Re: E Asia [Was: Re: Hardt & Negri on Genoa]

In a message dated 7/26/01 9:21:54 AM Pacific Daylight Time, 
kjkhoo@pop.jaring.my writes:

This is a very thoughtful response.  A few notes.  The fact that the three 
regions are very different does not make comparisons irrelevant.  The 
similarity is that all three are places where capital is accumulated in large 
piles, perhaps to be used at some future date in bids for world power.  In 
terms of having the money, I'm not sure what difference it makes how much of 
it is through trade etc.  Although these aspects may shape how much a region 
cares about the world descending into chaos.  In terms of hegemonic cycles, 
wealthy, politically well developed structures are typical of runners-up--the 
French, Germans, and the Spanish, rather than the hegemons, the Dutch, UK, 
and US, none of whom, for good reason, are considered models of state 
building.  Nor were they the intellectual and fashion pace setters for the 
elite of their day.  I mention this because the world seems to be moving from 
being organized around nation-states to being organized around regions.  But 
while the Europeans have the politically well-developed structure, the East 
Asians have the expansive region, organized around Chinese diaspora, 
Japanese, and US capital.  The US, by contrast, is just incorporating Mexico 
as a giant labor pool, with no vision of pulling it up to US wealth.

I think neo-liberal politics have to be distinguished in terms of their mild 
version and their intense version.  In the mild version, adopted by virtually 
all states in the world, there is some opening to the world market, some 
effort to get their hands on foreign capital, some privatization....In the 
strong version, the state is separated from the economy (never totally, which 
would be impossible, but mostly).  The US has belatedly realized that elected 
governments, in which all parties pretty much agree to keep their hands off 
the economy, are a better guarantee of the smooth functioning of this than 
militaries which might seize command of the economy.  Have any of the East 
Asian states really accepted the strong version of neo-liberalism?

You mention China breaking up.  I've been hearing speculation like this since 
Tianamen square--why should we believe its going to happen now?   On the 
other hand, Indonesia does look pretty chaotic.  It may well provide a test 
case for the 'Empire'.  Indonesia is no Yugoslovia.  Its one of the largest 
countries population wise.  Should it continue along the road to chaos, it 
will be interesting to see who proposes to fix things, and how they propose 
to do so.

Previous hegemonic transitions have occurred in the context of interstate 
struggle, fairly straightforwardly involving the struggle for territory.  I 
would agree with previous discussion on this list that the struggle for 
territory is no longer the struggle.  What matters is:  a.  shaping the world 
economic/political scene to facilitate your model of accumulation and b.  
keeping the chaos around the world in check.  Presently, the US is doing both 
a and b, and the other regions seem, if not thrilled, happy enough with the 
job the US (or the US/Empire, if you prefer) is doing.  The question is, does 
the Us actually have the resources to handle this job indefinitely, 
particularly if areas of chaos are larger than the former Yugoslovia?  If 
they do not, and other powers step to the plate, how will the US respond?

Steven Sherman

<< Subj:     E Asia [Was: Re: Hardt & Negri on Genoa]
 Date:  7/26/01 9:21:54 AM Pacific Daylight Time
 From:  kjkhoo@pop.jaring.my
 Sender:    wsn-owner@csf.colorado.edu
 To:    wsn@csf.colorado.edu
 
 At 6:18 PM -0400 23/7/01, Threehegemons@aol.com wrote:
 >As I see it, there are three areas of significant amounts of capital
 >accumulation in the system today,  Europe, the US, East Asia.  Each has
 
 Accumulation in E Asia, perhaps outside of China, is much dependent 
 upon access to Euro-American markets, made much worse by Japan's 
 ongoing crisis. It's been estimated that some 40% of E Asian growth 
 last year was due to the exports of electronics and electronic 
 products -- hence the collapse this year. As I've previously 
 mentioned in this forum, for a country like Malaysia, total trade to 
 gdp is about 190% and electronics and electronic products account for 
 close to 60% of export value, but this is extreme even in the context 
 of E Asia; other countries have lower ratios. But importantly the 
 various countries are  trying to export pretty much the same products 
 at roughly similar levels of technology -- but with two tiers, that 
 of Taiwan, Korea and Japan at one, and that of the others. At the 
 lower tier, it's becoming quite evident that unless they can make a 
 quick switch, no one can quite compete with China which is sucking in 
 the capital and spewing out the goods and doing an 8% clip at it, 
 with the big question mark being how the rural population is going to 
 take the widening gap and the urban working class the erosion of 
 previous rights with the primary replacement being greater freedom of 
 movement and consumption (for those who don't lose their jobs in the 
 privatisation process.)
 
