Re: Oromo demonstration in Atlanta

WSN,
I do agree with Alex.
To facilitate further discussion and understanding of the Oromian issues, I 
am forwarding the following article which is taken from Oromia Quarterly 
Volume II Number 3, April-June 1999. Erena discusses National 
Self-determination in Oromo Context, the role of Oromo leaders and how 
Oromos are different from Amhara, etc.
Regards,

Thomas

The Political and Cultural Locations of Nationalism and National 
self-determination: The Oromia Case


Temesgen Muleta-Erena



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Several scholars have argued that national self-determination is a claim 
for 
cultural independence and that nationalism in general is based on the right 
to cultural autonomy right to a culture. In the Oromo context, national 
self-determination is about the representation of collective identity and 
diginity. It is the demand of the Oromo people to govern themselves. 
Practically, this can be interpreted as let us be governed by people who 
are 
like us, people of our nationality or people who accept and respect our 
value system. For the last hundred years and so, the Oromo nation has 
suffered from Abyssinian (Ethiopian) expansionism, social, ecological and 
economic destruction and continuous and intensive cultural and physical 
genocide. The Abyssinians and Oromos connections have been the coloniser 
(refers to the former) and the colonised (refers to the latter) 
relationships. Contrary to the Ethiopianist discourse, they have not 
developed a common unifying identity, social and political system. While 
the 
Abyssinians feel a sense of glory of their kings, warlords and dictators, 
the Oromos feel victimisation to these rulers, so they have not emerged a 
common ancestry, culture and collective memory, which can result in common 
‘Ethiopian’ identity. From the perspective of Oromo social construction, 
the 
present Ethiopian domination over Oromia is a continuation of what pervious 
generations of Oromo nation have experienced. Thus, the Oromo people, sees 
the present political arrangement as illegitimate because it is a rule by 
the people who have engaged in destroying them. So, they claim not only 
cultural but also political independence. Oromo nationalism is also very 
democratic. It follows the UN principles of self-determination for the 
citizens of Oromia, claiming independence from the tyranny of Ethiopian 
Empire. The latter has been constructed based on Amhara-Tigre nationalism. 
The Oromo nationalism also offers democratic solutions to the ethnic 
minorities in the Ethiopian Empire. Scholars of Oromo studies claim that 
there is fundamental behavioural, linguistic, ethnic and cultural 
differences between the Abssynians (northern) and their subjects 
(Southern). 
The Oromo, Sidama, Afar and the Ogaden (Ogaden Somalians) nations, beyond 
their common Cushitic progeny, they have common experiences of 
victimisation 
and illegitimately absorbed by Abyssinian southward expansion. Their 
collective memory of past experiences and present victimisation are making 
common identity. This identity is a key to understand politics there and to 
work together for self-determination, to recover their lost humanity.


KEYWORDS: Nation; nationalism; politics; culture; self-determination



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Man knows himself only insofar as he knows the world, and becomes aware of 
the world only in himself, and of himself only in it. Every new object, 
well 
observed, opens a new organ in ourselves.

-Geothe, Maximen und Reflexionen, VI

Build therefore your own world.

-Ralph Waldo Emerson, Nature



Introduction


The passions of national freedom and national interest are probably the 
strongest in the whole political spectrum that characterises the present 
world. Kellas (1998) holds that it is stronger than the passions aroused by 
religion, class, individual or group interest. This passion is not all 
futile, either. In Gellener’s (1983) understanding, nationalism has been 
considered as essential to the establishment of a modern industrial 
society. 
According to Smith (1991), it is ‘the sole vision and rationale of 
political 
solidarity.’ For Kellas (1998), it provides legitimacy to the state, and 
inspires its citizens to feel an emotional attachment towards it. It can be 
a source of creativity in the arts, and enterprise in the economy. Its 
power 
to mobilise political engagement is unrivalled, particularly in the vital 
activity of nation building. It is intimately linked with the operation of 
popular democracy.

Indeed, the global pattern is a mosaic of political drives, economic 
interests, linguistic pride, cultural imperatives, psychological needs and 
nations seeking identity.

These factors are manifesting as a powerful staying power in a modern 
Africa, either. As European colonialism and socialism melted away, the 
perpetual existence of the backlash against ‘neo-colonial’ colony 
colonialism and the reviving of national selfdom become more and more 
significant in social and political dynamics of contemporary 
multi-ethino-nation African societies.

The African experience is motivated by the same aspirations as that of 
elsewhere. At its root is a need for freedom, diginity, for the right of 
people of distinct social communities to function freely and independently. 
In this regard, Oromia represents the case of rejuvenating claim for 
national freedom and the struggle against the century old Abyssinian Empire 
colonialism in Africa.

Oromia is a homeland for an Oromo nation, a group of people with a common 
culture and value system (seera fi aadaa), language ( Afaan Oromo), 
political institutions (Gadaa), and historical memories and experiences. 
Oromia is the single largest, homogeneous and endogenous nation in Africa 
with a population of 30 to 35 million. Both in terms of territorial and 
population size, more than two-third's today’s sovereign states that are 
making members of UN (United Nations) are smaller than Oromia.

The Cushite (see Demie, 1998) Oromo people have inhibited their homeland, 
Oromia, since pre-history and in antiquity were the agents of humanity’s 
documented Cushitic civilisation in terms of science, technology, art, 
political and moral philosophy. The links between the Oromo and the ancient 
civilisations of Babylon, Cush and Egypt has been discussed in Asfaw Beyene 
(1992) and John Sorenson (1998) scholarly works. Utilising prodigious 
evidence from history, philosophy, archaeology and linguistics, Diop (1974 
and 1991) confirms that the Cushite Egyptian civilisation was emerged from 
the Cushite civilisations of North East Africa, particularly, the present 
day Western Sudan and upper Nile Oromia (also known as Cush or Punt). 
Indeed, except the name of places, saints and prophets, many of the Old 
Testament and the Holy Koran moral texts are copies of the Oromo moral 
codes. The formers are written documents while the latter are orally 
transmitted.

