The world and George W. Bush (fwd)

Will a George W. Bush administration accelerate US decline (but would
such a decline be irreversible)?  Here is what Wallerstein thinks:

--

Fernand Braudel Center, Binghamton University
http://fbc.binghamton.edu/commentr.htm


Comment No. 56, Jan. 15, 2001
"The World and George W. Bush"
George W. Bush is the first U.S. President of the twenty-first century, and
the world is nervous. Outside the United States, everyone is discovering how
much they appreciated Bill Clinton. He turned out to be a far better U.S.
President from their point of view than they had ever expected. This was not
at all because they agreed with Clinton's policies all of the time, or even
most of the time. It is because the world found him intelligent,
well-informed, a good listener, and above all, the best variety of U.S.
president they could reasonably expect, given U.S. power, arrogance, and
self-centeredness - what the French would call a pis aller. 
The rest of the world by and large hoped (and expected) that Al Gore would
succeed Clinton and carry on. They are surprised (and dismayed) by the
actual results. The world fears, rightly, that George W. Bush has none of
the particular qualities Clinton displayed, and that the power, arrogance,
and self-centeredness will be all that's there. I have already suggested
(Comment No. 47, Sept. 1, 2000) that there will be little basic difference
in the foreign policy that will be conducted by Bush than there would have
been had Gore become president. But this equivalence needs to be qualified.
When it is said in the United States that there exists a "bipartisan"
foreign policy, what this means is that since 1945 the dominant majorities
in both major parties have agreed on the fundamentals of U.S. foreign
policy. From 1945 to today, this policy has been continuous and reasonably
coherent, and has never really wavered with a change in the presidency. That
said, it should be noted that each of the two parties has a significant
group within it which seeks to shift the emphasis of foreign policy in
important ways. The Democratic party has a (left) wing that tends to be more
"dovish" (that is, influenced by the peace movement) and more sympathetic to
the needs and claims of non-European zones of the world. This is what split
the Democratic party at the time of the Vietnam war.
The Republican party has the counterpart in its (right) wing which stresses
two themes: on the one hand, a greater isolationism (rejection of the United
Nations, unwillingness to spend money on aid projects, skepticism about
sending troops anywhere to "keep the peace"), and on the other hand macho
militarism (more money for the armed forces, and particularly for weapons
systems; aggressive impatience with development of military forces by anyone
else, including so-called allies; tough stances towards China and Russia).
It has been widely observed that Bush has a delicate political job holding
together the diverse groups of his supporters, even on domestic issues. So
far, he has indicated that he will handle the tensions by throwing bones to
each camp, and using slippery rhetoric. And so far (during the election) it
worked. The question is whether this tactic will work as well on foreign
policy issues, especially given the fact that Bush does not command a clear
majority in the U.S. Congress.
He has comforted the adepts of traditional U.S. policy by picking a foreign
policy/defense/economy team drawn from his father's administration. And the
appointment of Robert Zoellick as U.S. trade representative may be seen as
public assurance that Bush will continue the "globalization" thrust of his
predecessor. But he has not forgotten the other tendencies in the Republican
party. In Colin Powell, the U.S. now has a Secretary of State who incarnates
caution, even extreme caution, in the use of U.S. troops elsewhere in the
world. And in Donald Rumsfeld, the U.S. now has a Secretary of Defense,
totally committed to creating the so-called National Missile Defense (NMD)
system. 
Neither Powell nor Rumsfeld is an extremist representing respectively the
"isolationist" and "macho military" points of view, but neither do they
represent a real brake on these tendencies. Furthermore, it should be
underlined that there is a certain contradiction, at least on a tactical
level, in pursuing simultaneously these two tendencies. Contradiction, and
therefore confusion. And therefore nervousness elsewhere in the world.
In the short period since Bush was proclaimed the victor, the nervousness
has expressed itself publicly in a number of ways. The South Koreans have
indicated that they worry that Bush will not continue the initiatives
towards North Korea undertaken by Clinton, and thereby undermine the
"sunshine" policy of Kim Dae-Jong. Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, someone
devoted to maintaining a U.S. role in Asia, but someone who also behind the
scenes has been working to overcome distance between the Chinese government
in Beijing and Taiwan, has indicated his fear that pursuing the NMD would in
effect scuttle hopes that the differences could be bridged.
At the very moment that the Bush team has been suggesting that they wanted
to get "tougher" with Saddam Hussein, the last ally of the United States in
its policy in the region, Great Britain, has admitted that it is pressing
the U.S. to end the "no overfly" policy in the southern and northern thirds
of Iraq which the U.S. and Great Britain are unilaterally enforcing.
Most of the world's immediate nervousness centers around the NMD. The Prime
Minister of Canada has indicated diplomatically his complete lack of
enthusiasm. And virtually no one in Europe thinks it is anything but a balmy
idea. It is this which explains the somewhat exaggerated response of the
Europeans to the uncovering of the toxic damage of the use by U.S. forces of
"depleted uranium" in their weapons in Kosovo. I say exaggerated not because
I don't think that it was as irresponsible to use such weapons as to use
poison gas. I do. But the response is exaggerated because many of the
European governments have known of the dangers for a long time.
What happened is rather that the U.S. seems to think that NATO constitutes a
structure which constrains all its members to act together, except the
United States. The Italian government is thus understandably upset that its
soldiers have, as a consequence, contracted leukemia. And of course, not the
Italians alone. The French seem to play the role of saying publicly what
other Europeans are thinking privately. On Jan. 10, the President of the
Defense Commission of the French National Assembly, Paul Quilès, asserted
that this affair illustrates "one of the essential problems of NATO," namely
that "the Americans, within the framework of the Atlantic alliance, remain
prone to take decisions unilaterally, without informing their partners, even
after the event."
The U.S. is not fooled about what lies behind the debate on "depleted
uranium" weapons. It is really the structure, indeed the very existence, of
NATO. Donald Rumsfeld has already, in his testimony before Congress on his
confirmation, stated his strong opposition to an autonomous European army
which, he said, would threaten the structure of NATO.
Where will all this lead? Clinton did his best to slow down the inevitable
decline of U.S. power in the world. The Bush team thinks he didn't do
enough. They are going to make adjustments. The result will probably be that
they speed up the process.
Immanuel Wallerstein
[These commentaries may be downloaded, forwarded electronically or e-mailed
to others, but may not be reproduced in any print medium without permission
of copyright holder (iwaller@binghamton.edu).
These commentaries, published twice monthly, are intended to be reflections
on the contemporary world scene, as seen from the perspective not of the
immediate headlines but of the long term.]
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