global praxis and the future of the world-system Thu, 13 Jun 1996 14:02:54 -0600 (CST) chris chase-dunn (chriscd@jhu.edu) We have begun to publish Volume 2 of the _Journal of World-Systems Research_. The next batch includes an article by Historian W. Warren Wagar on his ideas about the future of the world-system and political practice. Wagar proposes the formation of a World Party to carry through the project of global democratic socialism. Included with his article are thirteen comments by Sociologists, Political Scientists and activists. Perhaps Wagar's article and the comments might serve as a topic for discussion on wsn. JWSR is primarily an outlet for research articles on world-systems, but Wagar's ideas are so important that we have included them despite our determination that JWSR not become a political magazine.
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Where World Capitalism is going? Tue, 25 Jun 1996 21:46:37 -0600
(NSK) Nikolai S. Rozov (ROZOV@cnit.nsu.ru)
We have gone far away from criticism of WS fathers. While reflecting
on Richard Moore's arguments I decided to suggest a new subject concerning
objective long-term trends of World Capitalism and possible alternative
evaluations of them. Three main views on this point can be seen: a) the
liberal 'mainstream' position: "free market economy and democracy are winning,
they are becoming stronger and stronger and they are really worthy this
victory" (Fukuyama, etc) I think nobody in wsn needs arguments against
this position. b) the left expectations of world capitalism's decline:
it's a world desease ("virus") and it is worthy its forthcoming failure
(Wallerstein, Chase-Dunn) My question: What are real visible signs of decline
or crisis, which should be stronger than all those problems and crises
that world capitalism successfully prevailed in the past (f.e. in 1810-15,
1848-9, 1914-18, 1930-32, 1939-45, 1968-69)? c) the left appeals for struggle
against strong and threatening world capitalism (appeals by Maoism, Trotskism
in Latin America, etc, Russian Communism, maybe in wsn by R.Moore in his
struggle against 'imperialism' and TNC) My doubts and questions: Historical
facts tell us that in most cases of open 'hot' struggle against world capitalism
did not succeed, but ALL the local national 'successes' (f.e. in Russia
since 1917, China, Cuba, N.Korea, Iran, Albania) led inevitably to mass
social disasters, poverty, frequently - mass terror. On the contrary most
"soft" and interior attemps to ameliorate capitalism were successful, or
at least, harmless (Second International and Social-Democratic reforms
in Europe in the beginning of XX, laborists in Great Britain, socialists
in Sweden, promotion of social programs in US, France, Germany, etc). Well,
WS-theory can tell that it was possible only for core or semipripheral
countries, not for periphery. Great, but in this case the imperative should
be not a struggle against 'imperialism' (ie core countries) transforming
them to less democratric and tolerant regimes, but vice versa - the imperative
should be to try to rise the status (from periphery to semipheriphery)
of most exploited countries and peoples. Is the last task possible without
support of world capital, without IMF, TNC, Big- 7 and all other 'devils',
without appeal to moral norms of humanism, justice,etc, even if we see
so much hypocrisy in proclaiming these values by mainstream leaders? My
position in brief on the question posed in the subject above: - World Capitalism
seems to strengthen (not decline), - it is not a monolite, it is rather
open for reforms (much more than all non-capitalist social regimes!), -
many long-term trends of its transformation during last 500 years should
be morally appreciated, - the task is not to unmask hypocrisy of its social-moral
ideology, but to use this ideology as a support for 'soft' promotion of
reforms for humanizing Capitalism (first of all to work out the correspondent
norms of world legal system in international trade, debts, raw resources,
etc) -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fwd:Re:Where the World Capitalism is going? Thu, 27 Jun 1996
20:34:16 -0600 (NSK) Nikolai S. Rozov (ROZOV@cnit.nsu.ru) I am forwarding
a feedback of Dr.Georgi Derluguian who has been working for more than 5
years with I.Wallerstein and is an expert in rather wide range of ws-theory
and history issues. Mostly I agree with Georgi, just one note on misunderstanding
my position (see below). Nikolai Rozov rozov@cnit.nsu.ru
From: Georgi Derluguian
Nikolai Rozov: Sic! I suggested a radically different things. I
think WSN members remember my postings on: World Law versus World State
Georgi continues: IW thinks that this is way too much for the capitalist
world-economy to sustain. The previously unwashed masses and then the classes
dangereaux could be successfully tamed because that was just 10 to 15%
of the world population. What about 50 or 75%? In a condensed form, IW
argues that the MWS was successfull in deflecting the crises mentioned
by Nikolai and many other threats (primarily from the disgruntled and eventually
organized masses). The seminal success of the demise of communism brings
two kinds of trouble -- no more orderly counterpart, sort of responsible
bad guys who play by the rules even when they try to cheat a little --
but, as George Kennan said in 1946, "Soviets know that they have a lot
to loose and every possibility to enjoy their acquisitions if they do not
behave recklessly so they are not desperate". No more such relaxed opponents
with still enormous though misleading popular appeal in the Third World.
Secondly, huge, densely populated China and Russia with educated cheap
workforce and industrial potential enter the world markets. Who needs Sierra
Leone then? The loop of capital accumulation will function well without
much of the Third World. Once the anticapitalism lure is gone, many middle
classes (state-produced cadres especially) will try to live like the core.
This will overburden the system, for no system can consist of core alone.
least of all such a historical system as the capitalist one. There are
two alternatives -- either peripheries become equal to the core and this
finishes the MWS peacefully transforming it into a social-democratic global
success, or the system crumbles down under the weight of growing demands.
Democracy is actually a very subversive thing in this perspective -- Liberalism
was about the rule of the competent and meritorious, not the "demagogues"
from the streets. Democracy allows social groups to organize and struggle
politically pressing their demands upon governments. This might not necessarily
be what we like -- Nikolai should look around himself. I presume, it was
Comrade Zyuganov, the Russian fundamentalist, who won in Novosibirsk, in
a fairly democratic manner, n'est-ce pas? Democracy makes governing institutions
more open to popular influences. The problem then is political -- what
and who those influences will be? --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fwd:Wallerstein Re: Where the World Capitalism is going? Wed,
17 Jul 1996 22:07:12 -0600 (NSK) Nikolai S. Rozov (ROZOV@cnit.nsu.ru) To:
"Nikolai S. Rozov"
From: immanuel wallerstein
Re: Fwd:Wallerstein Re: Where the World Capitalism is going Thu, 18
Jul 1996 19:49:00 -0600 (NSK) Nikolai S. Rozov (ROZOV@cnit.nsu.ru) Dear
Al, I mostly agree with you and confess that did not emphasized (but not
omitted) the core-periphery aspect of W-Capitalism. Why not to discuss
it now in wsn? These issues are very close to the topic of Wagar's paper
that Chris suggested recently for discussion. BTW Wagar seems to be free
from purist objectivism, signs of which I saw in your reply. Wagar bravely
calls to discuss NORMATIVE (or values-oriented, ethical, pragmatic) aspects
of global future. Strictly objectivist prognoses are not sufficient in
our time. I also doubt in usefulness of any unique scenario and suggest
to consider multiple trajectories depending of current choices, coalitions,
conjuncture, collisions of cycles and trends, and even of historical chances.
In my book 1992 (The Structure of Civilization and World Development Trends)
I sugested to consider three modern world-wide megatrends directly dealing
with core-periphery axis. Each megatrend (MT) is a stable complex of positive
feed-back loops of trends from main spheres of social life. Briefly: MT1
(Inertia of growth, Assimilation, Westernization) leads to maximal liberalization
of world economy, maximal and fast profit for the core, encreasing gap
between core and periphery, forthcoming ecological, social-political, demographical
crises in periphery. Maybe US- Latin America in relations can serve here
as an example, Perestroika nad Gaidar reforms in Russia also were done
within this logic. MT2 (Isolationism): periphery (or semiperiphery) tries
to conserve its cultural-political identity from core expansion (USSR and
China until 1975- 80th, now Iran, Northern Korea); the core (or semipheriphery)
tries to protect its life level from peripheral emigrants. This MT leads
to stagnation of periphery isolates, and to crises of democratic, humanistic
principles in core countries (rising fascist-like movements in US- militia,
in France - Le Penn, in Russia - Jirinovski, etc) MT3 (Multipolarity and
World-wide social-economic-cultural programs) includes support by the core
of periphery with preserving its identity (UN, UNESCO, FAO, ecological,
medical programs etc), competition of multiple core poles in constructing
new semi- peripheries. Thus US and Japan already constructed their semi-periphery
- China and S.E.Asia. And now its turn for Europe to build its semipheriphery
on the base of Central Europe and Russia. I consider these processes as
mutually profitable for patrons and clients. Wallerstein notes that in
such scenario vast amounts of people in Africa, South Asia and parts of
S.America would be thrown off history. It is really a problem (maybe the
greatest humanistic problem of the coming decades) and I hope to hear smth
on it from experts in wsn. best regards, Nikolai ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Re: Fwd:Wallerstein Re: Where the World Capitalism is going Thu, 18
Jul 1996 15:21:29 -0700 (MST) Albert J Bergesen (albert@U.Arizona.EDU)
Dear Nikolai-- Thanks for replying. Your preference for focusing upon multiple
causes, conjunctures, possibilities, influences, etc. is fine, of course.
But if and when so many things are considered and if and when we are so
open to anything/everything then world systemic principles are no longer
guiding/making predictions about world development. Which, you know, is
fine too. It is a little like Isaiah Berlin's analogy of the hedgehog and
the fox: the fox knows many things--as it seems do you and Mr. Wagar--while
the hedgehog knows one big thing--which it was once hoped was the distinctive
insight/predictions from a world-systemic theoretical point of view. I
am still of that school--I am still a hedgehog--so I still want WS theory
to have some predictive power and hence be able to respond to the everyting
goes/all influnces count/all possibilities exist fox-school of late 20th
century thought. In that regard let me mention two things: (1) your trends
which, as I hope I correctly remember from your reply you said had some
core-periiphery structural aspects. But these still seem to me to be mostly
about changes in countries, maybe additive to make a world-like-fact (an
aggregative individualism where individual countries are the individuals)
but still non-world systemic. MT1, for instance being about growth, assimilation
and westernization, is still about country level change; as is MT2, Isolationism:
countries are isolated, not the world-system; and MT3, world wide programs,
are reaching outs from core countries to peripheral ones. (2) I would suggest
that MT1-3 are themselves consequences of world systemic dynamics, not
the dynamics themselves. These are descriptive outcomes, not underlying
processes. For example, the whole multiple causes approach you endorse
in your reply is part of a larger postmodern movement in thought that is
produced by the B-phase cyclical undulation of the world-economy. The A-phase
produces its own pattern of thought: generalized universalism. Put another
way: A-phases produce hedgehogs; B-phases produce foxes in the life of
the mind. I suppose I am a child of the post-war A-phase of expansion and
universal theorizing. In the postmodern world of late 20th century thought
the absence of general theory is treated in a fox-like manner as an advantage--as
you argue--multiple possibilities always exist; nothing is determined.