Since the late 1880s the Oromo people have disowned their sovereignty. They 
disowned their autonomous institutions of governance, culture, education, 
creativity, business, commerce, etc. Thus, they have been claiming for 
national self-determination, national-self government and the right to 
their 
own state and resist the Abyssinian Empire saver (supremacist’s) 
nationalism. The Oromos are not only against the quality of Ethiopian 
Empire 
governance but also against the philosophy on which it is based: 
domination, 
dehumanisation, inequality, double standard, hypocrisy, deceit, exclusion, 
chauvinism, war institution, rent-seeking, extractive state, conservatism, 
feudalism, Aste fundamentalism (Aste Tewodros, Aste Yohannis, Aste Menelik, 
Aste Haile Sellasie), etc.

The political goal of national self-determination (national 
self-government) 
is asserted in the outlook and attitudes of the Oromo political and social 
organisations.

Of course, the Oromo nationalism, which supports the interests and identity 
of the Oromo people, is a more subtle, complex and widespread phenomenon 
than common understanding and observation. It is within this context that 
we 
are going to discuss the Oromos' politics of national self-determination 
and 
the search for the national homeland, the demand for reinventing a state of 
their own in the following sections.



Defining Nation, Nationalism and Self- Determination


To define nation and nationalism is as Benjamin Akzin (1964, pp. 7-10) 
discussed three decades ago, to enter into a terminological jungle in which 
one easily gets lost. Different scholarly disciplines have their own more 
or 
less established and more or less peculiar ways of dealing with nation and 
nationalism. Ideally, our definition of nation and nationalism should be 
induced of elements of nationalist ideology. Getting at such a definition 
has confirmed phenomenally strenuous. Hugh Seton-Watson, an authority in 
this domain, has deduced that ‘no scientific definition’ of a nation can be 
concocted. All that we can find to say is that a nation exists when 
significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a 
nation, or behave as if they formed one (Seton-Watson, 1982, p.5).Van den 
Berghe (1981) defines a nation as a politically conscious ethnic group. 
Several attempts have been made at making a cardinalist definition of the 
term, pointing out one or more key cultural variables as defining 
variables. 
Among those tried are language, religion, common history/descent, 
ethnicity/race, statehood and common territory (homeland). For a group of 
people to be termed a nation, its members typically have to share several 
of 
these characteristics, although historically, one criterion may have been 
predominant (for example, language in Germany, or culture and history in 
France). In the case of Oromo, common language (Afaan Oromo), common 
territory (Biyya Oromo, dangaa Oromiyaa or Oromia), common historical 
experiences (victimisation to Ethiopian Empire rules or Abyssinocracy) are 
particularly very significant.

Stalin made his undertaking in 1913. His definition includes four criteria: 
the members of a nation live under the same economic conditions, on the 
same 
territory, speak the same language, and have similar culture and national 
character (Seton-Watson, 1982, p.14).

Neither Ernest Gellner nor Eric Hobsbawn, two influencials, gave definite 
definitions of the nation in their major achievements. Indeed, they are 
very 
hostility towards what they define as nationalism. '…For ever single 
nationalism which has so far raised its ugly head…’ (Gellner, 1983, p.45), 
this is a Gellner’s conception and sees the world as naturally divided into 
nations, each with its own individuality. This implies an acceptance of the 
nationalist self-perception.

There are also other conceptualisations. A social anthropologist, Thomas 
Hylland Eriksen (1992, p. 220) says ‘a nation is an ethnic group whose 
leaders have either achieved, or aspire to achieve, a state where its 
cultural group is hegemonic’, Anthony H. Birch (1989, p.6) considers that a 
nation is best defined as ‘a society which either governs itself today, or 
has done so in the past, or has a credible claim to do so in the not-too- 
distant future.

Kellas (1998) defines the nation as a group of people who feel themselves 
to 
be a community bound together by ties of history, culture and common 
ancestry. Nations have ‘objective’ characteristics, which may include a 
territory, a language, a religion, or common descent, and ‘subjective’ 
characteristics, essentially a people’s awareness of its nationality and 
affection for it. In the last resort it is ‘the supreme loyalty’ for people 
who are prepared to die for their nation.

The definition of ‘nation’ which we will make use of in the following is 
one 
suggested by Anthony D. Smith (1983,pp. 27-109, 1991, p. 14; 1995); a 
definition mastering well the ‘sounding board’ dimension. Smith here 
defines 
a nation as ‘a named human population sharing a historic territory, common 
myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and 
common legal rights and duties for all members. A recent definition of 
Smith 
holds nationalism, one manifestation of national-self-determination, as ‘an 
ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and 
identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to 
constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’ (Smith, 1991, p. 73; 1995). For 
Smith nationalism has a deep ethnic roots and rejuvenates itself in 
response 
to global and domestic impulses. While the phenomenon of globalisation and 
technocratic culture are there, nationalism is an eternal nature and 
nourishes and propels itself on technocratic innovations.

In this context, national self-determination may be defined as many part 
aspirations of a nation:

To be free to freely determine one’s own national identity, culture, 
including language, education, religion, and form of government,

To be free of rule by another ‘nation’, that is to overcome social and 
political systems of domination and exclusion in which nations other than 
one’s own wield predominant power.

To be free to select its own form of government; and those governed within 
it have the right of unflagging consent.


Culture and the Politics of self-determination


Nation, nationalism and national self-determination are commanding 
attentions. One of the perennial issues within nationalism is whether 
national self-determination can stand alone, or whether it requires a 
‘qualifier’ from within cultural or political ideas or both to clarify its 
precise cultural and political location.

Several scholars have argued that national self-determination is a claim 
for 
cultural independence and that nationalism in general is based on the right 
to cultural independence and that nationalism is based on the right to a 
culture.

