Gernot  Köhler

School of Computing and Information Management
Sheridan College
Oakville, Ontario, Canada L6H 2L1
e-mail:  gernot.kohler@sheridanc.on.ca

September 1999
 

1. ABSTRACT

Global income polarization ("the widening global gap") has been explained in various ways. My simulation assumes that some portion of global income polarization is due to global center-periphery exploitation. The simulation shows that even a small rate of global center-periphery exploitation can lead to significant global income polarization in the longer run. The abolition of this kind of center-periphery exploitation would lead to a closing of the global income gap.
 

2. GLOBAL EXPLOITATION

The term "global exploitation" is not well-defined in the literature. Several broad meanings of "global exploitation" are thinkable -- namely, (a) children's rights activists may think of the exploitation of children around the world; (b) feminists may think of "worldwide exploitation of women by men"; (c) others may think of "worldwide exploitation of workers by employers"; (d) yet others may think of "exploitation of poor countries by rich countries" or of "exploitation of the global periphery by the global center"; (e) yet others may think of "worldwide exploitation of non-whites by the white man" (or of ethnic groups X by ethnic group Y); and other notions. In the different meanings of the term, the two sides of the exploitative relationship are identified as different agents -- namely, children/adults, women/men; workers/employers; countries; ethno-cultural groups. My simulation uses the fourth meaning, namely, global center-periphery exploitation. This is close to, but not necessarily identical with, the term "unequal exchange", as used in the literature. Various mechanisms have been identified in the literature which can be considered as facets of "global exploitation", in the sense of center-periphery exploitation. These include: (1) the fact that the rules of the world economy are made by the center countries; (2) the fact that the transnational organizations regulating certain aspects of the world economy are dominated by the center countries; (3) the fact that the most powerful global corporations are corporations of the center countries; (4) unfair trade between center and periphery; (5) biased exchange rates between center and periphery; and other. Without going into the details of the discussions surrounding these issues, my simulation makes the assumption that the center countries (OECD countries) do exploit the rest of the world (non-OECD countries) through mechanisms of the mentioned kind. As a result center countries extract a certain amount of economic value, which I call "transfer value" (T), from the rest of the world which is due to the exploitative mechanisms rather than due to the center countries' own hard work and technological brilliance. In some historical empires this transfer value (T) was more explicit and was called "tribute" or "slave labour" and was extracted from the subdued peoples by the imperial country (e.g., in the Hapsburg or Ottoman or Chinese empires).
 

3. SIMULATION LOGIC

Simulation is a calculation exercise which can be used for constructing alternative "scenarios" (e.g., alternative ways of declaring taxes); for projecting "alternative futures" (e.g., alternative ecological developments); or for constructing "alternative histories". Simulations have also been called "What-If?-analysis". My simulation constructs an "alternative history" and pursues the question: What would have happened to the world income distribution between 1961 and 1989, if there had been less global exploitation?

The logic underlying this simulation can be explained with an example. Imagine two brothers (or sisters) -- LITTLE BROTHER and BIG BROTHER. Each brother has 100 dollars to invest. Both brothers invest their money in the same bank in two separate bank accounts. The bank gives, say, 2% interest per year. At the end of year 1, each brother will have $102; at the end of year 2, $104; and so on. The relation between the two accounts will remain 1 : 1 at the end of every year since the accounts accumulate in exactly the same manner and independently from each other. There is no income polarization.

Now introduce exploitation. Let us assume that BIG BROTHER is a bully and forces LITTLE BROTHER to hand over one half of the interest he earns every year. As a result, the situation at the end of year 1 is: BIG BROTHER has $103 [ = 102 + 1 (exploitation)] and LITTLE BROTHER has $101 [ = 102 - 1 (exploitation)]. The situation at the end of year 2 will be: BIG BROTHER has $106 [ = 103 + 2 (interest) + 1 (exploitation)] and LITTLE BROTHER has $102 [ = 101 + 2 (interest) - 1 (exploitation)]. At the end of year 3, BIG BROTHER will have $109 [ = 106 + 2 (interest) + 1 (exploitation)] and LITTLE BROTHER  will have $103 [ = 102 + 2 (interest) - 1 (exploitation)]. The relation between the two accounts at the end of year 3 is 109 : 103. In other words, income polarization is underway.

