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 Nowar Collective 


      Osama Bin Laden: How the U.S.Helped Midwife a Terrorist



      Ahmed Rashid of Pakistan is a member of the International 
Consortium
      of Investigative Journalists, a project of the Center for Public
      Integrity. He is the Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia
      correspondent for the Far Eastern Economic Review and The 
Daily
      Telegraph of London. This is an excerpt from his book "Taliban:
      Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia" (Yale
      University Press).



      By Ahmed Rashid



      In 1986, CIA chief William Casey had stepped up the war 
against the
      Soviet Union by taking three significant, but at that time highly
      secret, measures. He had persuaded the US Congress to 
provide the
      Mujaheddin with American-made Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to
      shoot down Soviet planes and provide US advisers to train the
      guerrillas. Until then, no US-made weapons or personnel had 
been
      used directly in the war effort.



      The CIA, Britain's MI6 and the ISI [Pakistan's Inter-Services
      Intelligence] also agreed on a provocative plan to launch 
guerrilla
      attacks into the Soviet Socialist Republics of Tajikistan and
      Uzbekistan, the soft Muslim underbelly of the Soviet state from
      where Soviet troops in Afghanistan received their supplies. The 
task
      was given to the ISI's favourite Mujaheddin leader, Gulbuddin
      Hikmetyar. In March 1987, small units crossed the Amu Darya 
river
      from bases in northern Afghanistan and launched their first 
rocket
      attacks against villages in Tajikistan. Casey was delighted with 
the
      news, and on his next secret trip to Pakistan he crossed the 
border
      into Afghanistan with [the late Pakistani] President Zia [ul-Haq] 
to
      review the Mujaheddin groups.



      Thirdly, Casey committed CIA support to a long-standing ISI
      initiative to recruit radical Muslims from around the world to 
come
      to Pakistan and fight with the Afghan Mujaheddin. The ISI had
      encouraged this since 1982, and by now all the other players 
had
      their reasons for supporting the idea.



      President Zia aimed to cement Islamic unity, turn Pakistan into 
the
      leader of the Muslim world and foster an Islamic opposition in
      Central Asia. Washington wanted to demonstrate that the entire
      Muslim world was fighting the Soviet Union alongside the 
Afghans and
      their American benefactors. And the Saudis saw an 
opportunity both
      to promote Wahabbism [their strict and austere Wahabbi 
creed] and to
      get rid of its disgruntled radicals. None of the players reckoned 
on
      these volunteers having their own agendas, which would 
eventually
      turn their hatred against the Soviets on their own regimes and 
the
      Americans.



      Thousands of radicals come to study



      ...Between 1982 and 1992, some 35,000 Muslim radicals from 
43
      Islamic countries in the Middle East, North and East Africa, 
Central
      Asia and the Far East would pass their baptism under fire with 
the
      Afghan Mujaheddin. Tens of thousands more foreign Muslim 
radicals
      came to study in the hundreds of new madrassas that Zia's 
military
      government began to fund in Pakistan and along the Afghan 
border.
      Eventually more than 100,000 Muslim radicals were to have 
direct
      contact with Pakistan and Afghanistan and be influenced by the
      jihad.



      In camps near Peshawar and in Afghanistan, these radicals 
met each
      other for the first time and studied, trained and fought together.
      It was the first opportunity for most of them to learn about 
Islamic
      movements in other countries, and they forged tactical and
      ideological links that would serve them well in the future. The
      camps became virtual universities for future Islamic radicalism.
      None of the intelligence agencies involved wanted to consider 
the
      consequences of bringing together thousands of Islamic 
radicals from
      all over the world. "What was more important in the world view 
of
      history? The Taliban or the fall of the Soviet Empire? A few
      stirred-up Muslims or the liberation of Central Europe and the 
end
      of the Cold War?" said Zbigniew Brzezinski, a former US 
National
      Security Adviser. American citizens woke up to the 
consequences only
      when Afghanistan-trained Islamic militants blew up the World 
Trade
      Center in New York in 1993, killing six people and injuring 
1,000.