The hallmark of of today's intellectual climate. Everyone from the postmodernist
lit crit types to you and Wagar believe in the reality of multiple causes,
of no one prediction, of no one model, of no logocentricism, of no one
world-system logic. The hedgehog in me disagrees with the fox in you. In
that regard I wish to stand as a counter weight and push for the hedgehog
agenda: figuring out the inner logic of the world system and from that
being able to make theoretically principled predictions about the future.
yours, al bergesen ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Re: Fwd:Wallerstein Re: Where the World Capitalism is going Fri, 19
Jul 1996 09:40:28 -0600 (NSK) Nikolai S. Rozov (ROZOV@cnit.nsu.ru) Dear
Al, it may be strange for you but our methodological positions are in this
aspect are very close and by no means opposite! I don't like post-modern
tradition in science because these falks make the water of thought not
more clear but more muddy. I just as you do try to reveal the underlying
logic of historical dynamics. Moreover I still think that Hempel-Popper
explanation-prediction scheme (so unfashionable in recent decades) can
serve us in combination with rich conceptual apparatus of WST, civilization
approach, geopolitical approach, social-changes theory. My 'fox' considerations
to which you reacted are limited by the initial position of widest openness
to future results of research. Sure, after revealing interior logic, dynamics,
maybe laws this range of possibilities becomes much more narrow and a fox
should be transformed into a hedgehog. But according to specifics of social-historical
reality with changing logic, changing weight of factors, changing limits
of growth, self-reflection, significance of choices and conjuncture, I
really don't believe in possibility of one precise long-term prognosis.
I never told of 'no predictions', 'no models'! On the contrary I appeal
to construct and use multiple models, make multiple predictions based on
these models and hypothetical laws and then see which presuppositions and
hypotheses were right or wrong. Well, stop pure methodology and lets turn
to WS issues. I am very glad that you accept the idea of megatrends at
least as a phenomenal description. I agree that core-periphery relations
are not sufficiently elaborated here, it is really a special large task
to combine the megatrend model (polispheral complex of positive feed-back
loops of trends) with WS model. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Re: Where World Capitalism is going? Fri, 19 Jul 1996 15:29:10 +1000
Bruce R. McFarling (ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au) On Thu, 18 Jul 1996, Nikolai
S. Rozov wrote: [Nikolai]: >>> My doubts and questions: >>> Historical
facts tell us that in most cases of open 'hot' >>> struggle against world
capitalism did not succeed, but ALL >>> the local national 'successes'
(f.e. in Russia since 1917, >>> China, Cuba, N.Korea, Iran, Albania, led
inevitably to mass >>> social disasters, poverty, frequently - mass terror.
[myself (Bruce)]: >> I find it hard to credit Castro's regime with leading
>> to poverty in Cuba. I don't much favor hypotheses with >> consequences
leading causes by that length of time. And >> there's a bit of a post-hoc
ergo propter-hoc problem, as >> well, particularly if you note the tremendous
economic >> growth (sic) of Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Jamaica
>> over this time. > > Castro transformed Cuba from periphery to communistic
isolate. I have not > insisted that to periphery in w-economy gives any
guarantees for growth. > They have some chances, not more (take South-East
Asia that triumphally > used its chance).I insist only on the guarantees
for non-growth and > stagnation for communistic isolates (in spite of periods
of military- > industrial growth by means of mass slavery as in USSR 1920-56)
This is a shift from the position above. Above Castro's Cuba experienced
an inevitable mass social disaster due to the nature of the adopting the
"communistic isolate" strategy (as it has just been dubbed). It may be
that in adopting this strategy Castro's Cuba has been locked out of the
opportunities that many South East Asian countries have taken advantage
of. On the other hand, its neighbor's that have been pursuing these opporunities
have also been locked out, so it may well be that the options available
to East Asian nations weren't available to small Caribbean nations. In
this case, the 'social disaster' that Cuba has experienced has been to
be a bit poorer and a bit healthier, under a government that is from a
bit to a lot more authoritarian, depending on the Caribbean country it
is being compared to. And the substantial difference between the post-Castro
and pre-Castro comparison is the part about Cubans being a bit healthier
than comparable neighboring countries, because it was both poorer and more
authoritarian than average before it adopted the "communistic isolate"
strategy. [Nikolai]: >>> On the contrary most "soft" and interior attemps
to >>> ameliorate capitalism were successful, or at least, harmless >>>
(Second International and Social-Democratic reforms in Europe >>> in the
beginning of XX, laborists in Great Britain, socialists >>> in Sweden,
promotion of social programs in US, France, Germany, >>> etc). >>> Well,
WS-theory can tell that it was possible only for core >>> or semipripheral
countries, not for periphery. Great, but in this >>> case the imperative
should be not a struggle against 'imperialism' >>> (ie core countries)
transforming them to less democratric and >>> tolerant regimes, but vice
versa - the imperative should be to try >>> to rise the status (from periphery
to semipheriphery) of most >>> exploited countries and peoples. >>> Is
the last task possible without support of world capital, >>> without IMF,
TNC, Big- 7 and all other 'devils', without appeal >>> to moral norms of
humanism, justice,etc, even if we see so much >>> hypocrisy in proclaiming
these values by mainstream leaders? [Bruce]: >> The question supposes that
it's possible *with* the support >> of 'world capital'. Whatever that means,
and if it means anything >> *besides* the IMF/WorldBank/TNC's or the Big7.
> Oh, well, you are fairly precise here and I was not precise. But > what
the use of splitting hairs instead of principal debate? This was not an
effort to split hairs. The question *does* presuppose that this development
is possible *with* the IMF / WorldBank / TNC's etc, and the track record
in that respect is not very strong. Regarding the East Asian countries
that are cited above as providing examples of the potential available to
peripheral countries, it is arguable whether they did so by working with
IMF / WorldBank / TNC 'development policy', or by working arounf it. The
performance of African countries that have followed the development policy
line of the day has over the years been abysmal. So, I'd like to see the
specific argument that it *is* possible to raise the status of peripheral
countries *with* the support of the IMF / World Bank / TNC's / etc, before
looking that the (presently loaded) question of whether its possible without
the support of these organizations. Virtually, Bruce R. McFarling, Newcastle,
NSW -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
W. Warren Wagar's "Praxis" Thu, 25 Jul 1996 14:32:21 +1000 Bruce
R. McFarling (ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au) Regarding the article by Wagar
and symposium of commentary published as Article 2, comments and reponse
In JWSR, Volume 2, Number 2, 1996, https://jwsr.ucr.edu/
In "TOWARD A PRAXIS OF WORLD INTEGRATION", W. Warren Wagar writes (quoted
text pp.1-3 [electronic page markers embedded in quoted text]): ________________________________________________________________
> > The theme of the 90th annual meeting of the American > Sociological
Association is "Community of Communities: > Shaping Our Future." The program
asks three leading > questions: must the plurality of communities now >
identifying themselves throughout the world "along ethnic, > racial, gender,
religious, and other lines...be blended away > to ensure civility? Or,
can we have a society of vying > tribes without shared bonds and values?
Or can there be a > shared framework in which many colorful elements find
a new > place...[in] a community of communities?" >_______________________________________________________________
Wagar will claim to be presenting a fourth question, but he is really going
to answer (1): the plurality of communities now identifying themselves
throughout the world along ethnic (etc...) lines must be blended away to
ensure civility. So if these were leading questions in the sense of framing
to bias preferences toward (3), it didn't work on W. Warren Wagar. But
to be fair, these questions are leading questions in one way or another,
and they lead toward selecting (3), and W. Warren Wagar does not want to
select (3), as one wouldn't if one wants to answer (1). So he criticizes
the questions by parable: ________________________________________________________________
> > The authors of the program might just as well have > asked--transferring
these questions to the realm of [Page > 1] domestic relations--whether
husband and wife should fuse > into some kind of fabulous androgynous quadruped,
go their > separate ways, or form an interdependent partnership > respecting
the rights and values of each. >_______________________________________________________________
Now the analogy is fairly loose. The first option, the one that W. Warren
Wagar is going to adopt below, is turned into a fantastic absurdity in
the analogy, which diverts attention from the fact that he will select
it -- in its original form, of course, and not in the form of the fantastic
analogy. The second is quite obviously *not* a society of vying tribes
without shared bonds and values. If the tribes *could* go their seperate
ways, there wouldn't be nearly the problem of the tribes *vying*. In fact,
I have seen that as a stronger assertion: More than five millenia ago,
when the tribes *could* go their seperate ways, they *did* go their seperate
ways rather than have to deal with the problem of power. Civilization happened
because we ran out of unoccupited, prime real estate. And the third alternative
that is posed is dispensed with by pretending that it is utopic. Real communities
exist. Real communities do not rely exclusively on "mutual respect for
the rights and values of each". They rely as well on institutions, rules
regarding approved, permitted, and proscribed behavior, and rewards and
sanctions enforcing the rules. And therefore, unless the term is explicitly
redefined, we can presume that a community of communities will also have
to rely on institutions, rules regarding approved, permitted, and proscribed
behavior, and rewards and sanctions enforcing the rules. So in transforming
the third alternative into a utopian fantasy, W. Warren Wagar evades addressing
it as it was posed, and replaces it with an alternative that is much easier
to dismiss. ________________________________________________________________
> > ... Obviously these > are not serious questions. No attempt is made
to > problematize the issues at stake. The authors offer only > one "right"
answer, the third path of partnership, of > mutualist multiculturalism,
a future in which radical > feminism, fundamentalist Islam, populist libertarianism,
> militant Hinduism, Marxian socialism, born-again > Christianity, megacorporate
capitalism, Bosnian nationalism, > Serbian nationalism, and all the other
colliding forces at > work in our whirling world somehow lie down together
like > lions and lambs in the New Jerusalem and agree to eat grass, > or
better yet, develop the capacity to feed themselves by > photosynthesis.
It is a profoundly "nice" answer. It is > also profoundly wrong, at least
for the 1990s. >_______________________________________________________________
And so the parable was only paving the way for recasting the "community
of communities" alternative explicitly as a utopian fanatasy. It may well
be that case that some proponents of the third alternative engage in sloppy
thinking about it. It would not, in fact, be surprising if many proponents
for each of the three alternatives presented engage in sloppy thinking
about their favored alternatives. However, in casting the third alternative
in the terms presented, only poorly thought through versions of the third
alternative have been addressed. It should be obvious that a wishful-thinking
community of wishful-thinking communities is not a serious alternative,
and W. Warren Wagar's argument here lies on that obvious observation. However,
since it is clearly an unfair reading of the third alternative, the possibility
of a real-world community of real-world communities is not addressed by
the argument. ________________________________________________________________
> > My own answer is to ask a fourth (and also leading) > question. "Should
our society of vying tribes be > transformed into a single planetary civilization
that > strives to make all people equal and free?" In other words, > should
our system of predatory global capitalism flourishing > in a political
environment of competing sovereign states be > replaced by a democratic,
liberal, and socialist world > commonwealth? >_______________________________________________________________
And it is at this point that I would be prepared to argue that W. Warren
Wagar has simply decided to select alternative 1, masking that fact by
at the same time specifying some of the content that he wishes to impose
on the uniform civilization. But I don't have to argue this, since W. Warren
Wagar admits it in the nvery next paragraph: ________________________________________________________________
> > If you say yes, please note that you are not giving a > multiculturalist
response. Your response implies, and > indeed requires, the acceptance
by the great mass of > humankind of a common secular culture derived from
the > intellectual revolution of the late 17th and 18th centuries > in
Western Europe--from the Enlightenment and its sequels in > the 19th century.
That common secular culture obviously has > roots deep in human history,
but it happened to flower first > in one [Page 2] place and at one time.