Next, apply this at the world level, with LITTLE BROTHER = periphery and BIG BROTHER = center, and assume that the center is the exploitative bully. Note that the historical data we have about GDP growth rates are "after-exploitation" -- namely, they include the effect of exploitation. Thus, the observed growth rate of OECD countries include gains from global exploitation; and the observed growth rates of non-OECD countries include losses from global exploitation. (The situation is similar to the difference between "gross income" and "net income" or "before tax income" and "after tax income".) Thus, if the center shows a historical growth rate of, say, 3% per annum and the exploitation rate was 1%, then we may claim that the center's historical growth rate of 3% was composed of 2% self-generated growth ("before-exploitation growth") plus 1% exploitation [3 = 2 + 1]. Similarly, if the periphery shows an historical growth rate of, say, 3% per annum and the exploitation rate was 1%, then we may claim that the periphery's historical growth rate of 3% was composed of 4% self-generated growth ("before-exploitation growth") minus 1% exploitation [3 = 4 -1]. The simulation thus operates with the two concepts of "before-exploitation growth rate" and "after-exploitation growth rate".

The simulation exercise proceeds in five broad steps -- namely,
(1) collect historical data
(2) make an assumption about the transfer value (T). Here I am assuming that the T value was 1.5% of the GDP of the OECD countries in every year (exploitation rate = 1.5%). Feel free to make other assumptions (it's a simulation!). The T value is the amount of gain (loss) due to global center-periphery exploitation. As empirical-historical support for a 1.5% rate, see Amin (1976: 144) and Köhler (1998: Table 2), who found a rate of "unequal exchange" for the years 1965 (1966) amounting to 1.5%  of the GDP of the industrialized countries (OECD, center).
(3) calculate alternative growth rates for center (OECD) and periphery (non-OECD) by removing the influence of exploitation (i.e., subtract the T value from OECD GDP and add the T value to non-OECD GDP). For the center, the resulting "before-exploitation growth rates" will be smaller than the historically observed (after-exploitation) growth rates; for the periphery the resulting "before exploitation growth rates" will be greater than the historically observed (after-exploitation) growth rates.
(4) recalculate the growth trajectories for 1961 - 1989 for center (OECD) and periphery (non-OECD), using the postulated "before-exploitation growth rates"
(5) display the results in graphical form

For further details of the calculations, see the Appendix, Table 6.
The calculations were done with a computer "spreadsheet" software.
 

4. SIMULATION RESULTS

The results of the simulation are summarized in four diagrams -- namely:
Figure 1 shows actual polarization of per capita incomes, 1961 - 1989 (historical data);
Figure 2 shows simulated per capita incomes, 1961 - 1989 (assuming and removing a global exploitation rate of 1.5% per annum);
Figure 3 shows the actual development of GDPs (aggregate incomes), 1961 - 1989 (historical data);
Figure 4 shows the simulated development of GDPs (aggregate incomes), 1961 -1989 (assuming and removing a global exploitation rate of 1.5% per annum).
 

5. DISCUSSION

The results of the simulation are somewhat of a surprise to myself. I had been studying "unequal exchange" along Emmanuel's and Amin's lines. My own estimates of unequal exchange between periphery and center of the world showed the same result as Amin's -- namely, 1.5% of center GDP for 1966 (Amin 1976: 144; Köhler 1998). This gave me the idea of simulating the development of world income distribution by making the assumption that "unequal exchange" had not taken place. In other words: What would have happened, if there had been no global exploitation (unequal exchange)? I was expecting some consequences in the direction of the simulation results, but not as strong an impact as the simulation shows. The simulation thus poses two challenges -- (1) methodological; (2) substantive. I leave the methodological challenge to others who may want to develop their own simulations of global exploitation, using different definitions, assumptions, values and algorithms.