      "The war," wrote Samuel Huntington, "left behind an uneasy 
coalition
      of Islamist organizations intent on promoting Islam against all
      non-Muslim forces. It also left a legacy of expert and 
experienced
      fighters, training camps and logistical facilities, elaborate
      trans-Islam networks of personal and organization 
relationships, a
      substantial amount of military equipment including 300 to 500
      unaccounted-for Stinger missiles, and, most important, a 
heady sense
      of power and self-confidence over what had been achieved and a
      driving desire to move on to other victories."



      A young Bin Laden



      ...Among these thousands of foreign recruits was a young 
Saudi
      student, Osama Bin Laden, the son of a Yemeni construction 
magnate,
      Mohammed Bin Laden, who was a close friend of the late King 
Faisal
      and whose company had become fabulously wealthy on the 
contracts to
      renovate and expand the Holy Mosques of Mecca and Medina. 
The ISI
      had long wanted Prince Turki Bin Faisal, the head of 
Istakhbarat,
      the Saudi Intelligence Service, to provide a Royal Prince to lead
      the Saudi contingent in order to show Muslims the 
commitment of the
      Royal Family to the jihad. Only poorer Saudis, students, taxi
      drivers and Bedouin tribesmen had so far arrived to fight. But no
      pampered Saudi prince was ready to rough it out in the Afghan
      mountains. Bin Laden, although not a royal, was close enough 
to the
      royals and certainly wealthy enough to lead the Saudi 
contingent.
      Bin Laden, Prince Turki and General Gut were to become firm 
friends
      and allies in a common cause.



      The centre for the Arab-Afghans [Filipino Moros, Uzbeks from 
Soviet
      Central Asia, Arabs from Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait,
      and Uighurs from Xinjiang in China who had all come to fight 
with
      the Mujaheddin] was the offices of the World Muslim League 
and the
      Muslim Brotherhood in the northern Pakistan city of Peshawar. 
The
      center was run by Abdullah Azam, a Jordanian Palestinian 
whom Bin
      Laden had first met at university in Jeddah and revered as his
      leader. Azam and his two sons were assassinated by a bomb 
blast in
      Peshawar in 1989.



      During the 1980s, Azam had forged close links with Hikmetyar 
and
      Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, the Afghan Islamic scholar, whom the 
Saudis had
      sent to Peshawar to promote Wahabbism. Saudi funds flowed 
to Azam
      and the Makhtab at Khidmat or Services Center, which he 
created in
      1984 to service the new recruits and receive donations from 
Islamic
      charities. Donations from Saudi Intelligence, the Saudi Red
      Crescent, the World Muslim League and private donations from 
Saudi
      princes and mosques were channelled through the Makhtab. A 
decade
      later, the Makhtab would emerge at the center of a web of 
radical
      organizations that helped carry out the World Trade Center 
bombing
      and the bombings of US embassies in Africa in 1998.



      Until he arrived in Afghanistan, Bin Laden's life had hardly been
      marked by anything extraordinary. He was born around 1957, 
the 17th
      of 57 children sired by his Yemeni father and a Saudi mother, 
one of
      Mohammed Bin Laden's many wives. Bin Laden studied for a 
master's
      degree in business administration at King Abdul Aziz 
University in
      Jeddah but soon switched to Islamic studies. Thin and tall, he 
is 6
      feet 5 inches, with long limbs and a flowing beard. He towered 
above
      his contemporaries, who remember him as a quiet and pious 
individual
      but hardly marked out for greater things.



      His father backed the Afghan struggle and helped fund it, so 
when
      Bin Laden decided to join up, his family responded 
enthusiastically.
      He first traveled to Peshawar in 1980 and met the Mujaheddin
      leaders, returning frequently with Saudi donations for the cause
      until 1982, when he decided to settle in Peshawar. He brought 
in his
      company engineers and heavy construction equipment to help 
build
      roads and depots for the Mujaheddin. In 1986, he helped build 
the
      Khost tunnel complex, which the CIA was funding as a major 
arms
      storage depot, training facility and medical center for the
      Mujaheddin, deep under the mountains close to the Pakistan 
border.
      For the first time in Khost he set up his own training camp for 
Arab
      Afghans, who now increasingly saw this lanky, wealthy and
      charismatic Saudi as their leader.