For many of the > same reasons, having nothing to do with race or gender,
> Western Europe was also the cradle of the capitalist world- > economy.
Because of the place and the time, those who > articulated the culture
of the Enlightenment and its > sequels, from John Locke to Karl Marx, were
almost entirely > Caucasian males. Is this a problem? No doubt. But it
is > not a problem that will go away by chanting multiculturalist > mantras.
>_______________________________________________________________ Again,
defending the position he is proposing by posing a sloppy version of an
opposition position, and then pointing out the weakness of that version
of that position. Well, I don't buy it. The Enlightenment secular culture
is particularly important as a progressive force because it is a tradition
of more or less progressive thought from within the societies that had
the means to impose their nasty old capitalist system[1] best guns and
armies and ships. If the enlightenment had happened in Europe while the
cradle of the capitalist world with the means to impose it on the rest
of the world had been in East Asia, or East Africa, or South Asia, or Central
America, it would have been the progressive tradition within the dominant
culture that would have been important, except perhaps for some radical
independence movements in Europe that drew on the enlightenment to show
that Europeans had an indigenous progressive tradition. But that's not
the most serious reason not to buy it. The serious reason not to buy it
is that the solution proposed is so predictably the same old solutions
magnified for the world stage. Form a political party, pursue a twin-track
progressive front and underground subversion strategy, and grab the reigns
of power. Habits of thought that lead along these lines is part of the
problem, and so applying them on a world scale is the solution. The most
constructive use I see for W. Warren Wagar's argument is as a challenge
to elaborate the praxis of developing a community of commuities, as opposed
to both alternative 1, the authoritarian solution W. Warren Wagar proposes
to work toward (and an authoritarian solution will be the only way to impose
a 'democratic world commonwealth' national government on a world-wide level),
and alternative 2, the vying tribes, as we've seen for the last five millenium.
Virtually, Bruce R. McFarling, Newcastle, NSW ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au
[1] Yeah, this part is a bit tongue in cheek. Figuring out how much is
left as an exercise for the reader. 8-)# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
McFarling on Wagar Thu, 25 Jul 1996 12:20:38 -0400 (EDT) wwagar@binghamton.edu
Just a quick response to Bruce R. McFarling's response. Yes, my fourth
alternative smells a little like the first. I think it's a different critter,
but there are clearly similarities. Also, yes, I would like to challenge
world-systems theorists and sociologists and anybody else to come up with
a praxis of world integration or a praxis of community-building on a world
scale that can prevent or at least mitigate wholesale chaos and the implosion
of civilization in the next century. The refusal of most scholars nearly
everywhere to move from theory and analysis to praxis has baffled me most
of my life. Further, I do anticipate that beyond world integration will
emerge a global community of communities, as discussed in the third book
of my "A Short History of the Future." But I see no way to get there except
through a transitional regime of socialist world government rooted in a
shared world-view. If McFarling sees another way, excellent! Let him point
it out! Regards, W. Warren Wagar ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Re: McFarling on Wagar Fri, 26 Jul 1996 09:54:57 +1000 Bruce R. McFarling
(ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au) On Thu, 25 Jul 1996 wwagar@binghamton.edu wrote:
> Just a quick response to Bruce R. McFarling's response. > ... Ditto [squared],
since I have to head out today. But I would like to comment on: > ... >
Further, I do anticipate that beyond world integration will emerge > a
global community of communities, as discussed in the third book > of my
"A Short History of the Future." But I see no way to get > there except
through a transitional regime of socialist world > government rooted in
a shared world-view. If McFarling sees > another way, excellent! Let him
point it out! If a socialist world government rooted in a shared world-view,
that is sufficiently effective at self-reproduction to establish and maintain
itself and sufficiently ineffective to be a "transitional regime" is actually
one way to get to a community of communities, that's one situation. I am
very skeptical that it is. There may be ways to build a world government
that is sufficiently effective at self-reproduction to establish itself,
but if one of the ways that it establishes itself is by reducing the autonomy
of communities -- which would seem necessary -- then I don't see how it
is leading in the direction of a community of communities. And certainly
I don't see what it is in the history of the Enlightenment tradition that
offers any hope of leading us in that direction. So I don't know that I
see a way, full stop, and that is taking the suggestion to head off in
the opposite direction to get there into consideration. And, on a pragmatic
note, after the long history in the Soviet Union of constantly moving toward
communism but never making much progress, the argument that we can get
to a community of communities via a single world state is going to be a
bit of a hard sell. Virtually, Bruce R. McFarling, Newcastle, NSW ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Re: McFarling on Wagar Fri, 26 Jul 1996 11:08:12 -0400 (EDT) wwagar@binghamton.edu
On Thu, 25 Jul 1996, Andrew W. Austin wrote: > > In a one world government
where do you flee to when your government is > oppressing you? > > Andrew
> Andrew, You left out the adjective "socialist." A socialist world government,
which would also be democratic (or it couldn't be socialist), is a government
that can be replaced or reformed democratically. If there is oppression,
the means are at hand to fight back--through opposition parties, through
the courts, through ombudspersons (= tribunes), through the media, whatever
it takes. Regards, Warren -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Re: McFarling on Wagar Fri, 26 Jul 1996 10:32:25 -0500 (CDT) Andrew
W. Austin (aaustin@mtsu.edu) A socialist society, if structured correctly,
would have no centralized state. Socialist democracy is decentralized,
stateless, and classless. If the world was comprised of autonomous socialist
communities then the need for one world government would be rather absent,
I think. At least I hope. Andy --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Re: McFarling on Wagar Fri, 26 Jul 1996 13:53:17 -0400 (EDT) wwagar@binghamton.edu
Dear Andy, This is one vision of socialism, the vision of William Morris
in "News from Nowhere." It may well be the telos of socialist evolution,
although I see no reason why a socialist society need be decentralized,
if the people choose otherwise. But meanwhile there simply has to be a
transitional regime of global governance, to clean up the planet, redistribute
wealth, dismantle national armed forces, and dispossess the old ruling
and profiting elites. Will that regime be a lovely idyllic commonwealth
of handsome lads and winsome maids, a la Morris? No. Will it make mistakes?
Yes. Will it go wrong, and maybe horribly wrong, from time to time? Yes.
I am not talking about utopia here, but a world in which we confront real
dragons and really slay them. In the process we will frequently screw up,
because we are human, all too human. Does the "example" of the Soviet Union
mean we will make a complete mess of almost everything? Well, in history
there are no examples. Nothing ever happens exactly the same way twice.
All we can do is grit our teeth and do our best. Signing off for the week,
Warren --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Re: McFarling on Wagar Fri, 26 Jul 1996 15:52:41 -0500 (CDT) Andrew
W. Austin (aaustin@mtsu.edu) The Soviet Union is not an example of socialist
democracy gone astray. The Soviet Union was set up like one big corporation.
It was a disaster precisely because it was a centralized, top-down, command
state economy that tried to do the things that you espouse. I cannot support
any plan which seeks to make all cultures and all people live under global
rule. If something goes horribly wrong I would rather it be in a small
autonomous community than in a totalized world-system. In fact, the problem
with the world today is centralized ruling structures and hierarchies of
dominations that systematically deny human freedom and crush creativity.
If the world is on an evolutionary telos towards socialism then we should
see decentralization and greater autonomy of community. What we see is
the movement towards a world capitalist order (really already upon us)
with powerful (although dissimulated) bureaucratic state and ideological
structures. I do not think your world is utopian--indeed, I fear your world
precisely because it is not. Andy Austin ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Re: Wagar's World Fri, 26 Jul 1996 17:24:24 EST5EDT Terry Boswell
(TBOS@socsci.ss.emory.edu) Contained within Autsin's critique of Wagar
is a simple admission that, ironically, makes Wagar's point ring true.
Austin states that, "What we see is the movement towards a world capitalist
order (really already upon us) with powerful (although dissimulated) bureaucratic
state and ideological structures." This is exactly right. Admitting as
much completely changes the frame of debate. The question then is whether
we have an undemocratic, capitalist world state or a democratic, socialist
world state. What is utopian is the proposal that the world has no order.
Terry Boswell -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Selling Internationalism to Phobics Sun, 28 Jul 1996 17:49:42 -0500
J. Timmons Roberts (timmons@mailhost.tcs.tulane.edu) WSNers: After reading
some of the posts on Wager's comments about the need for an international
state(s) of some sort, I made the mistake of listening to talk radio while
driving around yesterday. Only about 12 hours after the bomb at the Olympics,
the host was going on about how tacky Centennial Park in Atlanta was, and
how the Olympics are another example of creeping internationalism that
must be stopped. My own work on global environmental problems and the flight
of corporations to avoid labor and pollution regulations makes me keenly
aware of the need for strong international controls and at least what Chase-Dunn
used to call "A U.N. with Teeth," to enforce them. Perhaps even more is
needed, along the lines of an international state. But my point today is
simply that selling an international state to that segment of the "masses"
who are afraid of anything on a greater scale than their municipal government
is going to be tough, to say the least. How does one encourage citizenry
and politicians to "give up control" to the larger bodies needed to keep
our species alive? That's all. Timmons --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Re: Wagar's World Mon, 29 Jul 1996 11:30:08 +1000 Bruce R. McFarling
(ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au) On Date: Fri, 26 Jul 1996 11:08:12 -0400 (EDT),
W. Warren Wagar (wwagar@binghamton.edu) wrote: > On Thu, 25 Jul 1996, Andrew
W. Austin wrote: >> In a one world government where do you flee to when
your government is >> oppressing you? > You left out the adjective "socialist."
A socialist > world government, which would also be democratic (or it couldn't
> be socialist), is a government that can be replaced or reformed > democratically.
If there is oppression, the means are at hand > to fight back--through
opposition parties, through the courts, > through ombudspersons (= tribunes),
through the media, whatever > it takes. This argument relies on a presumption
that would appear to be in dispute. The presumption is that a one world
government *can* be authoritarian enough to impose itself on the world,
and at the same time democratic enough to permit individuals to successfully
fight against oppresion. So the response begs the question: in writing
the Future history, the government can be made sufficiently effective at
preventing opposition to establish itself, but sufficiently ineffective
at preventing opposition that it can be reformed or replaced democratically.
On Fri, 26 Jul 1996, Andrew W. Austin wrote: > The Soviet Union is not
an example of socialist democracy gone astray. The > Soviet Union was set
up like one big corporation. It was a disaster > precisely because it was
a centralized, top-down, command state economy > that tried to do the things
that you espouse. ... Since this was under a "McFarling on Wagar" subject
line, it was ambiguous who Andrew Austin was responding to. But in any
event, notice that we have an example here of a effort to establish a transnational
state. Would it have remained in place longer if it was less effective
at imposing top-down decisions upon the nations within the state; or would
it have fallen apart sooner; or would it never have been established? Perhaps
it could be compared to the West Indian Federation, which incorporated
sufficient freedom for inhabitants of individual islands to express by
democratic vote whether to pursue independence collectively or to pursue
indpendence individually -- and when Jamaica pulled out, Trinidad and Tobago
pulled out, and after a period of trying to put together a small island
WI Federation, even Barbados pulled out and went it alone (see _The Agony
of the Eight_). That's less than 5 million people in the Federation, at
the time: it would appear that a system that only met a limited subset
of the criteria for socialism still permitted too much freedom of action
to permit the establishment of a trans- English-speaking Caribbean island
governmnet. Which is the question I posed: how is this party effective
enough to establish a one-world government in the face of organized opposition
from the states that will have to be incorporated by force, while at the
same time it remains open enough to opposition that it simply surrenders
power in the face of internal democratic opposition? Saying that if it
qualifies for labelling as socialist, it won't be oppressive, is simply
evading the question: in those terms, how is this party effective enough
to establish a one-world government while at the same time it is socialist
enough to establish a government that can be overturned peacefully? Virtually,
Bruce R. McFarling, Newcastle, NSW -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Re: Wagar's World Mon, 29 Jul 1996 21:45:24 -0600 (NSK) Nikolai S.