Nielson, for example, peers a nation as groups of people whom ‘perceive 
themselves as having a distinct culture and traditions’, and Tamir presents 
that a nation is a community in which individuals develop their culture, 
and 
they therefore regard their place within a nation as membership in a 
cultural group. Indeed, she argues that ‘the right to national-self 
determination stakes a cultural rather than a political claim, namely, it 
is 
the right to preserve the existence of a nation as a distinct cultural 
entity.’ Will the people who demand national self-determination be 
satisfied 
with such an arrangement?

Tamir gives credence to that the idea of basing the right to 
self-determination on the right to a culture is the one that has best 
conformity with a liberal internationalist viewpoint. That is thinkable, 
but 
international liberalism is incompetent on this particular matter.

A nationalism, which is based on culture and cultural distinctions, was not 
very long a go. It is a concept that characteristic the thesis of right 
wing, or romantic theorists such as Herder. Indeed, Herder’s nationalism 
was 
not political, and it distrusted a state as something external, mechanical, 
not emerging spontaneously from the life of the people.

Nevertheless, in the Oromo context the claim for national 
self-determination 
is a political rather than a cultural one. If we look at the distinction 
between the two, it would seem that the claim for national 
self-determination involves more than a demand to be tolerated while the 
cultural question is. For example, the Catalan's and Quebecois’ culture and 
identity have been tolerated and respected to some extent, and yet many of 
them thought that this did not reflect a situation of self-determination. 
Indeed, meeting their claim would involve legislation and redefinition of 
institutions within the state, and perhaps even a new state.

In the Oromo case the demand is actually the claim to have control over 
their lives. This does not mean over every individual’s private life, but 
over the public aspect of one’s existence, i.e. the system of mutual 
relationships, which reflect and sustain one’s membership of a certain 
collective. Here the self is conceptualised within the context of 
community, 
but one that has to be real, actual, and functioning and performing. 
Otherwise these communal ties are too abstract, which makes it impossible 
for the self to be defined by them. The statement of Cohen has to be 
recalled:

'A person does not only need to develop and enjoy his powers. He needs to 
know who he is, and how his identity connects him with particular others. 
He 
must… find something outside himself which he did not create… He must be 
able to identify himself with some part of objective social reality' 
(Cohen, 
1988).

Moreover, self-realisation, however, cannot be merely a mental situation; 
thus this community cannot be only cultural. It must be a political 
situation at least so that, in order for the Oromo people to realise 
themselves, they must not be dependent on the goodwill of a second party. 
They then must be certain that their self-realisation in all spheres of 
life 
will not be prevented by the Abyssinian government, the TPLF, the Orthodox 
Church, and so forth. They should therefore be politically active and watch 
such institutions carefully. In addition, they must participate in politics 
in order to decide collectively upon public matters, which influence their 
self-realisation.

So the Oromos claim for national-self determination is about the 
realisation 
of their potential status, ability and collective character, which may be 
achieved only through participation in autonomous political institutions. 
But for more than a century Oromos have been denied access to these 
institutions, either officially or in practice. In other words, if Oromos 
as 
a nation achieve self-determination they will better able to participate, 
better represented, better able to deliberate, gain much more control over 
their life than formerly and more autonomous. The Oromos demand for 
national 
self-determination thus, aims at establishing those institutions, which are 
needed for the realisation of the self-determination.

When an Oromo demands national self-determination, he/she is not asserting 
that he/she would like to control his/her private life, e.g. his/her job, 
his/her shopping activities, his/her love affairs. Many Oromos do not 
control these aspects of their lives and yet nevertheless demand national 
self-determination.

But the same principle also applies to cultural life. The Oromos may be 
allowed more-or-less to use their language, have their own newspapers and 
theatre, and the freedom of worship, etc. which are making cultural 
freedom. 
Actually these rights are hardly exist at present. But when they claim 
national self-determination they are not only referring to these aspects of 
life, as political community: they want to be able to form and choose among 
and vote for the Oromo political parties, to observe the Oromo 
constitutional laws, to pay taxes to an Oromo authority, and to have a 
history (and indeed, myth) of independent Oromo state, from which their 
identity and self-determination can derive. Thus, the Oromo's Declaration 
for Independence will emphasise parliamentary participation and the need to 
form a constitution, rather than cultural activities.

In general the Oromos demand for national self-determination entails that 
the individuals in this nation should be citizens, engaged in politics as 
members of a community committed to the realisation of certain (their own) 
common goods, rather than participating as individuals who seek their 
self-interests, as it is implied by the right- to- culture school of 
thought 
and Liberal Internationalists. Perhaps for this reason Margalit and 
Halbertal revise the right-to- culture argument, arguing that the right is 
to a certain culture rather than to culture. A certain culture, then, 
becomes a common good. And yet, this is not enough, because they still 
regard the common good in cultural rather than political terms: ‘shared 
values and symbols… are meant to serve as the focus for citizens’ 
identification with the state, as well as the sources of their willingness 
to defend it even at the risk of their lives (Margalit and Halbertal, 1994).