      ...Bin Laden later claimed to have taken part in ambushes 
against
      Soviet troops, but he mainly used his wealth and Saudi 
donations to
      build Mujaheddin projects and spread Wahabbism among the 
Afghans.
      After the death of Azam in 1989, he took over Azam's 
organization
      and set up Al Qaeda or Military Base as a service center for
      Arab-Afghans and their families and to forge a broad-based 
alliance
      among them. With the help of Bin Laden, several thousand 
Arab
      militants had established bases in the provinces of Kunar, 
Nuristan
      and Badakhshan, but their extreme Wahabbi practices made 
them
      intensely disliked by the majority of Afghans. Moreover, by 
allying
      themselves with the most extreme pro-Wahabbi Pashtun 
MuMeddin, the
      Arab-Afghans alienated the non-Pashtuns and the Shia 
Muslims.



      Upset by U.S. role in Gulf War



      ...By 1990, Bin Laden was disillusioned by the internal 
bickering of
      the Mujaheddin and he returned to Saudi Arabia to work in the 
family
      business. He founded a welfare organization for Arab-Afghan
      veterans. Some 4,000 of them had settled in Mecca and 
Medina alone,
      and Bin Laden gave money to the families of those killed. After
      Iraq's invasion of Kuwait he lobbied the Royal Family to 
organize a
      popular defense of the kingdom and raise a force from the 
Afghan war
      veterans to fight Iraq. Instead, King Fahd invited in the 
Americans.
      This came as an enormous shock to Bin Laden. As the 
540,000 US
      troops began to arrive, Bin Laden openly criticized the Royal
      Family, lobbying the Saudi ulema to issue fatwas, religious 
rulings,
      against non-Muslims being based in the country.



      ...In 1992, Bin Laden left for Sudan to take part in the Islamic
      revolution under way there under the charismatic Sudanese 
leader
      Hassan Turabi. Bin Laden's continued criticism of the Saudi 
Royal
      Family eventually annoyed them so much that they took the
      unprecedented step of revoking his citizenship in 1994. It was in
      Sudan, with his wealth and contacts, that Bin Laden gathered 
around
      him more veterans of the Afghan war, who were all disgusted 
by the
      American victory over Iraq and the attitude of the Arab ruling
      elites who allowed the US military to remain in the Gulf. As US 
and
      Saudi pressure mounted against Sudan for harboring Bin 
Laden, the
      Sudanese authorities asked him to leave.



      In May 1996, Bin Laden travelled back to Afghanistan, arriving 
in
      Jalalabad in a chartered jet with an entourage of dozens of Arab
      militants, bodyguards and family members, including three 
wives and
      13 children. Here he lived under the protection of the Jalalabad
      Shura [an advisory body or assembly], until the conquest of 
Kabul
      and Jalalabad by the Taliban in September 1996. In August 
1996, he
      had issued his first declaration of jihad against the Americans,
      whom he said were occupying Saudi Arabia.



      "The walls of oppression and humiliation cannot be demolished 
except
      in a rain of bullets," the declaration read. Striking up a
      friendship with Mullah Omar, in 1997 he moved to Kandahar,
      Afghanistan, and came under the protection of the Taliban.



      By now, the CIA had set up a special cell to monitor his 
activities
      and his links with other Islamic militants. A US State 
Department
      report in August 1996 noted that Bin Laden was "one of the 
most
      significant financial sponsors of Islamic extremist activities in
      the world." The report said that Bin Laden was financing 
terrorist
      camps in Somalia, Egypt, Sudan, Yemen, Egypt and 
Afghanistan. In
      April 1996, President Clinton signed the Anti-Terrorism Act, 
which
      allowed the US to block assets of terrorist organizations. It was
      first used to block Bin Laden's access to his fortune of an
      estimated US$250-300 million. A few months later, Egyptian
      intelligence declared that Bin Laden was training 1,000 
militants, a
      second generation of Arab-Afghans, to bring about an Islamic
      revolution in Arab countries.