Rozov (ROZOV@cnit.nsu.ru) Enjoying Bruce's crucial questions I dare to
add some more: 1. What are any real signs of moving towards world socialist
state? What can prevail real geopolitical, geoeconomic, civilizational
underlying and current surface conflicts? 2. Why ecological, demographic
and other crises, 'world revolution' will lead to world socialism, not
to confrontation of much more severe versions of modern regimes? Doesn't
history and theory of revolutions' results tell that initial popular dreams
always were crashed and most cynical, demagogic parts of previous elits
win the game? Isn't world socialism a mere chimera non- worthy for discussion?
3. Even if after terrible disasters some collective force manages to get
all world power and proclaims itself 'socialist' what factors save it from
fast shifting to totalitarian anti-utopia? 4. What really proponents of
world socialism mean by 'socialist' besides 'good' or 'humanistic'? What
political-economic regime would have a world socialist state? What would
be the destiny of non-state capital, property, institutions? If they become
subordinate to the world state why will not beaurocracy grasp ALL power
and eliminate democracy? If they preserve current autonomy what will be
the difference from capitalism? If just taxes encrease (as in Sweden model)
for global programs realization what are guarantees against giant corrupcy
of giant pyramids of officals? 5. Why nobody of Western scholars say a
word of amelioration of international LEGAL system? (For Russian intelligentsia,
so tired from revolutionaty, state and emperal ideologies, the West is
a symbol of idea of Law, legal approach to social problems, and high art
for making coalitions). Why in these discussions the only voice from Siberia
calls for legal approach and rational coalition-making? best wishes from
Novosibirsk Akademgorodok (I am already here, but really there is much
to lose) Nikolai Rozov -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The World Party: Too Weak or Too Strong? Mon, 29 Jul 1996 11:20:07
-0400 (EDT) wwagar@binghamton.edu Dear Bruce, Your question at the end
of this morning's post is perfectly fair. "How is this party effective
enough to establish a one-world government in the face of organized opposition
from the states that will have to be incorporated by force, while at the
same time it remains open enough to opposition that it simply surrenders
power in the face of internal democratic opposition?" In "A Short History
of the Future" I take the easy way out--the world in the aftermath of a
cataclysmic North-South war is so shattered that most of the survivors
embrace the regime of the World Party without needing much persuasion.
Some states and remnants of states put up a fight, but they are too weak
to prevail. Thereafter the World Party, learning from many past horrors,
insists on ruling democratically and gradually, over the decades, attracts
mounting opposition. It loses its resilience, but in the final crisis imposes
martial law in a last-ditch effort to save itself. So it does not "surrender"
power gracefully, but in effect the power has drained out of it, and the
world order is then radically restructured to permit the rise of autonomous
communities of all shapes and sizes and flavors. Also helping to smooth
the transition is the bioengineering of a new, more altruistic human type
(this part will be dismissed by all social science purists as a neo-fascist
fantasy, but the progress of genetics in recent years convinces me such
a thing is eminently possible). In a world not shattered by a catastrophic
war (or environmental or economic collapse), the World Party would obviously
have a much more awesome task. I have no idea whether it could succeed.
In my scenario it is not even formed until the 2030s, and until the war
breaks out (in 2044) it makes little progress. The short-term prospects
for Homo sapiens are bleak, as Wallerstein keeps telling us. All I am trying
to do is plant the idea that an alternative to drift, disintegration, and
despair is imaginable. Best wishes, Warren -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
the world party Tue, 30 Jul 1996 11:13:44 -0700 chris chase-dunn (chriscd@jhu.edu)
thanks to all who have contributed to the discussion of the world party
and the world state. i agree with warren wagar, except for a few details.
there needs to be a world state to sort out the problems that capitalism
and human social evolution have created. a state is a monopoly of legitimate
violence. governance, commonwealth, federation, all these words will be
needed but fundamentally the problem is to create a monopoly of legitimate
violence. this because one of the main unsolved and cyclical products of
capitalism is warfare. and warfare under modern technological conditions
is species suicide. in this regard things are somewhat worse than wagar
imagines. because he accepts the position that world wars occur during
Kondratief downswings he thinks the likely time for the next one is 2044.
unfortunately goldstein has shown that world wars are most likely to occur
at the end of k-wave upswings. that would be some time in the 2020s. some
see the possibility of global ecological disaster within a similar time
frame. the second problem is this. the world party cannot simply wait for
the capitalist world-system to destroy itself and most of the people on
earth. it must act to prevent that from happening. even though a world
state is the best solution as an instrument for creating a more just and
sustainable world society (call it socialism, call it democracy, call it
a collectively rational and democratic global commonwealth, call it strawberry
jello) there is not likely to emerge a world state strong enough to prevent
a war among core states in the next twenty five years even if we try very
hard, which we should do. given the high probability of nuclear annihilation,
that means looking hard at possible substitutes for the world state. one
possibility, though it may not be much more likely than a world state,
is a renewed US hegemony. yes folks. that is what i said. this is a hard
conclusion for someone who spent his youth opposing US imperialism. talk
me out of it.
chris
p.s. this line of reasoning is spelled out in more detail in Chase-Dunn
and Podobnik, "The next world war: world-system cycles and trends" _Journal
of World-Systems Research_ 1,6 1995. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Response to Chris Chase-Dunn Tue, 30 Jul 1996 13:15:04 -0400 (EDT)
wwagar@binghamton.edu Just a few postscripts to Chris's comment of 30 July.
I am not a firm believer in the thesis that world wars occur during Kondratieff
downswings. In fact I am not enough of a sociologist to believe that world
wars must occur during any part of any cycle. The greatest world war ever
was brewed in the murky vat of the Great Depression, but its baleful predecessor
came during a time of general prosperity. A further point. My argument
that the next world war may occur in 2044 is not really an argument at
all: it is a scenario, one among many that I might have chosen. I do not
believe that another world war is inevitable, or that it has to come during
a downswing, or that it could not happen in the 2020s. There is enough
instability and injustice in the present world-system to allow it to erupt
at almost any time, and there are enough problems in the present world-economy
to produce runaway inflation, famine, and environmental collapse in a matter
of a decade or two. For example, as Lester Brown asks, who will feed China?
China is on a collision course with catastrophe and this matters profoundly
to everybody else on earth. Of course I agree with Chris that the World
Party must not wait for the capitalist world-system to destroy itself.
It would have to do its best to prevent such a thing, because there is
no way that the death of one or two or five billion people can be justified.
There is no way to justify the death of anybody. But as Chris goes on to
say, the World Party might not be able to keep the system from suicide.
Maybe a renewed US hegemony will turn out to be the least of the various
evils in store for humankind. Better red, white, and blue than dead? In
any event, the one thing this discussion has not elicited, to any great
extent, is attention to praxis. The session at the ASA last summer that
started all this was supposed to be devoted to praxis. How do we get from
here to there? Even if we can't agree on what's happening here and what's
needed there--and that's par for the course in left circles--couldn't we
at least focus for once on appropriate means? If the World Party is a pipedream,
what would be better? If it's not a pipedream, how should it be organized,
how should it operate, what kind of politics should it pursue? To echo
Chris, how do we prepare strawberry jello? Warren ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Re: Response to Chris Chase-Dunn Wed, 31 Jul 1996 00:11:39 -0600 (CST)
Kerry (macdonak@Meena.CC.URegina.CA) On Tue, 30 Jul 1996 wwagar@binghamton.edu
wrote: > Just a few postscripts to Chris's comment of 30 July. I am not
a > firm believer in the thesis that world wars occur during Kondratieff
> downswings. In fact I am not enough of a sociologist to believe that
> world wars must occur during any part of any cycle. The greatest world
> war ever was brewed in the murky vat of the Great Depression, but its
> baleful predecessor came during a time of general prosperity. I would
agree, Kondratieff's economic theory is deterministic, mechanistic, instrumental
and other bad things :). He attempted to create a grand theory of capital
accumulation to explain why capitalism had failed to fall apart. I dislike
because it's not only non-dialectical but it negates humanity (given that
the two are dependent I guess I'm being redundant ... oh well). > Of course
I agree with Chris that the World Party must not wait > for the capitalist
world-system to destroy itself. It would have to do > its best to prevent
such a thing, because there is no way that the death > of one or two or
five billion people can be justified. There is no way to > justify the
death of anybody. But as Chris goes on to say, the World > Party might
not be able to keep the system from suicide. Maybe a renewed > US hegemony
will turn out to be the least of the various evils in store > for humankind.
Better red, white, and blue than dead? And that way only those who resist
the support of dictatorships go missing or tortured. As for the rest they
are simply exploited, forced to work in unsafe conditions, are underemployed,
dieing many years before their time (using our lifespans in the North as
a comparison). That is better. Wars are simply dramatic death, out of the
ordinary. More people die in Canada in industrial accidents than those
who are murdered. People have been so commodified and objectified that
they are no longer even personell they are human resources. No different
than a wrench or plow. The system perpetuates a "state of violence" in
the way that people are organized. Granted, here in the North and for those
in affluent positions war is a justifiably poorer alternative, however,
to argue that Pan America is the answer (or to be fair, the lesser of our
evils) is not something that is so apparent. It depends more upon where
one is sitting as to whether or not that is an appropriate choice. By the
way, what is this "World Party"? Is it B.Y.O.B.? :) > In any event, the
one thing this discussion has not elicited, to > any great extent, is attention
to praxis. The session at the ASA last > summer that started all this was
supposed to be devoted to praxis. How do > we get from here to there? Even
if we can't agree on what's happening > here and what's needed there--and
that's par for the course in left > circles--couldn't we at least focus
for once on appropriate means? If the Means? Hmmmmm? Given that praxis
is the combination of theory and action in a dialectical relationship I'm
not so sure how an "appropriate means" can be accomplished. This is not
to say that we are emascualated or incapable of action (a la Marcuse's
great refusal), its only that there is always a kind of "fast food", instant
gratification, that seems to embrace certain elements within the left -
let's' do something, anything approach. I would submit that much of the
angst within the left arises from that need to do it now. It has been said
that Rome wasn't built in a day and neither was capitalism and I don't
think that it's eradication is going to be accomplished in a few years
or even decades. It seems to me that much of what has happened with the
left is that it sees that the system is bad and we only need to do this
or that and the whole thing will change. This was the hope with the Russian
Revolution and we all saw how that worked itself out. The current fad is
variations on Schumacher's "small is beautiful". Regardless, the left constantly
sets itself up for disappointment; which has lead to a kind of retreat
(a la the Frankfurt School boys) or resignation and embracing the "enemy",
IMO. > World Party is a pipedream, what would be better? If it's not a
> pipedream, how should it be organized, how should it operate, what kind
of > politics should it pursue? To echo Chris, how do we prepare strawberry
> jello? It isn't simply politics it is social interaction, society needs
to be changed. The seisure of the state, whether by force as in the case
of the various communist movements, or by the ballot box, as with the numerous
democratic socialist governments, just dosen't work. The state is embedded
within a system of pre-existing social practices which happers what it
can do (Marx is much more elegant upon this point in the German Ideology).