 In addition, the differences between the various countries of the 
 region do mean that it's not going to be like an EU any time in the 
 near future. State of the economy, wage rates, per capita incomes, 
 poverty rates, etc. are all much wider apart than in the EU bloc of 
 countries. A country like Malaysia is a net importer of labour -- 
 with something like 10% of the labour force being foreign 
 (unofficially, it's closer to 20%) -- while Singapore is trying to 
 draw in the professional and intellectual labour, with its capacity 
 to do so greatly enhanced by the financial crisis. The Philippines 
 would have little growth if not for remittances. Indonesia is 
 probably going to take a generation to re-set itself.
 
 These features make the comparison of the three regions, and 
 especially with the US, not especially meaningful, even misleading.
 
 >countries--Eastern Europe and Latin America in particular..  But I'm not
 >sure, if things were purely a popularity contest, that this form of
 >capitalism would be as popular with the strata of professionals worldwide as
 >the European kind--in which the market is subordinated to the wisdom of the
 >professional classes.  The tensions over the Kyoto accords epitomize the
 >different vision of Europe and the US. Europe isn't very good at bullying
 >anyone these days, so it mostly preserves what it has on the continent. Then
 >there is the East Asian brand of capitalism--the market subordinated to the
 >needs of the maintenance of community.
 
 There would appear to be a distinctive path of capitalist development 
 in E Asia, and it's much more welfarist than the absence of formal 
 welfare systems might suggest. But, please, let's not go overboard 
 and buy wholesale into official propaganda about maintenance of 
 community. Nor underestimate the attractions of neo-liberal ideology 
 to the professional classes (at least up until the financial crisis, 
 with varying responses since), if not for the same reasons that 
 neo-liberal theology seems to have swept the field in much of 
 EuroAmerica.
 
 Amongst the reasons for the attraction of neo-liberal ideology for 
 the professionals -- aside from the fact that so many of the leading 
 professionals were trained in the period of neo-liberal ascendancy -- 
 is the role and character of the state. Thus, for many, 
 neo-liberalism was seen as a means to trim the over-bearing state. 
 However, in a state such as Thailand, neo-liberal ideology has taken 
 a bit of a beating with the crisis -- a result both of nationalism as 
 well as the much less developed informal state-sponsored welfarism of 
 Thailand. In Singapore, the state itself has further embraced 
 neo-liberalism, seeing that as its way of further propelling 
 Singapore ahead of the pack, but keeping a wary eye on the 
 "heartlanders", fearing a backlash against the cosmopolitans (the 
 Stalinists did have a point about the cosmopolitans ;)). Amongst 
 capitalists, neo-liberalism appeals to those with global links and 
 connections, not so to the more localised. It's not a simple matter 
 of bribery and propaganda; it's also local perceptions of local 
 issues within a global ideological frame established, usually, by 
 EuroAmerica.
 
 >Apart from several 'mouses that roar'--leaders of Malaysia and Singapore,
 >notably, not Japan, China or even South Korea--East Asian leaders haven't
 >made much of an effort to point the world in any sort of direction.
 
 Careful there. The "roaring" is not against US capitalism as such, or 
 even whole chunks of globalisation, but rather against liberal 
 democracy and that globalisation which cuts into state power and 
 bureaucratic discretion, amongst other things. It was during their 
 watch that the wave of privatisation took place, and continues to be 
 official policy. It was during their watch that liberalisation of 
 financial systems without concomitant regulatory mechanisms occurred, 
 etc. It was during their watch that the boom of the late '80s and 
 early '90s became hubris, exemplified in, e.g., cheering that at some 
 points in the early '90s, the volume of trade on the Kuala Lumpur 
 Stock Exchange exceeded that on Wall Street!
 