Why, then, do theories adhere to the culture discourse? Of course, for most 
of the Western theorists, the term national self-determination is 
affiliated 
to the strive to become part of humanity, to regain the human condition of 
autonomy; it is adjoined to the struggle to be part of the free world, of 
the more progressive forces; it is seen as decolonisation, as civilisation, 
as an attempt made to become part of the world of liberty, rights, and 
justice. But, it is seen as part of centrifugal forces, from the centre to 
the global, universalism or what Lane (1974) calls as 'total situation' or 
citizenship based on individual freedom and social justice. These 
theorists, 
therefore, universalise the notion of national self-determination: they 
make 
it part of liberalism. The liberals' universal approach tends to be 
uniformist. This makes a society rootless and a citizen far removed from 
those who control his/her destiny. On the other hand, the notion as it is 
put forward and used by the Oromos that the demand for national 
self-determination is also centripetal, from the global and the greater 
units to the smaller ones. These groups demand the disengagement from the 
'other', the global, the colonist, even from other humanity, by asserting 
that ‘we are not merely the essential equal and part of humanity, but 
rather 
we are also different and distinct: we have our own political identity, 
which we want to preserve, sustain, and establish institutionally, like the 
Scottish vision in multi-nation state Europe. This is the language of 
liberation from colonisation. It is also the language of particularisation 
within the universal or the global, and it seems that the uniformist 
approach is not sensitive enough to the real Oromos problems. Thus, the 
Oromos quest for self-determination involves the ultimate goal of 
particularism (its own unique space), reinventing the Oromia State, owning 
the national homeland. Of course, in a heterogeneous society of the 
Ethiopian Empire, though uniformity may simplify system of control, social 
justice will not be attained in one vast monolithic block of oppressed by 
colonial legislation, bureaucrats and its armies. An important work of 
Professor Asafa Jalata, an authority in the study of Oromo nationalism 
kindly quoted as’ The Oromo question involves both colonialism and 
ethnonationalism. Ethiopian colonialism has been imposed by global 
capitalism on the Oromo nation. Ethiopians, both Amharas and Tigrayans, 
through establishing settler colonialism in Oromia, have systematically 
killed millions of Oromo and expropriated their lands and other resources 
from the last decades of the nineteenth century until today. Ethiopian 
colonialists already destroyed the people called Agaw by taking their 
lands, 
systematically killing them, and assimilating the survivors. They attempt 
to 
do the same thing to the Oromo by destroying the Oromo national movement, 
confiscating Oromo lands, and forcing the remaining Oromo into ‘settlement 
villages’ or (reservations). Many times, some Oromo organisations attempted 
to democratize Ethiopia so that the Oromo would achieve equal citizenship 
rights and maintain their ethnocultural identity. Determined to maintain 
their colonial domination and to destroy the Oromo cultural personality 
through ethnocide or assimilation, Ethiopian colonialists destroyed or 
suppressed those Oromo political forces that attempted to transform 
Ethiopia 
into a multinational democratic society. Therefore, most Oromos are 
convinced that their rights and freedom cannot be obtained and respected 
without creating their own state, or state that they can create as equal 
partners with other ethnonational groups interested in forming a 
multinational democratic society to promote ethnocultural diversity and 
human freedom. Hence, Oromo nationalism is an ideology of the subjugated 
Oromo who seek human rights, freedom, justice, and democracy’ (Jalata, 
1997).

In fact social justice can be attained when and only when the oppressed 
majority able to rule its homeland. The Oromos work for national 
self-determination is the great humanist and historical task in terms of 
Freire (1993) argument ‘To liberate themselves and their oppressors as 
well. 
The oppressors, who oppress, exploit, and rape by virtue of their power, 
cannot find in this power the strength to liberate either the oppressed or 
themselves. Only power that springs from the weakness of the oppressed will 
be sufficiently strong to free both. Any ‘attempt to soften the power of 
the 
oppressor in difference to the weakness of the oppressed almost always 
manifest itself in the form of false generosity; indeed, the attempt never 
goes beyond this.’ In this context, for Oromos in order to have the 
continued opportunity to express their ‘generosity,’ the Habasha colonist 
must perpetuate injustice, too. Tyranny is the permanent fount of this 
‘generosity,’ that sustains at the price of death, dehumanisation, despair 
and poverty. ‘True generosity consists precisely in fighting to destroy the 
causes which nourish false charity.’ (Freire, 1993).

For further discussions on Oromo nationalism, universalism, globalism, 
Ethiopianist discourses and Oromo Nationalism, see Sorenson (1998) and 
Sisai 
Ibssa (1998).


Concluding Thoughts


Man as a social animal always seeks his own territory and belongings to a 
social group in which his identity and sense of community is observed and 
respected. In the defence of the cause for social justice and social 
ecology, these are basic tenets to backlash against the danger of the 
rhetoric of universalism, polyarchy and false perspectives of social 
uniformity, which appear to appreciate the social problems from a single 
privileged point.

Georg Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind ( New York, 1967 edition), in his 
famous philosophical discussion of the relationship between ‘lordship and 
bondage’ maintained that a single consciousness could know itself only 
through another, even in a condition of totally unequal power relationship. 
According to this philosophical model, the lord (the oppressor) is lord 
only 
through the relationship with a bondservant (the oppressed, the one whose 
humanity is stolen). In the relationship, however, the other is annulled. 
The self of the mastery, the lord, derives from the conquest and negation 
of 
the servant, the bond. Only recognition of the selfhood of the other 
permits 
for its annulation. Thus, lordship covertly recognises the separate 
identity 
of the dominated. They are normally equal selves locked into unequal 
hierarchy. Metaphorically, Hegel’s dialectics of lordship and bondage is 
very important to understand the Ethiopian domination over Oromia. However, 
in the Ethiopianist discourse, the essential equality of the selves has 
been 
escaped totally. Rather, the persisting hierarchy has taken for granted. 
According to Sorenson (1998), Ethiopianist scholars like Clapham, Sven 
Rubenson and Levine because of their attachment to one version of the 
Ethiopian past and present make them either or unwilling to engage with the 
full complexity of the problem. From this point of view, to accept the 
unchanging polarity of Ethiopia and Oromia in the lordship-bondage 
relationship is to succumb to a structure of Ethiopian aggression and 
colonialism.

The Oromos demand for national self-determination is, however, the 
civilised 
step out of the polarity upon which the coercive hierarchy relies, it is 
the 
collective political demand, as its main purpose is to achieve the good of 
the social whole, humanisation, the essential liberation of the Oromo 
national identity, diginity and the reinvention of Oromia as a sovereign 
state.