IMO, the only way that society will change is when the way that people
interrelate changes. Thus stealing an old feminist cleche "the personal
is political", we need to change the way that people think and act towards
one another; new institutions, networks of interaction, need to constructed.
This all takes time and it needs to powerful enough to withstain the hegemonic
social norms in order to sustain itself as an alternative. This will take
decades or possible centuries or it could simply be a footnote of history
(as many of the counter-hegemonic attempts during the Middle Ages were.)
The strategy needs to contain certain elements: 1) the critique of the
existing systems needs to be continued and disseminated; 2) counter-hegemonic
institutions or personal practices need to tried out; 3) that those institutions
must also be open to critique; 4) that "support systems" need to be created
to provide sustenance (in a subjective sense) to those groups; 5) that
people appreciate that what they are doing may only bear fruit for their
children's children (if lucky); and, finally (in the sense that I can't
think of anymore at the moment :)) that dialectical reasoning becomes more
prevalent. This may work or it may not, but the nice thing is that we have
time or at least take the time. If the world blows up well that would be
unfortunate and we should attempt to insure that the probability is minimized
but that shouldn't make us attempt to force something that can't be forced.
Or then again I could be off in left field :) kerry ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Re: the world party Wed, 31 Jul 1996 17:36:30 +1000 Bruce R. McFarling
(ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au) On Tue, 30 Jul 1996, chris chase-dunn wrote:
> i agree with warren wagar, except for a few details. there needs to >
be a world state to sort out the problems that capitalism and human > social
evolution have created. a state is a monopoly of legitimate > violence.
governance, commonwealth, federation, all these words will be > needed
but fundamentally the problem is to create a monopoly of > legitimate violence.
this because one of the main unsolved and cyclical > products of capitalism
is warfare. and warfare under modern > technological conditions is species
suicide. Two points come to my mind here. First, my own query was focused
on the feasibility of a one world state *as specified* by Wagar. If *that*
one world state is not feasible, the above argument would indicate a necesity
to work toward a one-world state as a first priority, and as the next priority
struggle toward the type of one-world state we desire. On the other hand,
I don't see any movement more likely to lead to a dramatic escalation in
the current level of warfare than an effort to build a one-world government
and wrest sovereignty from the nation-state. And in order for the less
centralized multi-lateral institutions implied by the 'community of communities'
alternative to be effective, the constituent communities cannot be as large
as the present day US, Russia, China, India, etc. So either way, whichever
is feasible and/or desireable, some fundamental changes at the level of
the present-day nation-state may be necessary, in order to effectively
manage the problem that Chris Chase-Dunn identifies. > in this regard things
are somewhat worse than wagar imagines. because he > accepts the position
that world wars occur during Kondratief downswings > he thinks the likely
time for the next one is 2044. unfortunately > goldstein has shown that
world wars are most likely to occur at the end > of k-wave upswings. that
would be some time in the 2020s. And the above line of argument would only
reinforce this conclusion. > some see the possibility of global ecological
disaster within a similar > time frame. Even more problematic, on the time
scales of higher-level ecosystem processes, global ecological disaster
could occur within this time frame while it takes much longer for its full
effects to be felt. An interstate system in which a clear and present danger
is necessary (and even then often not sufficient) to provoke effective
multi-lateral action is a serious obstacle in addressing problems with
delayed onset of the most severe effects. > the second problem is this.
the world party cannot simply wait for > the capitalist world-system to
destroy itself and most of the people > on earth. it must act to prevent
that from happening. > even though a world state is the best solution as
an instrument for > creating a more just and sustainable world society
(call it socialism, > call it democracy, call it a collectively rational
and democratic global > commonwealth, call it strawberry jello) there is
not likely to emerge > a world state strong enough to prevent a war among
core states in the > next twenty five years even if we try very hard, which
we should do. So, while I am not persuaded of the premise, I mostly agree
with the assertion. > given the high probability of nuclear annihilation,
that means looking > hard at possible substitutes for the world state.
one possibility, > though it may not be much more likely than a world state,
is a renewed > US hegemony. yes folks. that is what i said. this is a hard
conclusion > for someone who spent his youth opposing US imperialism. talk
me out of > it. OK, I'll have a go at it. Renewed hegemony would only prevent
war if it was successful and preemptive. And in a sense, that is precisely
how hegemony works: it is not a static structure that makes for a dominant
power, but the effective exercise of its advantages in a way that successfully
renews its advantages. The re-emergence of tri-polar trading bloc structures
that Tieting Su wrote of in last year's JWSR tells us of the growing ineffectiveness
of US efforts to renew its dominant advantages. Is increasingly intense
conflict between the US and rival nation- states, in an effort to re-impose
US dominance, a strategy that reduces the likelihood of war? I don't think
it is. This may be simple-minded, but I would see a strategy that reduces
the intensity of conflict between the US and rival nation-states as a strategy
that would be more likely to reduce the likelihood of war. That calls for
a rethink of the economic Life Space of the US as originally envisioned
in the 1930's. Consider when North and South America was considered to
be insufficient as a an economic 'Life Space' for the US, one reason to
look to the Western Pacific Rim as adding the missing element was the distance
of the Western Pacific Rim from Europe as opposed to the West Coast of
the US. At the time the strategy underrated the dangerousness of conflict
with Japan. However, the only other direction in which to push, eastward
across the South Atlantic to Africa, would have immediately involved the
US in conflicts with European powers -- and even worse, would have immediately
entangled the US in conflicts among European powers. But today? The US
is focused on the Pacific Rim and conflict with Japan over overlapping
trade blocs in the Pacific Rim -- while Africa is uncontested. Of course,
pursuit of a South Atlantic strategy would require the US to re-think its
relationship with both South American and African nations -- and in particular,
the difference between economic interests of the US and the economic interests
of those trans-national corporations that have their flagship headquarters
in the U.S. This intersects with the question I raised in a different thread,
as to whether it is sensible to view the current multi-national economic
institutions as potential resources for development. In any event, *if*
the US trade bloc could be re-oriented to reduce the overlap between the
core of the US trade bloc, the core of the Japanes trade bloc, and the
core of the German trade bloc, that seems to me to be a more promising
strategy to reducing the threat of substantially expanded warfare than
a drive by the US to re-assert itself as global hegemon. Virtually, Bruce
R. McFarling, Newcastle, NSW -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Re: the world party Wed, 31 Jul 1996 17:36:39 -0600 (NSK) Nikolai S.
Rozov (ROZOV@cnit.nsu.ru) Dear Chris, completely supporting you in peaceful
and humanistic aspirations I need an answer for the following questions
and comments > From: chris chase-dunn
Re: the world party Fri, 2 Aug 1996 13:34:53 +0100 (BST) Richard K.
Moore (rkmoore@iol.ie) 7/30/96, chris chase-dunn wrote: >...in this regard
things are somewhat worse than wagar imagines. because he >accepts the
position that world wars occur during Kondratief downswings >he thinks
the likely time for the next one is 2044. unfortunately >goldstein has
shown that world wars are most likely to occur at the end >of k-wave upswings.
that would be some time in the 2020s. To ignore all the uniquely new realities
of the modern world, and depend on "k-wave upswings" for predictions, makes
no more sense than reading tea leaves. Allow me to re-iterate A Austin's
comment in this regard... 7/31/96, Andrew W. Austin wrote: > ...I think
much of what goes on this channel suffers from a >very intellectually bounded
view of the world, one where some very broad >concepts and theories reduce
the ability to think about the world to very >narrow eschatologies. ...illegitimate
teleologies with all >the trappings of a Nostradamus. chris chase-dunn
continues: >...given the high probability of nuclear annihilation, that
means looking >hard at possible substitutes for the world state. one possibility,
though >it may not be much more likely than a world state, is a renewed
US >hegemony. yes folks. that is what i said. this is a hard conclusion
>for someone who spent his youth opposing US imperialism. talk me out of
>it. What's this about "renewed" US hegemony? The U.S has global hegemony,
has had it since 1945, and has it more totally now than ever before. The
hegemony has been so pervasive that use of the nuclear arsenal hasn't even
been necessary. But it's always there as a backup, in case any real threat
arises to American power. As for a world state, that's exactly what we're
getting, because that's what the U.S. elite wants. Having achieved military
hegemony in 1945, they had strategic options as to how to exploit that
in the post-war world. They could have opted for a classical U.S.-centric
imperialist system -- an enlarged British Empire, if you will. But they
chose not to, partly because (I imagine) it would have been difficult to
manage PR-wise, partly because it would have created the seeds of global
rebellion, and partly because such empires are problematic to manage and
maintain. But they weren't going to fritter away their advantage either.
They did decide to maintain U.S. military hegemony, manufacturing the "Soviet
threat" as an excuse for the necessary expenditures. But in the economic
realm, they had more subtle designs for their new world order than an unwieldy
U.S.-centric trading empire. What they chose instead was to dismantle the
trappings of classical European imperialism, create lots of little fledgling
"independent" nations, and thereby create a "level playing field" for global
capitalism. To use a metaphor from American mythology, you might say capitalism
graduated from a Wild West stage of existence, and that the time had come
to urbanize the Western Frontier -- banks and marshalls instead of shoot-em-up
anarchy. What we see in the current globalist initiative (GATT and all
that) is the codification of what has been an ad-hoc set of U.S.-sponsored
arrangements for this new world order. This is the world government we're
heading for, and it has no trappings of democracy, and it won't be needing
core-power warfare -- k-waves or tea-leaves notwithstanding. The problem
with cycle-based theories is that they can't anticipate the impact of change-of-state
paradigm shifts. IMHO, rkm --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Re: the world party Mon, 5 Aug 1996 13:06:29 -0400 (EDT) wwagar@binghamton.edu
Dear Christian, Yes, that is exactly the question. How? And yes, there
is no hint in 1996 of anything like a World Party forming anywhere. But
you can't leap from this observation to the conclusion that "it ain't gonna
happen." The more people who believe that the best way to confront the
challenge of a proliferating globalizing capitalism aided and abetted by
the nation-state system is to build a global political formation to oppose
that system, the more likely it is that a nucleus of activists here or
there will begin to build one--or several. We have to start with some kind
of rough consensus about what must be done. Never mind the odds. They're
pretty low. So what? We don't have the option of moving to Mars. You play
with the hand you've been dealt. What comes first is a climate of expectation
for authentically antisystemic global political action. The more people
who share that expectation, the more likelihood it can provoke serious
attempts to move from theory to praxis. In short, you gotta believe! Warren
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Re: the world party Tue, 6 Aug 1996 14:02:56 -0600 (NSK) Nikolai S.
