U.S., said that
Secretary of the Treasury, Paul O'Neill, risked losing all his credibility
because of his rosy optimism about the economy. Clearly, a lot of U.S.
capitalists are hunkering down for the stormy period ahead. U.S. voters
notoriously have a short memory and, once the flag-waving has passed, will
vote their pocketbooks. And they always blame the ins for economic troubles.

If that weren't enough, suppose the U.S. took out bin Laden, overthrew the
Taliban, and then three months later, somebody else was able to pull off a
spectacular attack, in the U.S. or in western Europe, would not all the U.S.
credit for success disappear in a huff of smoke before the emergence of a
hydra-headed monster? Certainly, the bravado and the self-confidence would
be shaken. Is this so implausible?

Now, then, if we move to a five-year perspective, will the U.S. position in
the world-system be stronger than today? Will today's geopolitical line-ups
survive as a serious mode of organizing global politics? Might the
"anti-globalization" movement perhaps have been metamorphosed into something
more coherent and far more militant than today? These are not unreasonable
questions to consider. Above all, may not chaotic conditions become
something much more the universal norm, and insecurity the daily potion of
still more of us? And might the world economy not begin to oscillate wildly?

And if it does, where will we be 50 years from now? Nothing could be less
certain. But looking back from 50 years ahead, it is doubtful that Sept. 11
in itself will seem all that important.

President Bush, in that same speech to Congress, said "And we know that God
is not neutral." I guess Bush is not known as a theologian. I thought that
the way the three great Western religions - Judaism, Christianity, and Islam
- had all dealt with the problem of evil ("If God is omnipotent, why does He
permit evil to exist?) had been by saying that God had endowed humans with
free will. But if God is not neutral, then humans do not have free will. And
if humans have free will, then God is distinctly neutral about human
conflicts.

Immanuel Wallerstein





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