The Abyssinian occupation of Oromia, the existence of the Abyssinian Rule, 
war-lordism and their armies in Oromia and the making of Finfinnee their 
garrison station, the centre of their Crowds is not only an act of 
conquest, 
aggression and colonialism but also, from Oromo perspective, such elements 
are symbols of bondage and slavery that negate the Oromo selfhood as equal 
essential.

For the last hundred years, the Oromo nation has disowned selfhood, its own 
state or administration, and lived as a bondage of Abyssinia. The 
Abyssinian 
administration which has undermined the Oromo national traditions, 
exploited 
it economically, and maintained order through mechanical and repressive 
means- such a nation actually must seek national self-determination to 
foster within its politics, to bring diginity, justice, freedom and 
democracy and to survival as essential equal, as a nation and as part of 
humanity and its civilisation.

It is necessary for Oromos to build the world of their own, a world which 
make them capable to sustain as a group of human people. They must able to 
liberate themselves and the violent, the oppressor too. In this context, 
the 
Oromo issue is a test case to the deceptive ‘democracy world-wide’ which is 
being advocated in the USA foreign policy and manipulated by the 
neo-nafxanyas (see Ibssa, 1998). It is a challenge to contemporary theories 
of democracy and polyarchy (Robinson, 1997) and actors of post cold war 
Ethiopian politics who simply take for granted that the boundaries and 
powers of political community in the 'Horn' have already been settled. 
Thanks to the dedicated works of human rights activists, particularly the 
OSG (the Oromia Support Group) and its UK based publication, Sagalee 
Haaraa, 
we have been well informed on plights of human population and their 
environment in the entire region. We are interested to recommend this 
publication to all actors of the region.

In this context, we are confident to say that Ethiopian democracy rhetoric 
or federalism sham politics is nothing more than a fig leaf, covering up 
the 
continuation of an extraction of the ‘politics of the belly’, in terms of 
Bayart (1993) from ‘prudish eye of the West.’ Its democratic rhetoric is a 
new type of rent seeking (extracting economic rent). By making believe, it 
enables the collection of international aid that includes diplomatic, 
military and humanitarian. It enables the seizure of the resources of the 
modern economy for the benefit of the Tigrayan elites. The situation is not 
in democracy’s favour, rather it is a situation that the Tyranny is 
retaining control over the security forces, economic rents and the support 
of the West. Such manipulation is not new for Africa. Menilik, Haile 
sellassie, Mengistu, Mobutu, Biya, Senghor and Diouf did the same thing 
either in Ethiopia or elsewhere in the continent at one time or another. 
The 
Quote from Bayart’s (1993) African analyis comes to our mind ‘...The 
support 
of western powers and multilateral institutions of Bretton Woods and the 
Vatcan, who despite having waved the flag of democratic conditionality and 
respect for human rights, have not dared to pursue such sentiments to their 
logical conclusion and have continued to think in terms of ‘Mobutu or 
Chaos’ 
where Gorbachev given up saying ‘Ceaucescu or chaos’...’. Indeed, very 
recently, we have read the deceptive descriptions to neo-Mobutu, 
neo-Mengistu, etc.: democratic, new generation, confident and pragmatic, 
etc. Sadly, everything changes so that everything stays the same. 
Nevertheless, the oppressed Oromos are not passive objects, either. They 
have not allowed themselves to be ‘captured’, as in the past they have 
demonstrated their historical ability to resist dehumanisation, despair and 
poverty, and predictably will continue to resist until the justice will 
come 
to them. An everyday Oromo coins the following: ‘Victory to the Oromo 
people! Oromia shall be free!’ We feel moral and social responsibility to 
support the just cause of fellow humanity.


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reflections, Journal of Peace Research, No.2, p. 220.

Gellner, E. (1983), Nations and nationalism, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.

Glassner, M. and de Blij (1989) Systematic political geography, fourth 
edition, New York, John wiley & Sons.

Freire, P. (1996), Pedagogy of the oppressed, London, Penguin Books.

Ibssa, S. (1998), The ideological foundations of Current US

Foreign policy: the ‘Promotion of democracy’ and its impact on the Oromo 
national Movement, The journal of Oromo Studies, 5(1&2), 1-

34.

Kellas, J.G. (1998), The politics of

nationalism and ethnicity,

second edition, London,

Macmillan Press Ltd.

Lane, A. (1974), The roots of identity, Penguin Books, London.

Margalit, A. and Raz, J. (1990), National self-determination, Journal of 
Political Philosophy, 87, 439-61.

Nielsen, K. (1993), Secession: the case of Quebec, Journal of Applied 
Philosophy, 10, 29-44.

Robinson, W.I. (1997), global Capitalism and the Oromo Liberation

struggle: theoretical notes on U.S.

Policy towards the Ethiopian Empire, The Journal of Oromo Studies, 4(1&2), 
1-46.

Sorenson, J. (1998), Ethiopian discourse

and Oromo nationalism, in A. Jalata (1998), ed. Oromo nationalism and the 
Ethiopian discourse: the search for freedom &

democracy, the Red Sea Press, Inc.

Seton-Watson, H. (1982), Nations and sate: An enquiry into the origins of

nations and the politics of nationalism. Methuen, London.

Smith, A. (1983), Theories of Nationalism,

Duckworth, London.

Smith, A. (1991), National identity, Penguin, London.

Smith, A. (1995), Nations and Nationalism, Polity Press,

London.

Smith, A. (1995), Nations and nationalism in a global era, Cambridge, 
polity 
Press.

Tamir, Y. (1993), Liberal nationalism, Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, pp. 6 and 57.




