ZNet Commentary / April 25 / Noam Chomsky / Colombia Part 2 (fwd)

This is Part 2 of a Chomsky analysis of the US extending the war in 
Columbia. But I post it here because it also further documents the issue
-on WSN a week or so ago - about whether or not US and other
'northern' agricultural production and policies have harmful, nay
disasterous, results in the "south' -- they DO.
part 1 of Chomsky's is findable as per eddress below.
gunder frank
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
                     ANDRE GUNDER FRANK
          Visiting Professor  of  International Relations       
University of Miami           &         Florida International University  

380 Giralda Ave. Apt 704                Tel: 1-305-648 1906
Miami - Coral Gables FL                 Fax: 1-305-648 0149
USA  33134                              e-mail:agfrank@chass.utoronto.ca 

Personal/Professional Home Page> http://csf.colorado.edu/archive/agfrank/

My NATO/Kosovo Page> http://csf.colorado.edu/archive/agfrank/nato_kosovo/   
    

My professional/personal conclusion is the same as Pogo's - 
            We have met the enemy, and it is US 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Mon, 24 Apr 2000 21:55:06 +0100
From: Michael Albert <sysop@zmag.org>
To: znetcommentary@tao.ca
Subject: ZNet Commentary / April 25 / Noam Chomsky / Colombia Part 2


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Here then is today's ZNet Commentary from Noam Chomsky...

---

Colombia – Part Two of Two
By Noam Chomsky

The sharp increase in arms shipped to Colombia is officially justified in
terms of the "drug war," a claim taken seriously by few competent analysts,
even apart from the instructive historical pattern, barely sampled here. As
many have observed, the military themselves are heavily involved in
narcotrafficking, and their paramilitary associates -- who openly proclaim
their reliance on narcotrafficking -- are not the targets of the planned
operations. The targets are guerrilla forces based on the peasantry and
calling for internal social change, which would interfere with integration
of Colombia into the global system on the terms that the US demands,
dominated by elite elements linked to US power interests that are accorded
free access to Colombia's valuable resources, including oil.

But let us put these matters aside and consider a few other questions.
Why do peasants in Colombia grow cocaine, not other crops? Colombia was once
a major wheat producer. That was undermined in the 1950s by US "Food for
Peace" aid, a program that provided taxpayer subsidies to US agribusiness
and counterpart funds for US client states, used commonly for military
spending and counterinsurgency. A year before President Bush announced the
"drug war" with great fanfare (once again), the international coffee
agreement was suspended under US pressure, on grounds of "fair trade
violations." The result was a fall of prices of more than 40% within two
months for Colombia's leading legal export.

Further background is discussed by the late political economist Susan
Strange in her last book. In the 1960s, the G77 governments of the Third
World (now over 130, accounting for 80% of the world's population) initiated
a call for a "new international economic order" in which the concerns of the
large majority of people of the world would be addressed. Specific proposals
were formulated by UNCTAD, established by the UN to address such concerns.
But these plans scarcely even had to be dismissed. Official "globalization"
is designed to cater to the needs of a different sector, namely its
designers -- hardly a surprise, any more than the fact that in standard
dogma "globalization" is depicted as an inexorable process to which "there
is no alternative."

One early UNCTAD proposal was a program for stabilizing commodity prices, a
practice that is standard within the industrial countries by one or another
form of subsidy. In 1996, Congress passed the "Freedom to Farm Act" to
liberate American agriculture from the "East German socialist programs of
the New Deal," as Newt Gingrich put it. Subsidies quickly tripled, reaching
a record $23 billion in 1999. The market does work its magic, however: the
taxpayer subsidies go disproportionately to large agribusiness and the
"corporate oligopolies" that dominate the input and output side, as Nicholas
Kristof correctly observed in the _NY Times_. Those with market power in the
food chain (from energy corporations to restaurant chains) are enjoying
great profits while the "agricultural crisis," which is real, is
concentrated among smaller farmers in the middle of the chain, who produce
the food.

But the devices used by the rich to ensure that they are protected by the
nanny state are not available to the poor. The UNCTAD initiative was quickly
shot down, and the organization has been largely marginalized and tamed,
along with others that reflect the interests of the global majority to some
extent. Reviewing these events, Strange observes that farmers were therefore
compelled to turn to crops for which there is a stable market. Large-scale
agribusiness can tolerate fluctuation of commodity prices, compensating for
temporary losses elsewhere. Poor peasants cannot tell their children: "don't
worry, maybe you'll be able to eat next year." The result, Strange
continues, was that drug entrepreneurs could easily "find farmers eager to
grow coca, cannabis or opium," for which there is always a ready market in
the rich societies.

The programs of the US and the global institutions it dominates are
constructed to magnify these effects. The current Clinton plan for Colombia
includes only token funding for alternative crops; others are to take care
of constructive approaches, while the US concentrates on military
operations -- which, incidentally, happen to benefit the high-tech
industries that produce military equipment and have been lobbying for the
escalation. Furthermore, IMF-World Bank programs demand that countries open
their borders to a flood of (massively subsidized) agricultural products
from the rich countries, with the obvious effect of undermining local
production. And peasants are instructed to become "rational," producing for
the export market and seeking the highest prices -- which translates as
"coca, cannibis, opium." Having learned their lessons properly, they are
rewarded by attack by military gunships while their fields are destroyed by
chemical and biological warfare, courtesy of Washington.

Another question lurks not too far in the background. Just what right does
the US have to carry out these operations in other countries to destroy a
crop it doesn't like? We can put aside the cynical response that the
governments requested this "assistance"; if they hadn't, they wouldn't be
the governments for long. The number of Colombians who die from US-produced
lethal drugs exceeds the number of North Americans who die from cocaine, and
is far greater relative to the populations. In East Asia, US-produced lethal
drugs are causing millions of deaths. These countries are compelled not only
to accept the products but also advertising for them, under threat of severe
trade sanctions; the Colombian cartels, in contrast, are not permitted to
fund huge advertising campaigns in which a Joe Camel counterpart extols the
wonders of cocaine. Does China, then, have the right to carry out military,
chemical, and biological warfare in North Carolina? If not, why not?

Yet another question has to do with the alleged concern over drug use. The
seriousness of that concern was illustrated when a House Committee was
considering the Clinton proposals. It rejected an amendment proposed by
California Democrat Nancy Pelosi calling for funding of drug demand
reduction services. It is well known that these are far more effective than
forceful measures. A Rand study funded by the US Army and the government
drug control agencies found that funds spent on domestic drug treatment were
23 times as effective as "source country control" (Clinton's Colombia Plan),
11 times as effective as interdiction, and 7 times as effective as domestic
law enforcement. But that path will not be followed. Rather, the "drug war"
targets poor peasants abroad and poor people at home; by the use of force,
not constructive measures to alleviate problems at a fraction of the cost.
We might also ask why there are no Delta Force raids on US banks and
chemical corporations, though it is no secret that they too are engaged in
the narcotrafficking business.

The next question is: why the "drug war," in its specific form? An answer is
implicit in an observation of Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, one of the
few Senators to pay close attention to social statistics. By adopting these
measures, he observed, "we are choosing to have an intense crime problem
concentrated among minorities." And why should that choice be made in a
period when a domestic form of "structural adjustment" is being imposed?
Answers do not seem too hard to find.