On the praxeological side, the simulation sends a hopeful message, namely:  If political activists and/or socially responsible elites can raise enough consciousness and organize enough political pressure, so as  to reduce global exploitation by 1.5% per annum, the global income gap will begin to close within a number of years (far less than eternity!) -- by virtue of the logic of compounding, as the simulation shows.

On the analytic-theoretical side, the simulation raises various difficult questions which I cannot answer right now. Question 1: Is it plausible to think that, as the simulation shows, OECD per capita income would have stayed at a plateau after 1971-73? The implication of this is that all per capita income growth of the OECD countries after 1971-73 was due to global exploitation. If that was so, then some more research and theory would be nice to have in order support such a view. Question 2: Can the fact that the simulation shows some special role for the years 1971-73 be used as an indictment of global neoliberalism which abolished the preceding Keynesian-influenced international economic regime around that time (USA going off the gold standard, dismantling of the preceding Bretton-Woods system, deregulation of the old system, enforcement of neoliberal regulations, IMF "Structural Adjustment Policies", and other)? Question 3: What would the First World do without global exploitation? Are all the people who see a  technological superiority of the West wrong? Question 4: Is there truly such a thing as global exploitation (or, if you don't like this term, is there a transfer value (T))? "I don't know" is my answer to most these questions, except the last one -- I do believe that there is a transfer value T of some kind. It is the essence of a simulation to show something that is not real in an empirical sense. Potentialities are important for the understanding and evaluation of historical developments. If the Spanish Armada had not been destroyed in 1588, we might all be speaking Spanish today.
 

6. REFERENCES

Amin, S. (1976) Unequal Development. New York, USA: Monthly Review Press [translated from the 1973 French original]

Emmanuel, A. (1972) Unequal Exchange: A Study of the Imperialism of Trade. New York, USA: Monthly Review Press [translated from the 1969 French original]

Köhler, G. (1998), "Unequal Exchange 1965 - 1995: World Trend and World Tables", World-Systems Archive, Working Papers, /archive/papers/kohlertoc.htm

Penn World Table (Mark 5.6a) (1999) available online at: http://datacentre.chass.utoronto.ca:5680/pwt
 

7. APPENDIX -- TABLES

The simulation was done in a single computer spreadsheet with columns A - AC. The original spreadsheet is here broken up into 5 tables. The columns are numbered as in the original spreadsheet. Thus, you may load the material into your own spreadsheet and simulate something else. Notes to Tables 1-5 are given in Table 6, including method of calculation. Tables 1-3 (columns A - S) refer to the actual, historical situation, as captured in the statistical data available in the Penn World Table. Tables 4-5 (columns T - AC) contain the simulation exercise. The T value, which is central in this simulation, is in column (T). Abbreviations are explained in Table 6.