      CIA tries snatch operation



      In early 1997, the CIA constituted a squad that arrived in 
Peshawar
      to try to carry out a snatch operation to get Bin Laden out of
      Afghanistan. The Americans enlisted Afghans and Pakistanis 
to help
      them but aborted the operation. The US activity in Peshawar 
helped
      persuade Bin Laden to move to the safer confines of Kandahar. 
On 23
      February 1998, at a meeting in the original Khost camp, all the
      groups associated with Al Qaeda issued a manifesto under the 
aegis
      of "The International Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and
      Crusaders." The manifesto stated "for more than seven years 
the US
      has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, 
the
      Arabian peninsular, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers,
      humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbours, and turning its
      bases in the peninsular into a spearhead through which to fight 
the
      neighbouring Muslim peoples."



      The meeting issued a fatwa. "The ruling to kill the Americans 
and
      their allies -- civilians and military -- is an individual duty for
      every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is 
possible
      to." Bin Laden had now formulated a policy that was not just 
aimed
      at the Saudi Royal Family or the Americans, but called for the
      liberation of the entire Muslim Middle East. As the American 
air war
      against Iraq escalated in 1998, Bin Laden called on all 
Muslims to
      "confront, fight and kill, Americans and Britons."



      1998 U.S. Embassy bombings



      However, it was the bombings in August 1998 of the US 
Embassies in
      Kenya and Tanzania that killed 220 people which made Bin 
Laden a
      household name in the Muslim world and the West. Just 13 
days later,
      after accusing Bin Laden of perpetrating the attack, the USA
      retaliated by firing 70 cruise missiles against Bin Laden's 
camps
      around Khost and Jalalabad. Several camps which had been 
handed over
      by the Taliban to the Arab-Afghans and Pakistani radical 
groups were
      hit. The Al Badr camp controlled by Bin Laden and the Khalid 
bin
      Walid and Muawia camps run by the Pakistani Harakat ul 
Ansar were
      the main targets. Harakat used their camps to train militants for
      fighting Indian troops in Kashmir. Seven outsiders were killed in
      the strike -- three Yemenis, two Egyptians, one Saudi and one 
Turk.
      Also killed were seven Pakistanis and 20 Afghans.



      In November 1998 the USA offered a US$5-million reward for 
Bin
      Laden's capture. The Americans were further galvanized when 
Bin
      Laden claimed that it was his Islamic duty to acquire chemical 
and
      nuclear weapons to use against the USA. "It would be a sin for
      Muslims not to try to possess the weapons that would prevent
      infidels from inflicting harm on Muslims. Hostility toward 
America
      is a religious duty and we hope to be rewarded for it by God," 
he
      said.



      ...After the Africa bombings, the US launched a truly global
      operation. More than 80 Islamic militants were arrested in a 
dozen
      different countries. Militants were picked up in a crescent 
running
      from Tanzania, Kenya, Sudan and Yemen to Pakistan, 
Bangladesh,
      Malaysia and the Phillipines."



      In December 1998, Indian authorities detained Bangladeshi 
militants
      for plotting to bomb the US Consulate in Calcutta. Seven 
Afghan
      nationals using false Italian passports were arrested in 
Malaysia
      and accused of trying to start a bombing campaign." According 
to the
      FBI, militants in Yemen who kidnapped 16 Western tourists in
      December 1998 were funded by Bin Laden. In February 1999,
      Bangladeshi authorities said Bin Laden had sent US$l million 
to the
      Harkat-ul-Jihad (HJ) in Dhaka, Bangladesh, some of whose 
members had
      trained and fought in Afghanistan. HJ leaders said they wanted 
to
      turn Bangladesh into a Taliban-style Islamic state.



      Thousands of miles away in Nouakchott, the capital of 
Mauritania in
      West Africa, several militants were arrested who had also 
trained
      under Bin Laden in Afghanistan and were suspected of plotting 
bomb
      explosions. Meanwhile, during the trial of 107 Al-Jihad 
members at a
      military court in Cairo, Egyptian intelligence officers testified
      that Bin Laden had bankrolled Al-Jihad. In February 1999, the 
CIA
      claimed that through monitoring Bin Laden's communication 
network by
      satellite, they had prevented his supporters from carrying out 
seven
      bomb attacks against US overseas facilities in Saudi Arabia,
      Albania, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Uganda, Uruguay and the Ivory 
Coast
      -- emphasizing the reach of the Afghan veterans.