Oromia Quarterly can be contacted through  muleta_b32@erena.freeserve.co.uk


----Original Message Follows----
From: "Spectors" <spectors@netnitco.net>
Reply-To: spectors@netnitco.net
To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK <wsn@csf.colorado.edu>
CC: "WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK" <wsn@csf.colorado.edu>
Subject: Re: Oromo demonstration in Atlanta
Date: Tue, 11 Apr 2000 13:32:24 -0500

No way would I equate the TPLF of Ethiopia with the OLF (Oromo, for those on
WSN who don't understand). I don't agree with the slogan
"self-determination" but I do believe in militantly opposing invasions by
imperialists; so I probably would disagree with the OLF leadership. There
are other forces among the Oromo; Ethiopia itself has many, many people with
combined ethnic backgrounds.   Many Oromo are also Amhara; many Amhara are
also Oromo!

But, TPLF has power and has instituted virtual apartheid in Ethiopia, and
imprisoned tens of thousands, destroyed the labor movement, etc. There are
even many Tigrayans who don't support them but are afraid to speak out. TPLF
certainly aren't Marxists or Leninists of the "Albanian" or any other
variety, despite whatever rhetoric they used in the past. In some ways, they
may be worse than the Khmer Rouge (Pol Pot). Of course they haven't killed
as many people (yet) but the Khmer Rouge came to power after U.S.
imperialism had destroyed much of the region and forced hundreds of
thousands to flee to the cities, whilch helped lay the basis for the famine
and deaths of which the Pol Pot regime played a role. And most of the Khmer
Rouge was not involved in the struggle in order to get rich. Don't
misunderstand -- I'm NOT defending the Khmer Rouge --only making the point
that TPLF is just a run of the mill gang of bandits that doesn't even have
the pretense of serving the people -- just raiding the treasury.


Alan Spector

===================================================




-----Original Message-----
From: alexy2k gerard <alexandragerard@hotmail.com>
To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK <wsn@csf.colorado.edu>
Date: Tuesday, April 11, 2000 1:03 PM
Subject: Oromo demonstration in Atlanta


 >
 >
 >
 >The Atlanta Journal and Constitution
 >
 >                                 April 11, 2000, Tuesday, Home Edition
 >
 >
 >Hello Alan:
 >
 >My apologies if i seemed carried away in my last email.  I suppose i was
 >resenting the enmeshing of OLF, Eplf and TPLF all in one scale.  There are
 >grades of evil and I believe the TPLF (the Tigrean minority)
 >government in Ethiopia is particularly dangerous at this phase of the
 >struggle for justice in the Horn of Africa.  I would say that the TPLF has
 >all the potential and fanaticism of Pol Potism in the Horn of Africa.  In 
a
 >perverse way, this impending tragic famine may provide the catalyst to
 >expose them and give an opening to the various oppressed and muffled 
people
 >of the region and the people of Oromia.
 >Incidentally, the TPLF is a darling of the World Bank and is implementing 
a
 >structural adjustment program for Ethiopia.  Never mind that it was the
only
 >African "liberation" organization in the 1980s that espoused allegiance to
 >Alabanian (Anver Hojxa) version of  Marxism-Lenninsm.
 >
 >Alexy
 >
 >
 >
 >SECTION: Local News; Pg. 2B
 >LENGTH: 715 words
 >HEADLINE: Ethiopians air problems in Atlanta
 >BYLINE: Colin Campbell, Staff
 >
 >SOURCE: CONSTITUTION
 >
 >BODY:
 >A demonstration of about 250 Oromo men, women and children from Ethiopia
 >marched through downtown Atlanta Monday. It assembled
 >within camera shot of CNN, passed The Atlanta Journal-Constitution,
 >continued on to the state Capitol and tried, throughout, to call
 >attention to what organizers call a growing pattern of human rights abuses
 >by the Ethiopian government.
 >
 >The 25 million Oromo are the biggest ethnic group in Ethiopia, and one of
 >the largest in Africa. They're certainly not the sole subnation
 >claiming to be victims of their government and demanding greater autonomy,
 >and in some ways their plight is a reminder of how politically
 >confused and economically marginal Ethiopia has been for decades. Yet
 >Monday's march also reflects rising concerns over several crises
 >gathering in Ethiopia.
 >
 >Not only do many Oromo feel neglected and worse by the ethnic Tigrayan
 >minority that runs Ethiopia; there's also growing concern
 >around the world that Ethiopia's 3-year-old drought could break out into
 >another killer famine. Meanwhile the bitter, wasteful border
 >conflict between Ethiopia and its former province of Eritrea is as
dangerous
 >as ever (some feel it may explode again soon) and recently the
 >country has faced a new plague. More than a month ago, a huge forest fire
 >broke out in the south. It has destroyed thousands of farms
 >and houses, bared the land to erosion and threatened several already
 >endangered species of mammals, such as the mountain nyala and
 >Menelik's bushbuck.
 >
 >Atlanta's connection with all this is larger than Monday's march 
suggested.
 >In addition to the 1,000 or more Oromo living here, there are
 >also about 4, 000 Amhara, Eritreans and others who until a few years ago
 >were all " Ethiopians." The biggest Oromo community in the
 >U.S., about 10,000 strong, is in Minneapolis; yet here in Atlanta the
Carter
 >Center and CARE take a special interest in Ethiopia, and Prof.
 >Mohammed Hassen Ali, a historian at Georgia State University, is widely
 >known as an Oromo scholar and activist.
 >
 >Most curious of all, according to a British scholar and Oromo sympathizer
 >who recently visited Atlanta, the so-called Oromo Support
 >Group (as distinguished from the armed Oromo insurgency in Ethiopia --- 
see
 >www. oromoliberationfront.org) might not exist at all without
 >the financial support of Atlanta's Oromo.
 >
 >A letter on Monday from the Oromo Community Association of Georgia to Gov.
 >Roy Barnes (like similar letters the Oromo have sent in
 >recent weeks to President Clinton, Vice President Al Gore and other
leaders)
 >urged Washington to take steps against Ethiopian
 >government abuses. Oromo activists assert that the forest fire --- which
has
 >threatened Bale National Forest and drawn volunteer
 >firefighters from South Africa, Germany and Canada --- was deliberately 
set
 >by the Ethiopian government to deny sanctuary to Oromo
 >guerrillas. (The Ethiopian government denies this.)
 >
 >Citing criticisms of Ethiopia by Amnesty International and other human
 >rights groups, Oromo activists also are appealing to Americans to
 >help stop the Ethiopian government from shooting Oromo students who've
 >protested the fire, to protest Ethiopia's imprisonment of 165
 >farmers who've been arrested for setting the fire, and to quit introducing
 >settlers, "corporate farms" and foreign mining operations to the
 >region where many Oromo live.
 >
 >The fire is said to have spread over millions of acres in Ethiopia's south
 >and southeast. A Chinese news service reported recently that the
 >fire had been snuffed out by rain and emergency aid. But I don't know.
 >
 >The Oromo in America are probably wise at this point to be amplifying 
their
 >view of Ethiopia's troubles --- before more dramatic crises cry
 >out for attention.
 >
 >More than 300 children are reported to have died lately from 
hunger-related
 >diseases at a little place called Danan, in Ethiopia's Ogaden.
 >The U.S. and Europe have pledged a million tons of food aid for the Horn 
of
 >Africa, where the last rainy season failed just as Mozambique
 >was being devastated by floods. Most of this food probably will be
earmarked
 >for Ethiopia. But renewed fighting with Eritrea could cut off
 >that effort, which even in peacetime will face the usual grim challenges 
of
 >tardy food shipments, terrible roads and less than perfect
 >government.
 >
 >GRAPHIC: Graphic
 >ETHIOPIA AT A GLANCE
 >Originally, the Oromo occupied most of the southeast part of Ethiopia, but
 >by the 16th century they occupied all of southern Ethiopia,
 >with some settling along the Tana River in Kenya.
 >Area: 437,794 square miles, two-thirds the size of Alaska
 >Population: 58.7 million
 >Life expectancy: 45.5 years for men, 47.8 years for women
 >Literacy: 35.5 percent
 >Ethnic breakdown: Oromo 45 percent; Amhara and Tigre, 32 percent
 >Chief export: Coffee
 >Includes map of Ethiopia; inset map of Africa pinpoints the area shown on
 >the larger map.
 >Source: Encyclopaedia Britannca Online / ROB SMOAK / Staff
 >Photo
 >Members of the Oromo Community Association of Georgia protest at the state
 >Capitol Monday the treatment their ethnic group receives
 >in their Ethiopian homeland./ NICK ARROYO / Staff
 >Map
 >Ethiopia
 >Includes map of Ethiopia; inset map of Africa pinpoints the area shown on
 >the larger map.
 >Source: Encyclopaedia Britannca Online / ROB SMOAK / Staff
 >______________________________________________________
 >Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com
 >