TABLE 1--HISTORICAL

TABLE 1 Cols. A - G
	hist	hist	hist	hist	hist	hist
	N=121	N=24	N=24	N=97	N=97	N=97
	World	OECD	OECD	non-OECD	non-OECD	non-OECD
YEAR	GDP	GDP	GDP growth	GDP	GDP growth	GDP as % of
			rate		rate	World GDP
	intlPr85	intlPr85	%pa	intlPr85	%pa	%
	thousands	thousands		thousands
(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)	(E)	(F)	(G)
1961	6,644,104,915	4,197,078,117		2,447,026,798		37
1962	6,958,334,783	4,425,741,925	5.4	2,532,592,858	3.5	36
1963	7,318,210,382	4,647,760,802	5.0	2,670,449,580	5.4	36
1964	7,821,126,619	4,945,690,202	6.4	2,875,436,417	7.7	37
1965	8,232,636,791	5,209,411,377	5.3	3,023,225,414	5.1	37
1966	8,658,136,099	5,488,116,456	5.4	3,170,019,643	4.9	37
1967	9,002,641,628	5,688,121,612	3.6	3,314,520,016	4.6	37
1968	9,510,313,561	6,008,199,875	5.6	3,502,113,686	5.7	37
1969	10,089,946,152	6,332,236,056	5.4	3,757,710,096	7.3	37
1970	10,704,718,432	6,596,442,496	4.2	4,108,275,936	9.3	38
1971	11,142,091,771	6,825,657,455	3.5	4,316,434,316	5.1	39
1972	11,676,755,998	7,171,841,543	5.1	4,504,914,455	4.4	39
1973	12,437,495,139	7,614,357,468	6.2	4,823,137,671	7.1	39
1974	12,758,961,281	7,648,802,862	0.5	5,110,158,419	6.0	40
1975	12,928,493,353	7,582,721,503	-0.9	5,345,771,850	4.6	41
1976	13,539,756,819	7,954,236,256	4.9	5,585,520,563	4.5	41
1977	14,146,256,616	8,255,775,960	3.8	5,890,480,656	5.5	42
1978	14,795,395,856	8,604,173,926	4.2	6,191,221,930	5.1	42
1979	15,357,073,622	8,903,480,174	3.5	6,453,593,448	4.2	42
1980	15,775,665,903	8,970,184,755	0.7	6,805,481,148	5.5	43
1981	16,138,431,535	9,109,550,613	1.6	7,028,880,922	3.3	44
1982	16,244,188,844	9,060,345,894	-0.5	7,183,842,950	2.2	44
1983	16,709,104,924	9,318,985,537	2.9	7,390,119,387	2.9	44
1984	17,499,126,460	9,771,434,305	4.9	7,727,692,155	4.6	44
1985	18,172,039,417	10,087,409,006	3.2	8,084,630,411	4.6	44
1986	18,694,145,877	10,387,726,851	3.0	8,306,419,026	2.7	44
1987	19,315,927,688	10,743,245,634	3.4	8,572,682,054	3.2	44
1988	20,234,661,996	11,249,847,382	4.7	8,984,814,614	4.8	44
1989	20,941,943,905	11,650,765,699	3.6	9,291,178,206	3.4	44
			avg=		avg=
			3.7		4.9
			std=		std=
			1.9		1.6

 

TABLE 2--HISTORICAL

TABLE 2 Cols. H - P
	hist	hist	hist	hist	hist	hist	hist	hist	hist
	N=121	N=24	N=97	proportion	N=121	N=24	N=97	ratio	difference
	World	OECD	non-OECD	OECD	World	OECD	non-OECD	OECD	OECD
YEAR	POP	POP	POP	POP as %	GDP/cap	GDP/cap	GDP/cap	GDP/cap	GDP/cap
				of World				to	less
				POP				non-OECD	non-OECD
								GDP/cap	GDP/cap
	persons	persons	persons	%	intlPr85	intlPr85	intlPr85	ratio	intlPr85
	thousands	thousands	thousands
(A)	(H)	(I)	(J)	(K)	(L)	(M)	(N)	(O)	(P)
1961	2,858,189	645,972	2,212,217	23	2325	6497	1106	5.9	5391
1962	2,909,787	654,346	2,255,441	22	2391	6764	1123	6.0	5641
1963	2,972,467	662,313	2,310,154	22	2462	7017	1156	6.1	5862
1964	3,033,118	670,095	2,363,023	22	2579	7381	1217	6.1	6164
1965	3,095,949	677,836	2,418,113	22	2659	7685	1250	6.1	6435
1966	3,161,770	684,839	2,476,931	22	2738	8014	1280	6.3	6734
1967	3,226,711	691,232	2,535,479	21	2790	8229	1307	6.3	6922
1968	3,292,485	696,730	2,595,755	21	2888	8623	1349	6.4	7274
1969	3,363,212	704,386	2,658,826	21	3000	8990	1413	6.4	7576
1970	3,434,699	711,783	2,722,916	21	3117	9267	1509	6.1	7759
1971	3,492,117	719,319	2,772,798	21	3191	9489	1557	6.1	7932
1972	3,563,935	726,274	2,837,661	20	3276	9875	1588	6.2	8287
1973	3,634,780	732,356	2,902,424	20	3422	10397	1662	6.3	8735
1974	3,705,986	739,360	2,966,626	20	3443	10345	1723	6.0	8623
1975	3,775,319	745,870	3,029,449	20	3424	10166	1765	5.8	8402
1976	3,842,584	750,961	3,091,623	20	3524	10592	1807	5.9	8785
1977	3,909,379	756,458	3,152,921	19	3619	10914	1868	5.8	9045
1978	3,977,004	762,000	3,215,004	19	3720	11292	1926	5.9	9366
1979	4,046,192	767,659	3,278,533	19	3795	11598	1968	5.9	9630
1980	4,115,802	773,680	3,342,122	19	3833	11594	2036	5.7	9558
1981	4,186,282	779,383	3,406,899	19	3855	11688	2063	5.7	9625
1982	4,259,580	784,597	3,474,983	18	3814	11548	2067	5.6	9480
1983	4,333,177	789,442	3,543,735	18	3856	11805	2085	5.7	9719
1984	4,405,899	793,991	3,611,908	18	3972	12307	2140	5.8	10167
1985	4,480,046	798,728	3,681,318	18	4056	12629	2196	5.8	10433
1986	4,557,700	803,472	3,754,228	18	4102	12929	2213	5.8	10716
1987	4,637,452	808,305	3,829,147	17	4165	13291	2239	5.9	11052
1988	4,718,125	813,368	3,904,757	17	4289	13831	2301	6.0	11530
1989	4,797,981	817,538	3,980,443	17	4365	14251	2334	6.1	11917