 >Why would these three capitalisms compete?  They all have specific 
industries
 >and economic strategies they want to promote.  They have different strengths
 >and weaknesses.  For example, East Asia can clearly produce anything the US
 >can for much lower cost.  But as Walden Bello points out, the way the US
 >tries to get around this is to institute global copyright notions that will
 >indefinitely secure for the US monopoly positions in certain industries.
 
 See above. At the moment, E Asia is hardly competing as such. And if 
 it's competing, it's with the US and, less so, the European working 
 class for the 'privilege' of being the working class of the US- and 
 Euro-based transnationals.
 
 Sure, there are attempts to try and promote specific home-grown 
 industries, but the second tier has largely not managed to do so yet 
 to any great extent -- and even in areas where there are specific 
 resource advantages, such as wooden furniture, it remains dependent 
 upon demand from elsewhere and continues to compete largely on price, 
 a competition that China can only win.
 
 I'm not sure Walden is altogether right on the copyright/ipr issue. 
 It's a nice issue on which to get worked up about -- tangible, 
 immediate, symbolic, focussed, and with quite a few outrageous 
 examples, such as nim, basmati, etc. Yet, in the new and emerging 
 technologies, it really is more than possible for brain-workers here 
 to get somewhere -- and nowhere because the cost of bringing things 
 to market is so high and because the market is so locked up. Take 
 pharmaceuticals: while someone could discover, say, a candidate 
 vaccine, it would be difficult to marshall the resources to take that 
 through the whole process and into production. Not so much an issue 
 of ipr itself as the whole panoply of regulations, etc. imposed by, 
 e.g. US FDA and GMP. There are also the specifics of US patent law 
 that can well deny patent to a non-US entity, or at least a 
 meaningful patent -- and even when one is obtained, the cost of 
 policing it in the US would be exorbitant.
 
 >that fighting a war over it would require.  As Peter Gowan argues, the Asia
 >crisis was, in some ways, the US's best shot--and it failed--the US blinked
 >before South Korea, and was not able to get the East Asian states to
 >wholeheartedly adopt its form of capitalism.
 
 Actually, I don't think it blinked before S Korea. It blinked when 
 faced the effect of Russian default: LTCM and the possible threat to 
 US financial stability. And so interest rates were dropped twice in 
 quick succession which, together with devalued E Asian currencies and 
 uncertainties, extended the life on 'irrational exuberance' and set 
 off a consumption boom, pulling E Asia out of the pot, only to drop 
 it into another pot in 2001.
 
 >So now what?  I think over the next twenty to thirty years we'll definitely
 >see East Asia be more articulate about how it doesn't want to be part of 
this
 >empire.  Much as the Protestants broke with the church while remaining
 >Christian, I think they'll remain within the framework of human
 >rights/rationalistic modernity, but redefine these for their own purposes.
 
 I hope so, but I have my doubts. But for sure I hope the 
 protestantism will not be moonie-like, as it threatens to be in more 
 than one place.
 
 China, Indonesia and S Asia are big imponderables. I suspect the 
 break-up of China would not be unwelcome to the US, perhaps less so 
 to the EU, provided it can be contained, leaving a not un-Russianlike 
 situation: imagine a one billion workforce of impoverished Chinese. 
 But the choice may not be theirs -- can the widening gaps in China, 
 minus the safety nets, be controlled and contained? If not, then the 
 break-up of the Soviet Union may well look like a tea party.
 
 Can Indonesia find its way towards some acceptable federal solution, 
 while containing a resurgent minority Islamism? Everywhere, the 
 Afghan chickens are coming home to roost -- we need to thank the CIA 
 for that.
 
 Ditto, can S Asia also find its way to a workable federalism, or will 
 it descend into Hindu nationalism? Will Hindu nationalism be the 
 "ideal shell" for Indian neo-liberalism which is supported by big 
 capital and the professionals, opposed by the poor and regional 
 capital? And Pakistan -- will Musharraf militarism contain the Afghan 
 chickens or will it go into a downward spiral of a failed state?
 
 kj khoo
 
 
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