----Original Message Follows----
From: "Spectors" <spectors@netnitco.net>
Reply-To: spectors@netnitco.net
To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK <wsn@csf.colorado.edu>
CC: "WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK" <wsn@csf.colorado.edu>
Subject: Re: Oromo demonstration in Atlanta
Date: Tue, 11 Apr 2000 13:32:24 -0500

No way would I equate the TPLF of Ethiopia with the OLF (Oromo, for those on
WSN who don't understand). I don't agree with the slogan
"self-determination" but I do believe in militantly opposing invasions by
imperialists; so I probably would disagree with the OLF leadership. There
are other forces among the Oromo; Ethiopia itself has many, many people with
combined ethnic backgrounds.   Many Oromo are also Amhara; many Amhara are
also Oromo!

But, TPLF has power and has instituted virtual apartheid in Ethiopia, and
imprisoned tens of thousands, destroyed the labor movement, etc. There are
even many Tigrayans who don't support them but are afraid to speak out. TPLF
certainly aren't Marxists or Leninists of the "Albanian" or any other
variety, despite whatever rhetoric they used in the past. In some ways, they
may be worse than the Khmer Rouge (Pol Pot). Of course they haven't killed
as many people (yet) but the Khmer Rouge came to power after U.S.
imperialism had destroyed much of the region and forced hundreds of
thousands to flee to the cities, whilch helped lay the basis for the famine
and deaths of which the Pol Pot regime played a role. And most of the Khmer
Rouge was not involved in the struggle in order to get rich. Don't
misunderstand -- I'm NOT defending the Khmer Rouge --only making the point
that TPLF is just a run of the mill gang of bandits that doesn't even have
the pretense of serving the people -- just raiding the treasury.


Alan Spector

===================================================




-----Original Message-----
From: alexy2k gerard <alexandragerard@hotmail.com>
To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK <wsn@csf.colorado.edu>
Date: Tuesday, April 11, 2000 1:03 PM
Subject: Oromo demonstration in Atlanta