      ...But it was Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, the original sponsors 
of
      the Arab-Afghans, who suffered the most as their activities
      rebounded. In March 1997, three Arab and two Tajik militants 
[from
      Tajikistan] were shot dead after a 36-hour gun battle between 
them
      and the police in an Afghan refugee camp near Peshawar. 
Belonging to
      the Wahabbi radical Tafkir group, they were planning to bomb 
an
      Islamic heads of state meeting in Islamabad.



      Fighting in Kashmir against India



      With the encouragement of Pakistan, the Taliban and Bin Laden,
      Arab-Afghans had enlisted in the Pakistani party Harkat-ut-Ansar to
      fight in Kashmir against Indian troops. By inducting Arabs who
      introduced Wahabbi-style rules in the Kashmir valley, genuine
      Kashmiri militants felt insulted. The US government had declared
      Ansar a terrorist organization in 1996 and it had subsequently
      changed its name to Harkat-ul-Mujaheddin. All the Pakistani victims
      of the US missile strikes on Khost belonged to Ansar. In 1999, Ansar
      said it would impose a strict Wahabbi-style dress code in the
      Kashmir valley and banned jeans and jackets. On 15 February 1999,
      they shot and wounded three Kashmiri cable television operators for
      relaying Western satellite broadcasts. Ansar had previously
      respected the liberal traditions of Kashmiri Muslims, but the
      activities of the Arab-Afghans hurt the legitimacy of the Kashmiri
      movement and gave India a propaganda coup.



      Pakistan faced a problem when Washington urged Prime Minister Nawaz
      Sharif to help arrest Bin Laden. The ISI's close contacts with Bin
      Laden, and the fact that he was helping fund and train Kashmiri
      militants who were using the Khost camps, created a dilemma for
      Sharif when he visited Washington in December 1998. Sharif
      sidestepped the issue but other Pakistani officials were more
      brazen, reminding their American counterparts how they had both
      helped midwife Bin Laden in the 1980s and the Taliban in the 1990s.
      Bin Laden himself pointed to continued support from some elements in
      the Pakistani intelligence services in an interview. "As for
      Pakistan there are some governmental departments, which, by the
      Grace of God, respond to the Islamic sentiments of the masses in
      Pakistan. This is reflected in sympathy and co-operation. However,
      some other governmental departments fell into the trap of the
      infidels. We pray to God to return them to the right path," said Bin
      Laden.



      Conundrums for Pakistan, Saudi Arabia



      Support for Bin Laden by elements within the Pakistani establishment
      was another contradiction in Pakistan's Afghan policy.... The US was
      Pakistan's closest ally, with deep links to the military and the
      ISI. But both the Taliban and Bin Laden provided sanctuary and
      training facilities for Kashmiri militants who were backed by
      Pakistan, and Islamabad had little interest in drying up that
      support. Even though the Americans repeatedly tried to persuade the
      ISI to cooperate in delivering Bin Laden, the ISI declined, although
      it did help the US arrest several of Bin Laden's supporters. Without
      Pakistan's support, the United States could not hope to launch a
      snatch by US commandos or more accurate bombing strikes, because it
      needed Pakistani territory to launch such raids. At the same time,
      the USA dared not expose Pakistan's support for the Taliban, because
      it still hoped for ISI cooperation in catching Bin Laden.



      The Saudi conundrum was even worse. In July 1998 Prince Turki had
      visited Kandahar and a few weeks later 400 new pick-up trucks
      arrived in Kandahar for the Taliban, still bearing their Dubai
      license plates. The Saudis also gave cash for the Taliban's cheque
      book conquest of the north in the autumn. Until the Africa bombings
      and despite US pressure to end their support for the Taliban, the
      Saudis continued funding the Taliban and were silent on the need to
      extradite Bin Laden.