Rozov (ROZOV@cnit.nsu.ru) It's my answer to Chris Chase-Dunn: >From: chris
chase-dunn
Tue, 6 Aug 1996 12:10:23 +0100 (BST) Richard K. Moore (rkmoore@iol.ie)
8/03/96, SS
Re: U.S. Hegemony (?) academic monitoring Tue, 6 Aug 1996 20:48:02
-0600 (NSK) Nikolai S. Rozov (ROZOV@cnit.nsu.ru) Dear Bruce, your question
is quit legal > Some would argue that the system of multi-national economic
>institutions including the IMF, World Bank, Trans-National Corporations,
>and others *are* one of the principle problems. You are supposing that
>they can be reformed to provide part of the solution. I can't address
>your argument that they can be reformed in this way until I see it. >Virtually,
>Bruce R. McFarling, Newcastle, NSW >ecbm@cc.newcastle.edu.au I shared
our dialogue with a friend who proved your position telling about deplorable
results of IMF activity in Africa (f.e. Mosambique): deepening social gap,
bloody conflicts, etc He also noted that IMF is just an instrument of the
system and the agenda is how to change the system, not instrument. I agree.
This point makes our discussion very close to the thread of Wagar/Chase-Dunn
w-party. See my sketch of principal strategy 'how to change the system'
in my recent answer to Chris. At the same time 'reforming an instrument'(say,
IMF) can and should be , from my viewpoint, one of partial activities in
this strategy. What I mean here, can be named "an academic monitoring of
international institutions' policies". The main task is to organize a regular
comparing of real results of these activities in various countries with
proclaimed goals and philosophy of given institution. The left tradition
is to make this work a crushing critique of 'an obstacle for progress'.
According to the approach of 'splitting elites' and 'new-coalition-making,'
that I keep trying to promote in wsn, I suggest to "pack up" this monitoring
as a cooperation, an academic responsible aid (non-excluding definitely
addressed criticisms). As far as I know experts of very high range (mainly
from Harvard, London School of Economics, etc) do their best in IMF. It
seems they know nothing of WST, at best they take it as one of many left
post-Marxist approaches that can be neglected. This attitude should be
changed after meeting with well-based theoretically and empirically analyses
of their activities. Their work in IMF is temporal (not more than 3? years).
They are all very anxious of their future career, their names, etc. That's
why I think these folks cannot neglect such academic initiative, because
without communication and cooperation the public effect of such monitoring
can occur very troublesome for them personally. First it can be a project
based on Internet (Web) resources, then direct contacts with IMF should
be arranged, then publications in academic and later mass journals, TV,
newspapers, etc should be planned. Evidently sooner or later the effect
of 'instrumentality' will enter into play, i.e. TNC, intern. banks, main
core powers (see the last msgs of R.Moore with whom I mostly agree) and
other elites will try to stop or block up this academic control of their
instrument of world dominance. But one may expect also that some of these
forces find this activity profitable for their internal competition, for
publicity and academic support of their policies, etc. Here I remind my
old thesis that world capitalism is not a monolith and we must seek and
use all possibilities for splitting the elite of world political-economic
power. Surely, nor I, neither anybody can guarantee the efficiency of cooperation
between officials of intern.institutions (say,IMF) and WS experts. But
the general principles of conflict resolution (formulated by K.Boulding
if I remember well) tell that direct communication between conflicting
sides is almost always more preferable than their isolate activities (usually
connected with mutual irritation, misunderstanding, hatred and longing
to crash 'the obstacle'). I realize that I have not answer 'how to change
IMF' as a thing, because it is not a mere thing, it consist of people with
their own subjectivity and image of situation and of their work. I suggested
the form of communication and maybe cooperation (no wonder of appearance
of research grants for this work) with them. my best regards Nikolai PS
Thank you Bruce for support and sophisticated development of the idea of
using already existing regional unions in the way to more peaceful and
humanistic world order. Your idea of non-overlapping of fields of interests
between core powers is very strong. Great. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Re: the world party Mon, 12 Aug 1996 16:51:15 -0400 (EDT) wwagar@binghamton.edu
> Yes--but what do you 'gotta believe' in? that the same old 'strategy'
> (use parties (or party) to take over states will produce different result
> than last time (i.e. the third international). Sorry, that's too much
of > a leap of faith for my taste. > > S Sherman > Binghamton > > > Dear
Mr. Sherman, I often feel like a fish out of water when discussing issues
and prospects with sociologists. Immanuel Wallerstein's brave efforts to
integrate the social sciences (including history) notwithstanding, there
are still vast differences in world-view and methodology between the average
sociologist and the average historian. I happen to be, in this sense, an
average historian. Although I certainly concur with world-systems theorists
that there are trends and cycles in human affairs, I do not believe they
are unevadable, and I do not believe that the same things ever literally
happen more than once. Circumstances are always somewhat different, leading
to somewhat different outcomes. Simple-minded example: the Roman Empire
(in the West) "fell," the Roman Empire (in the East) "fell" but only a
millennium later, and the Chinese Empire survived many "falls" to live
again, until early in the 20th century, and maybe not even then if you
want to equate Chiang, Mao, and Deng with the emperors of yore. So I am
not in the least deterred by the apparent similarities between the fate
of the Third International (or the Second) and the prospects for a world
socialist party. The World Party I have in mind would be quite different
in many respects from the Third International, it would do battle in a
rather different world, and it would surely have a different impact on
world history--better or worse, who can say? In any event, the notion that
the World Party is doomed to repeat the history of the Third International,
or the CPSU, that the "next" time will be little different from the first,
just flies in the face of everything that historians think they know about
the cussedness of history. To me, history is full of surprises, nasty,
pleasant, or whatever. The earth is not an anthill, and human beings have
choices. So, yes, "you gotta believe." What's the alternative? Best, Warren
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SAVING DEMOCRACY (was "Re: world party") Mon, 12 Aug 1996 22:35:36
+0100 (BST) Richard K. Moore (rkmoore@iol.ie) On Mon, 5 Aug 1996 wwagar@binghamton.edu
wrote to WSN: > > Dear Christian, > > Yes, that is exactly the question.
How? And yes, there is no > hint in 1996 of anything like a World Party
forming anywhere. But you > can't leap from this observation to the conclusion
that "it ain't gonna > happen." The more people who believe that the best
way to confront the > challenge of a proliferating globalizing capitalism
aided and abetted by > the nation-state system is to build a global political
formation to oppose > that system, the more likely it is that a nucleus
of activists here or > there will begin to build one--or several. We have
to start with some > kind of rough consensus about what must be done. Never
mind the odds. > They're pretty low. So what? We don't have the option
of moving to Mars. > You play with the hand you've been dealt. What comes
first is a climate > of expectation for authentically antisystemic global
political action. > The more people who share that expectation, the more
likelihood it can > provoke serious attempts to move from theory to praxis.
In short, you > gotta believe! > > Warren --------------- Along these lines,
allow me to offer my humble ideas, below. Your feedback would be appreciated
on this draft, to improve it before publication... -rkm ________________________________________________________________
ON SAVING DEMOCRACY The companion piece to this article, "cj#547> The
Rise & Fall of Democracy," (posted June 20) presented an interpretation
of modern history (since the Enlightenment) which seems to offer little
hope for a happy future for mankind. Our "democracies" have been deeply
corrupted by corporate power, and the very existence of democratic institutions
is being mortally threatened by the current neoliberal campaign for a globalist
corporate state. Not only is the current situation contrary to the interests
of humanity, but all the trends are in the direction of even worse times.
But it's always darkest before dawn, and hope arises from the very corporate
dominance that is so threatening. The point is that nearly everyone is
being harmed by the corporatist schemes, whether it be the First-World
worker squeezed between frozen salaries and reduced social benefits, or
the Third-World farmer being shoved aside by agribusiness interests. Through
its all-pervasive power and arrogance, the elite has sown the seeds of
a potentially powerful counter revolution. It is the citizens of the First
World who may be in the best position to initiate progressive global changes.
First-World countries provide the primary infrastructure for corporate
operations, and First-World political systems, while they last, offer the
greatest opportunity for effective political action. If broad-based citizen
coalitions in First World countries could bring truly progressive governments
into power, it would be possible to reverse the global dominance of the
corporate elite, re-vitalize democratic institutions, and re-align First
World agendas along progressive lines. This could in turn create a climate
in which the rest of the world would be better able to pursue progressive
agendas as well. Obstacles to Progressive Political Action If you look
at the fundamentals, the conditions are right for a democratic resurgence:
the elite corporate danger is acute and ominous, and the opportunity for
an effective popular uprising exists -- in our tattered democratic institutions.
But the likelihood of this opportunity being pursued seems unfortunately
remote. There are three primary reasons for this: ignorance, organizational
malaise, and the absence of a comprehensive progressive agenda. By ignorance,
I refer to a general unawareness of the true nature of the corporatist
danger, and of the imminent threat to democratic institutions. This ignorance
can be over-stated -- the number of people who have managed to grasp the
situation may be much larger than the media-projected image of "public
opinion" would seem to indicate. But it is fair to say that people generally
are kept in ignorance, mesmerized by the corporate-dominated media and
distracted by manufactured crises and phony issues. Nonetheless, there
is considerable popular support for progressive changes, and a great many
progressive organizations fighting for this or the other "cause." But overall,
progressive organizing is in a chaotic state. Energy is split up among
so-called "special-interest" groups, whose cumulative effect is mostly
neutralized by one another, and by the corrupt political process. There
is insufficient effort directed toward building broad-based coalition movements
that could promote a progressive agenda and exert effective political influence.
Perhaps most crippling is the absence of an adequate progressive agenda.
It may be true that the journey of a thousand miles begins with the first
step, but with no clear destination in mind, even the first step cannot
be taken. A sensible, comprehensive political agenda is necessary. Around
such an agenda could be organized a broad-based coalition movement, and
such an agenda could provide the basis for a positive program of societal
regeneration and true democratic reform. Toward a Progressive Reform Agenda
Conditions vary from country to country, and no single reform agenda can
apply everywhere. But everywhere the central issues are corporate power
and the corruption of the democratic process -- and progressive agendas
need to focus on solving those central problems. These systemic reforms
need to be accomplished first: if the democratic process itself can be
made functional, and the controlling corporate fingers pried loose from
politics, then the means would exist for a broader progressive program
to be democratically defined and pursued. For want of a better focus, reform
will be examined from the perspective of the U.S. situation. This focus
is not all that unreasonable, given that it is the U.S. model that is being
increasingly foisted on the rest of the world. Media Reform -- An informed
citizenry is absolutely essential to the sound functioning of a representative
democracy. For the flow of public information and discussion to be monopolized
by the corporate elite, as it is in the U.S., is utterly corrupting of
the democratic process -- the result is that "public discussion" serves
to distract and manipulate rather than to inform and empower. Citizen perceptions
are filtered through the lense of corporate interests, and democracy is
corrupted at its very roots. There need to be alternate sources of news,
information, and entertainment which are not warped by corporate interests,
and which provide a broad spectrum of viewpoints. The BBC might be an appropriate
model for such an independent media venue in the U.S. BBC is dependent
neither on government nor corporate funding -- it is funded through a modest
television license fee paid by all media consumers. BBC is thus able --
in theory, and often in practice -- to manage its operations and its programming
independent of government and corporate control and free of advertisements.