 >
 >
 >
 >The Atlanta Journal and Constitution
 >
 >                                 April 11, 2000, Tuesday, Home Edition
 >
 >
 >Hello Alan:
 >
 >My apologies if i seemed carried away in my last email.  I suppose i was
 >resenting the enmeshing of OLF, Eplf and TPLF all in one scale.  There are
 >grades of evil and I believe the TPLF (the Tigrean minority)
 >government in Ethiopia is particularly dangerous at this phase of the
 >struggle for justice in the Horn of Africa.  I would say that the TPLF has
 >all the potential and fanaticism of Pol Potism in the Horn of Africa.  In 
a
 >perverse way, this impending tragic famine may provide the catalyst to
 >expose them and give an opening to the various oppressed and muffled 
people
 >of the region and the people of Oromia.
 >Incidentally, the TPLF is a darling of the World Bank and is implementing 
a
 >structural adjustment program for Ethiopia.  Never mind that it was the
only
 >African "liberation" organization in the 1980s that espoused allegiance to
 >Alabanian (Anver Hojxa) version of  Marxism-Lenninsm.
 >
 >Alexy
 >
 >
 >
 >SECTION: Local News; Pg. 2B
 >LENGTH: 715 words
 >HEADLINE: Ethiopians air problems in Atlanta
 >BYLINE: Colin Campbell, Staff
 >
 >SOURCE: CONSTITUTION
 >
 >BODY:
 >A demonstration of about 250 Oromo men, women and children from Ethiopia
 >marched through downtown Atlanta Monday. It assembled
 >within camera shot of CNN, passed The Atlanta Journal-Constitution,
 >continued on to the state Capitol and tried, throughout, to call
 >attention to what organizers call a growing pattern of human rights abuses
 >by the Ethiopian government.
 >
 >The 25 million Oromo are the biggest ethnic group in Ethiopia, and one of
 >the largest in Africa. They're certainly not the sole subnation
 >claiming to be victims of their government and demanding greater autonomy,
 >and in some ways their plight is a reminder of how politically
 >confused and economically marginal Ethiopia has been for decades. Yet
 >Monday's march also reflects rising concerns over several crises
 >gathering in Ethiopia.
 >
 >Not only do many Oromo feel neglected and worse by the ethnic Tigrayan
 >minority that runs Ethiopia; there's also growing concern
 >around the world that Ethiopia's 3-year-old drought could break out into
 >another killer famine. Meanwhile the bitter, wasteful border
 >conflict between Ethiopia and its former province of Eritrea is as
dangerous
 >as ever (some feel it may explode again soon) and recently the
 >country has faced a new plague. More than a month ago, a huge forest fire
 >broke out in the south. It has destroyed thousands of farms
 >and houses, bared the land to erosion and threatened several already
 >endangered species of mammals, such as the mountain nyala and
 >Menelik's bushbuck.
 >
 >Atlanta's connection with all this is larger than Monday's march 
suggested.
 >In addition to the 1,000 or more Oromo living here, there are
 >also about 4, 000 Amhara, Eritreans and others who until a few years ago
 >were all " Ethiopians." The biggest Oromo community in the
 >U.S., about 10,000 strong, is in Minneapolis; yet here in Atlanta the
Carter
 >Center and CARE take a special interest in Ethiopia, and Prof.
 >Mohammed Hassen Ali, a historian at Georgia State University, is widely
 >known as an Oromo scholar and activist.
 >
 >Most curious of all, according to a British scholar and Oromo sympathizer
 >who recently visited Atlanta, the so-called Oromo Support
 >Group (as distinguished from the armed Oromo insurgency in Ethiopia --- 
see
 >www. oromoliberationfront.org) might not exist at all without
 >the financial support of Atlanta's Oromo.
 >
 >A letter on Monday from the Oromo Community Association of Georgia to Gov.
 >Roy Barnes (like similar letters the Oromo have sent in
 >recent weeks to President Clinton, Vice President Al Gore and other
leaders)
 >urged Washington to take steps against Ethiopian
 >government abuses. Oromo activists assert that the forest fire --- which
has
 >threatened Bale National Forest and drawn volunteer
 >firefighters from South Africa, Germany and Canada --- was deliberately 
set
 >by the Ethiopian government to deny sanctuary to Oromo
 >guerrillas. (The Ethiopian government denies this.)
 >
 >Citing criticisms of Ethiopia by Amnesty International and other human
 >rights groups, Oromo activists also are appealing to Americans to
 >help stop the Ethiopian government from shooting Oromo students who've
 >protested the fire, to protest Ethiopia's imprisonment of 165
 >farmers who've been arrested for setting the fire, and to quit introducing
 >settlers, "corporate farms" and foreign mining operations to the
 >region where many Oromo live.
 >
 >The fire is said to have spread over millions of acres in Ethiopia's south
 >and southeast. A Chinese news service reported recently that the
 >fire had been snuffed out by rain and emergency aid. But I don't know.
 >
 >The Oromo in America are probably wise at this point to be amplifying 
their
 >view of Ethiopia's troubles --- before more dramatic crises cry
 >out for attention.
 >
 >More than 300 children are reported to have died lately from 
hunger-related
 >diseases at a little place called Danan, in Ethiopia's Ogaden.
 >The U.S. and Europe have pledged a million tons of food aid for the Horn 
of
 >Africa, where the last rainy season failed just as Mozambique
 >was being devastated by floods. Most of this food probably will be
earmarked
 >for Ethiopia. But renewed fighting with Eritrea could cut off
 >that effort, which even in peacetime will face the usual grim challenges 
of
 >tardy food shipments, terrible roads and less than perfect
 >government.
 >
 >GRAPHIC: Graphic
 >ETHIOPIA AT A GLANCE
 >Originally, the Oromo occupied most of the southeast part of Ethiopia, but
 >by the 16th century they occupied all of southern Ethiopia,
 >with some settling along the Tana River in Kenya.
 >Area: 437,794 square miles, two-thirds the size of Alaska
 >Population: 58.7 million
 >Life expectancy: 45.5 years for men, 47.8 years for women
 >Literacy: 35.5 percent
 >Ethnic breakdown: Oromo 45 percent; Amhara and Tigre, 32 percent
 >Chief export: Coffee
 >Includes map of Ethiopia; inset map of Africa pinpoints the area shown on
 >the larger map.
 >Source: Encyclopaedia Britannca Online / ROB SMOAK / Staff
 >Photo
 >Members of the Oromo Community Association of Georgia protest at the state
 >Capitol Monday the treatment their ethnic group receives
 >in their Ethiopian homeland./ NICK ARROYO / Staff
 >Map
 >Ethiopia
 >Includes map of Ethiopia; inset map of Africa pinpoints the area shown on
 >the larger map.
 >Source: Encyclopaedia Britannca Online / ROB SMOAK / Staff
 >______________________________________________________
 >Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com
 >


______________________________________________________
Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com