      The truth about the Saudi silence was even more complicated. The
      Saudis preferred to leave Bin Laden alone in Afghanistan because his
      arrest and trial by the Americans could expose the deep relationship
      that Bin Laden continued to have with sympathetic members of the
      Royal Family and elements within Saudi intelligence, which could
      prove deeply embarrassing. The Saudis wanted Bin Laden either dead
      or a captive of the Taliban -- they did not want him captured by the
      Americans.



      ...By now Bin Laden had developed considerable influence with the
      Taliban, but that had not always been the case. The Taliban's
      contact with the Arab-Afghans and their Pan-Islamic ideology was
      non-existent until the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996. Pakistan was
      closely involved in introducing Bin Laden to the Taliban leaders in
      Kandahar, because it wanted to retain the Khost training camps for
      Kashmiri militants, which were now in Taliban hands. Persuasion by
      Pakistan, the Taliban's better-educated cadres, who also had
      Pan-Islamic ideas, and the lure of financial benefits from Bin
      Laden, encouraged the Taliban leaders to meet with Bin Laden and
      hand him back the Khost camps.



      A life with the Taliban in Kandahar



      Partly for his own safety and partly to keep control over him, the
      Taliban shifted Bin Laden to Kandahar in 1997. At first he lived as
      a paying guest. He built a house for Mullah Omar's family and
      provided funds to other Taliban leaders. He promised to pave the
      road from Kandahar airport to the city and build mosques, schools
      and dams, but his civic works never got started as his funds were
      frozen. While Bin Laden lived in enormous style in a huge mansion in
      Kandahar with his family, servants and fellow militants, the
      arrogant behaviour of the Arab-Afghans who arrived with him and
      their failure to fulfill any of their civic projects antagonized the
      local population. The Kandaharis saw the Taliban leaders as
      beneficiaries of Arab largesse rather than the people.



      Bin Laden endeared himself further to the leadership by sending
      several hundred Arab-Afghans to participate in the 1997 and 1998
      Taliban offensives in the north. These Wahabbi fighters helped the
      Taliban carry out massacres of the Shia Hazaras in the north.
      Several hundred Arab-Afghans, based in the Rishkor army garrison
      outside Kabul, fought on the Kabul front against [the Mujaheddin
      leader Ahmad Shah] Masud. Increasingly, Bin Laden's world view
      appeared to dominate the thinking of senior Taliban leaders.
      All-night conversations between Bin Laden and the Taliban leaders
      paid off. Until his arrival, the Taliban leadership had not been
      particularly antagonistic to the USA or the West but demanded
      recognition for their government. However, after the Africa bombings
      the Taliban became increasingly vociferous against the Americans,
      the UN, the Saudis and Muslim regimes around the world. Their
      statements increasingly reflected the language of defiance Bin Laden
      had adopted and which was not an original Taliban trait.



      As US pressure on the Taliban to expel Bin Laden intensified, the
      Taliban said he was a guest and it was against Afghan tradition to
      expel guests. When it appeared that Washington was planning another
      military strike against Bin Laden, the Taliban tried to cut a deal
      with Washington -- to allow him to leave the country in exchange for
      US recognition. Thus, until the winter of 1998 the Taliban saw Bin
      Laden as an asset, a bargaining chip over whom they could negotiate
      with the Americans.



      The US State Department opened a satellite telephone connection to
      speak to Mullah Omar directly. The Afghanistan desk officers, helped
      by a Pushto translator, held lengthy conversations with Omar in
      which both sides explored various options, but to no avail. By early
      1999 it began to dawn on the Taliban that no compromise with the US
      was possible and they began to see Bin Laden as a liability. A US
      deadline in February 1999 to the Tatiban to either hand over Bin
      Laden or face the consequences forced the Taliban to make him
      disappear discreetly from Kandahar. The move bought the Taliban some
      time, but the issue was still nowhere near being resolved.



      The Arab-Afghans had come full circle. From being mere 
appendages to
      the Afghan jihad and the Cold War in the 1980s they had taken 
centre
      stage for the Afghans, neighbouring countries and the West in 
the
      1990s.... Afghanistan was now truly a haven for Islamic
      internationalism and terrorism and the Americans and the 
West were
      at a loss as to how to handle it.



      This text (and more) can be found at www.indymedia.org