Electoral Reform -- Elections are the primary transaction in the representative-governmental
process. The selection of candidates, the carrying out of campaigns, and
the voting rules -- these processes determine the people's role in selecting
leaders, and hence determine how representative (or not) the government
will be. In the current U.S. system, the voting rules are slanted to favor
the two-party system, the two parties are dominated by corporate interests,
and the campaigns are corporate-managed PR shows. The electoral system
is thus deeply corrupted by corporate interests, and voters choose among
corporate-sponsored propagandist-politicians rather than expressing their
democratic intent. Fundamental societal issues are never allowed to surface
during campaigns; instead, colorful peripheral topics are selected for
mock debate in a charade of a campaign. In order for elections to serve
their democratic purpose -- the expression of popular will -- it is essential
to break the major- party monopoly over politics. In order for new parties
to arise, they must be allowed to compete effectively when they are still
small -- otherwise they can never achieve public recognition and begin
to build up their constituencies. Under the current plurality-wins system,
people are afraid to vote for small parties -- they feel compelled instead
to choose the so- called "lesser of two evils" among the major parties.
There are various mechanisms which could help encourage effective new parties.
One such mechanism is the requirement of a majority for election, which
can be accomplished either by run-off elections or (more efficiently) by
a ranked-voting scheme. Another mechanism is proportional representation,
which gives each party a number of seats, in proportion to their share
of the votes. Reform of campaigns would be partially achieved by the measures
mentioned above: an independent media venue and the accommodation of small
parties. Both of these would broaden the scope of debate and encourage
the development of leaders who are more representative of popular will.
But in addition, it is necessary to remove the PR hype from the campaign
process and to end the role of corporate money in determining what issues
are debated and which candidates receive favorable media exposure. Some
measures which could, in some combination, help in this regard are (1)
much smaller limits to campaign spending, (2) public financing of campaigns,
(3) strictly equal access to media by all candidates (and their surrogate
organizations), (4) restriction of election coverage to the public media
venue. Political Reform -- Elected politicians, in a democratic society,
are supposed to represent the will of their constituencies. In our corrupted
system, it is fairer to say that politicians are the representatives of
their corporate backers, and that part of their assignment is to hoodwink
citizens into voting for them. With media and electoral reform, along the
lines mentioned above, much progress would be made toward restoring the
democratic role of politicians. But in addition salaries of officials should
be raised to be in line with private executives with similar levels of
responsibility, and all potentially conflicting outside interests and income
sources (consultancies, board memberships, remunerated speaking engagements,
etc.) should be prohibited. Further, the corrupting influence of corporate
lobbying on the legislative process must be ended. This is a complex topic,
and I'll offer only a single example of a possible reform measure. When
a Congressional committee holds public hearings on a bill, the democratic
intent of those hearings is to solicit a representative sampling of public
opinion and expert advice regarding the bill. What happens all too often
in practice is that some interested industry association hires a PR firm,
and dramatic testimony is staged so as to slant the views seen by the committee.
Scores of carefully selected "witnesses" and/or "experts" are flown at
corporate expense to Washington, in order to create the desired bias in
testimony. Thus the legislative process is corrupted by corporate special-interests.
What might help here would be to have a special public fund which is used
to bring witnesses to hearings, and which is sufficient to insure that
a wide range of viewpoints can be heard -- especially from those who would
be most affected by the legislation. Corporate-Role Reform -- At the heart
of any agenda must be a sensible policy regarding corporations and their
proper role in society. It would be folly to think in terms of eliminating
corporations, replacing them with, say, some kind of utopian socialism.
Not only would this create the insurmountable problem of designing (and
agreeing on) an entirely new society, but it would back the corporate elite
into a corner -- forcing them to fight to the death for their survival.
The corporation is an efficient machine for exploiting opportunities and
optimizing the operation of the economy. As such, corporations can be of
value to society, and preferable to a centrally-managed economy. The problem
is that the role of master and servant has gotten reversed: instead of
the corporation being chartered to serve society, we've reached a situation
where society is managed to serve the goal of corporate enrichment. What
is needed is a radical reversal in the relationship between corporations
and the larger society. A corporate charter should be a privilege, not
a right, and the interests of society at large should be represented on
corporate boards, not just the financial interests of stockholders. A corporation
is defined legally to be an artificial person: what is needed is to turn
these corporate "persons" into good citizens rather than greedy exploiters.
One important aspect of this "relationship reversal" has to do with cash-flow.
Currently, we have an absurd situation in which corporate profits are at
an all time high, corporate taxation is obscenely low, and government is
essentially bankrupt. Not only should corporate tax rates be raised to
a higher, fairer level, but the whole tangle of loopholes, depletion allowances,
and corporate subsidies should be pared back to the bone. In particular,
a business-like review of the value of public assets such as radio spectra,
oil leases, timber holdings, mining licenses, publicly-funded inventions,
etc. is long overdue. All too frequently, such public assets are given
away at a fraction of their commercial value to private operators. Such
sweetheart deals amount to corruption on a grand scale -- the corporate
theft of immense amounts of public property -- but such deals are typically
not perceived as corruption... The law doth punish man or woman That steals
the goose from off the common, But lets the greater felon loose, That steals
the common from the goose. - Anon, 18th cent., on the enclosures. If private
operation is deemed to be the most efficient means of exploiting a public
asset, then government should bargain from its position of strength, and
attain maximum public return on the deals it makes. It can seek higher
direct fees, a stronger oversight role in operations (to represent the
public interest), and a public share in revenues derived from operations.
Toward Effective Political Action Regardless of the agenda details, progressive
change can only come about through effective grass-roots political organizing.
As mentioned earlier, there is not so much a lack of popular political
fervor or activity, as there is a lack of focus and coalition. The People,
one might say, are scattered in all directions. Again, for want of a better
alternative, the focus will be on the American situation. Given the U.S.
dominance of international arrangements, and the increasing role of the
U.S. military as a globalist "police" force, the fate of progressive politics
in America is of direct importance to citizens around the globe. The phenomenon
of "single-issue movements" deserves special consideration. It is undeniable
that such movements have achieved desirable reforms for causes like environmentalism
and civil rights. But the political arena has evolved to a point where
single-issue organizing in the U.S. has become impotent, and serves mostly
to "divide and conquer" the people. Environmentalists are pitted against
labor groups; the women's movement is fractured by the abortion debate;
civil libertarians are portrayed as abetting crime; campaigners against
corporate power are painted as being luddite xenophobes. The corporate
elite has learned to play movements off against one another, to limit their
effectiveness by slanted media coverage, and to manufacture its own counter-movements
-- thus making grass-roots politics largely impotent. Only a broad-based
coalition movement, with a comprehensive and persuasive political agenda,
has any chance to revive democracy and reverse the trend toward corporate
domination. Such a coalition must seek to include labor, environmentalists,
civil libertarians, feminists, minorities, students, unemployed, elderly,
etc. -- literally everyone whose interests would be served by a responsive
representative democracy. The first hurdle such a coalition will need to
overcome will be divisiveness itself. The single-cause approach has so
pervaded society that it has become almost synonymous with political action.
People, especially activists, need to become aware their movements have
been backed into cul-de-sacs, and that broad popular solidarity is necessary
to face the the well-organized corporatist onslaught. Emphasis on coalition
among existing organizations, labor groups, etc., might be the best approach
to building a more comprehensive movement. By that means, existing organizational
structures can be leveraged toward broader objectives. A strong agenda
and credible, competent leadership are critical to attracting organizations
into coalition. As organizations join the coalition, the agenda will need
to be discussed and refined to accommodate additional concerns. But the
central focus on democratic reform and the global corporatist threat must
be maintained, lest the movement become strategically irrelevant. The second
hurdle facing any budding coalition will be the inevitable demonization/trivialization
campaign carried out against it by the mainstream media. Foibles of leaders
will be dug up and sensationalized. Unity will be challenged by reports
that some "causes" are taken more seriously than others within the coalition.
Scare stories will portray economic catastrophe as the inevitable result
of any agenda that doesn't cater to corporate interests. The more successful
the coalition, the more intense will be the media campaign against it.
The movement will need to develop its own internal communications infrastructure,
and find a way to get movement news out to its constituencies without depending
on help from the mainstream media. Rallies, newsletters, local chapters,
door-to-door canvassing -- even the Internet -- all can be used to create
a "counter media." If despite all these obstacles, a progressive movement
succeeds in building a formidable constituency -- one that threatens to
elect a significant number of progressive candidates at all levels -- then
two final hurdles must be surmounted: co-option by the major parties, and
over-attachment to the electoral process. Time and again in American history,
strong popular movements have dissipated when a major party (usually the
Democrats) adopted the rhetoric of the progressives, or when the popular
movement was tied too closely to the goal of winning some "key" election.
These seductions to rapid "victory" may be the most dangerous hurdle of
all. The Christian Coalition, unfortunately, is an example of an organization
with both a comprehensive agenda and a sound attitude toward the electoral
process. It does not stand on its laurels when favorable candidates are
elected -- instead it leverages its position toward greater victories in
the future. And it most certainly doesn't allow its organizational structure
to weaken in the face of successes. It is essential that a progressive
movement be organized as a long- term political force -- it must be aware
that its strength comes from its ongoing existence, as a continuing channel
of democratic expression. Success in electing supported candidates is a
sign to pursue implementation of its agenda, not a sign that the movement
has achieved its goals. Global Solidarity and National Focus Successes
in one nation can provide invaluable encouragement, and even material assistance,
to movements in other nations. The corporate elite operates on a global
scale, and progressives must have global consciousness as well. Cross-border
communication and solidarity is of strategic importance. The recent massive
demonstrations and work stoppages in France, and the similar protests in
Germany, represent strong popular sentiment against the effects of globalization.
But of course they weren't reported that way in the mass media, and no
sense of international solidarity was generated. Strong progressive organizations
could have picked up this connection and used it to build greater confidence
and self-awareness within the global movement. At the international level,
there is a natural focus of shared concerns: the economic and political
destabilization caused by globalist institutions (GATT, IMF, World Bank,
etc.) Nonetheless, it is important to emphasize the nation-state as the
primary unit of political organizing. Progressives must avoid the twin
traps of premature internationalism and premature devolution. Until corporations
are brought under democratic control, elite power is most dominant over
very small nations, and at the international level. Strong national sovereignty,
including economic self-determination, must be at the heart of progressive
politics everywhere. Democracy is difficult enough to achieve in a large,
modern nation -- larger scale units (such as the EU) simply make it easier
for the elite to gain control. And smaller, balkanized, states are too
weak to stand up to multinational pressures. A BRIEF BIBLIOGRAPHY Greider,
William, "Who will tell the People - The Betrayal of American Democracy"
(New York: Touchstone, 1993). Parenti, Michael, "Make-Believe Media - The
Politics of Entertainment" (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992). Parenti,
Michael, "The Sword and the Dollar - Imperialism, Revolution, and the Arms
Race" (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989). Zinn, Howard, "A Peoples History
of the United States" (New York: Harper & Row, 1980). ________________________________________________________________
~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~--~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~
Posted by Richard K. Moore - rkmoore@iol.ie - Wexford, Ireland ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Re: SAVING DEMOCRACY Tue, 13 Aug 1996 13:42:17 -0400 (EDT) wwagar@binghamton.edu
Dear Richard, Bravo. Your analysis of the predicament of democracy and
the plight of the progressives is astute and well put. I agree entirely
with your critique of single-issue movements. Of course I don't agree with
your insistence on the nation-state as the framework for organizing a broad
coalition of progressive forces. The megacorporate interests and the states
that front for them pay less and less attention to that framework, and
antisystemic movements must follow suit if they wish to be effective. There
is no reason why a global party could not have national chapters active
in national politics, but if the focus of each national segment of the
world party is largely national, and each segment gets embroiled and swallowed
up in national issues, and there is no supranational party structure coordinating
all efforts at the regional, national, and local level, megacorporate globalization
will just proceed on its merry way. The sine qua non, for me, is a world
political movement that is firmly set on a course toward a global democratic
state. Such internationalism, in 1996, is not "premature." The real problem
is that It may already be too late. Nonetheless, I like your article very
much, and I note that it really IS concerned with praxis! Good luck, Warren
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Re: SAVING DEMOCRACY Wed, 14 Aug 1996 12:51:04 +0100 (BST) Richard
K. Moore (rkmoore@iol.ie) 8/13/96, Warren Wagar
Re: SAVING DEMOCRACY (was "Re: world party") Wed, 14 Aug 1996 20:44:11
-0600 (NSK) Nikolai S. Rozov (ROZOV@cnit.nsu.ru) Dear Richard, I am certainly
on your side in your debate with Warren Wagar when you reject feasibility
and preferance of W state, insist on using already existing democratic
instruments on national level, and fairly appeal to work with the 'system',
not to make it an enemy. but in this 'our side' yours and my position have
also some differences: > I must say I've been extremely un-impressed by
the shallow analysis > and lack of deep comprehension evidenced under the
name of "WST". Seems > like would-be system theorists patching together
an arcane explanation for > what's obvious to everyone already, so they
can feel smug with their > "insider knowledge" that no one else can follow.
As such, it's trending > toward becoming a feedback-rich, self-deluding
cult, rather than a > scientific endeavor. nobody thinks here that WST
is an absolute key, it is a live changing approach with various competitive
subapproaches, as for me it must be combined and correctly sinthesized
with geopolitics and cultural- civilizational studies. If you ever read
books of Braudel, Wallerstein, Frank, Arrighi, Chase-Dunn you would not
dare to say of 'shallow analysis' and 'lack of deep comprehension'. It
seems you take your major information of WST from this list, but it is
an analog of couloirs (kofee-break) of conference: sometimes the talk is
brilliant and sharpminded, sometimes not, but the main work is going in
the main hall - in serious monographical research - in books and papers.
Moreover, frequently experts here exchange by concepts (with rather rich
interior content) but a non-expert can see not more than mere trivial words.
> There was no suggestion that the basic > core-periphery organization
of the globe needs to be, or is likely to be, > altered. good, here we
agree > > If this political shift were implemented globally, it would not
> constitute a new stage in the shifting hegemonies -- it would only broaden
> the constituencies involved in setting societal goals -- a minor shift
from > a systems point of view. It might also lead to a more collaborative,
> synergistic relationship between core states, and with and among the
> periphery. OK, but the trick is how to make this shift desirable for
the core, for the 'systemic' global and national elites? > Why, pray tell,
do you hold up Marx as a paragon of "solid arguments"? surely Marx is not
a paragon, he has made crucial mistakes concerning the world future, but
he was armed with 'The Capital' - the best political-economic analysis
in that period (and many people think - even up to now) Modern naive talks
of the end of global capitalism and transforamtion it into global socialism
are also a mistake but alas - without such solid theoretical support that
Marx had. I am glad that you are not in this camp and I take this criticism
back. > BTW> "core-periphery" is much more > general than just world systems.
ALL systems seem to be structured on a > core-periphery basis, from the
human nervous system, to computers, to > animal-grazing patterns, to highway-systems,
to shopping centers -- you > name it. What's the big deal? I am not an
expert in WST, but here it is just a nice example when I use WST CONCEPTS
and you take into account only general WORDS. Core-periphery in WST is
really a big deal, dozens of books, thousands of pages are devoted to it.
> > R.Moore's program seems to be "antisystemic" and "anticore", that's
> >why I think it is hopelesss. > > Please substantiate this characterization,
if you still believe it > to be true. Really, I changed my mind after your
clarification, also after your recent answer to Warren. Now your program
is not overtly anisystemic and anticore, but I suspise it is such immanently.
I mean your courageous and persistent struggle AGAINST TNC and their supporting
global institutions (in favor of national democracies). Is I told earlier
these elites and structures form the very framework of modern cap. world
system. To fight with them IS to be antisystemic. Why don't you consider
the idea of SPLITTING UP these elites and to involve the part of them in
the wide humanistic coalition? best wishes, yours Nikolai ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Re: SAVING DEMOCRACY Wed, 14 Aug 1996 11:42:11 -0400 (EDT) wwagar@binghamton.edu
Dear Richard, On Wed, 14 Aug 1996, Richard K. Moore wrote: > Dear Warren,
> > The "states that front for them" need to stop fronting for them --
> and that requires people to take control of their on-paper national >
democracies. Global solidarity and cooperation among national-based > movements
is indeed important, as I said in the posting, but it is national > democratic
institutions that provide the potential infrastructure for > popular empowerment.
> Okay, and how do you propose to create such "global solidarity and cooperation?"
If it's really important, how can the solidarity be forged? A grass-roots
popular movement that is nationally based and focused may well turn out
to pursue trade and military and environmental policies inimical to world
peace, world justice, and the health of the biosphere. A true national
democracy might rein in the corporations in that country without any serious
thought to the needs of countries thousands of miles away. In short, democracy
in and of itself does not guarantee that a country will act in the best
interests of humankind--only a global democracy is likely to do that. >
You use "antisystemic", evidently, to describe any program for > significant
change. I say it is folly to ignore systems -- one must use > them and
work within them, if even to change them. The systems which offer > us
the most hope are the democratic-national-government systems. They > exist
and operate, and their controls are within our grasp if we have the > necessary
political will and competence. No, I use "antisystemic" in a very specific
sense: against the continuation of the present capitalist world-economy
with its support system of armed national states. > The necessity of "coordinating
all efforts" is not obvious, and I > disupte it. Mutual solidarity and
support is not the same as being > "coordinated" from above. Your "supranational
party structure" -- > especially if it is to make detailed plans for every
nation and locality -- > sounds like a rehash of a Soviet Communist Party
system. Too big, too > bureaucratic, too centralized, too arrogant, too
distant from the needs of > the people. > > Decentralization, I believe,
is essential to democracy, and the > nation state is not too-small a unit
to deserve decentralized autonomy. You have a very strange notion of "decentralization."
To be sure, a world party would run the grave risk of not being democratic,
of not being responsive, and all the rest. It would have to be on its guard
against such tendencies every minute. But what is decentralized about a
nation-state the size of Russia or Germany or Japan or the USA? These are
already immense polities with central governments far removed in many ways
from their electorates. The kind of direct town-meeting participatory democracy
you seem to have in the back of your mind is impossible once a polity gets
any bigger than Andorra. The nation-state is not too small, agreed. But
it is much, much too big for direct democracy. I just cannot see any vast
difference between a polity of six billion people and a polity of 300 million
people. If democracy of some sort can work in the latter, it can work in
the former. > To seek a "global democratic state" at this time in history
is > folly in the extreme, folly for a whole host of reasons. I see absolutely
no chance of a global democratic state at this time, but beginning to think
about it and beginning to seek it, these are hardly follies. And when you
speak of "storming the fortresses," I am pretty sure that some day we will
have to do just that--literally in many instances. The world party will
have to become, at some stage, a revolutionary party, prepared to seize
power whenever and wherever there is no other way to break the stranglehold
of corporate fascism. > If you feel it's impossible to reform national
governments in this > way, then I say it's ten times as impossible to force
these reforms from > some nebulous global forum. > No, I don't think it's
impossible to reform national governments. But without concerted global
political action, it will be impossible to replace the capitalist world-system
with a democratic world-government. Best, Warren ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Re: SAVING DEMOCRACY / world government Thu, 15 Aug 1996 09:53:29 +0100
(BST) Richard K. Moore (rkmoore@iol.ie) 8/14/96, Warren Wagar wrote: >
No, I don't think it's impossible to reform national governments. >But
without concerted global political action, it will be impossible to >replace
the capitalist world-system with a democratic world-government. Perhaps
it would be productive to pursue both a "world focus" and "national focus"
track -- do at each level what is most appropriate there, and to encourage
communication between the two efforts. Regards, rkm ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Re: SAVING DEMOCRACY / corps. & govt. Thu, 15 Aug 1996 11:49:31
-0400 Salvatore Babones (sbabones@jhu.edu) In regards to Richard K. Moore's
question: > Dear Salvatore, > > Could you say more of what you mean by
"liberal, capitalist, > particularist government" ? > > > -rkm > I could
take the cheap way out and refer you to my comment on Warren Wagar's "Praxis
of World-Integration" (see https://jwsr.ucr.edu/archive/vol2/),
but I will attempt a brief answer here. By a liberal government I mean
a government that GOVERNS (creates a legal environment for the market,
provides a court system and enforcement, "governs" human action to the
extent of prohibiting and punishing theft, murder, pollution, etc.) but
does not ADMINISTER any more than is necessary for carrying out the duties
of government (does not direct production, either directly or indirectly).
This is liberalism in Mises' sense, and also Polanyi's (Polanyi called
Mises "the consistent liberal") By capitalist I strictly mean to refer
to the market, not the government; that is, I mean a market in which individuals
or patnerships of individuals use their own capital (equity) in their businesses,
bearing full responsibility (unlimited liability) for their obligations.
If you take your money and open up a chemicals company, pollute a river,
make enormous profits, take those profits out of the company and buy a
mansion, when people are hurt by your polution, they can sue you and take
your mansion away. Hopefully, if your chemical company operates under a
well-governing government, the government will have anti-pollution laws
and take you to court itself. By particularist I simply meant non-global.
There's no reason why there couldn't be a wonderful global government,
but I think the chances are much better of there being one or two "good"
governments in a world of over a hundred governments than in a world of
one government. I emphasize: while I am FOR capitalism, I am also FOR active
government (I don't propose a return to the 1840s), and I am certainly
AGAINST a corporate-controlled economy overseen by a corporate-controlled
government. Salvatore ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Re: SAVING DEMOCRACY / world government Mon, 19 Aug 1996 11:21:51 -0400
(EDT) wwagar@binghamton.edu On Thu, 15 Aug 1996, Richard K. Moore wrote:
> > 8/14/96, Warren Wagar wrote: > > > No, I don't think it's impossible
to reform national governments. > >But without concerted global political
action, it will be impossible to > >replace the capitalist world-system
with a democratic world-government. > > Perhaps it would be productive
to pursue both a "world focus" and > "national focus" track -- do at each
level what is most appropriate there, > and to encourage communication
between the two efforts. > > > Regards, > rkm > Okay, I have no problem
with that. No one can know what will work best until the attempt(s) is
(are) made. But I would certainly hope that ANY nationally focused party
or movement would adopt as a cardinal tenet the assumption that ultimately
democracy cannot be saved unless all the world's people enjoy its benefits
and no one segment of humankind has the right to prey on another. The world
cannot survive half-free and half-slave. Best, Warren ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Re: half-free and half-slave Wed, 21 Aug 1996 19:56:31 +0100 (BST)
Richard K. Moore (rkmoore@iol.ie) 8/19/96, wwagar@binghamton.edu wrote:
>I would certainly hope that >ANY nationally focused party or movement
would adopt as a cardinal tenet >the assumption that ultimately democracy
cannot be saved unless all the >world's people enjoy its benefits and no
one segment of humankind has the >right to prey on another. D'accord. rkm
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