 

TABLE 3 -- HISTORICAL

TABLE 3 Cols. Q - S
	hist	hist	hist
	N=121	N=24	N=97
	World	OECD	non-OECD
YEAR	GDP/cap	GDP/cap	GDP/cap
	growth rate	growth rate	growth rate
	based on	based on	based on
	intlPr85	intlPr85	intlPr85
	%pa	%pa	%pa
(A)	(Q)	(R)	(S)
1961
1962	2.9	4.1	1.5
1963	3.0	3.8	2.9
1964	4.7	5.2	5.3
1965	3.1	4.1	2.7
1966	3.0	4.3	2.4
1967	1.9	2.7	2.1
1968	3.5	4.8	3.2
1969	3.9	4.2	4.8
1970	3.9	3.1	6.8
1971	2.4	2.4	3.2
1972	2.7	4.1	2.0
1973	4.4	5.3	4.7
1974	0.6	-0.5	3.7
1975	-0.5	-1.7	2.4
1976	2.9	4.2	2.4
1977	2.7	3.0	3.4
1978	2.8	3.5	3.1
1979	2.0	2.7	2.2
1980	1.0	-0.0	3.4
1981	0.6	0.8	1.3
1982	-1.1	-1.2	0.2
1983	1.1	2.2	0.9
1984	3.0	4.3	2.6
1985	2.1	2.6	2.6
1986	1.1	2.4	0.7
1987	1.5	2.8	1.2
1988	3.0	4.1	2.8
1989	1.8	3.0	1.4

 

TABLE 4 -- SIMULATION

TABLE 4  Cols. T - X
sim	sim	sim	sim	sim
	N=24	N=97	N=121	N=97
	OECD	non-OECD	control:	non-OECD
T	hypoth. GDP	hypoth GDP	difference	hypoth GDP	YEAR
transfer value	using historical	using historical	hypGGDP/	as % of
= 1.5% of	GDP growth rate	GDP growth rate	histGGDP	hypoth GGDP
OECD GDP	less T value	plus T value	as % of
	(1961 GDP=given)	(1961 GDP=given)	hist GGDP
intlPr85	intlPr85	intlPr85	%	%
thousands	thousands	thousands
(T)	(U)	(V)	(W)	(X)	(A)
	4,197,078,117	2,447,026,798			1961
66,386,129	4,359,355,796	2,598,978,987	0.0	37	1962
69,716,412	4,508,327,978	2,810,165,720	-0.0	38	1963
74,185,353	4,723,134,143	3,100,062,684	-0.0	40	1964
78,141,171	4,896,846,694	3,337,537,983	-0.0	41	1965
82,321,747	5,076,507,722	3,581,915,563	-0.0	41	1966
85,321,824	5,176,190,667	3,830,513,390	-0.0	43	1967
90,122,998	5,377,338,888	4,137,434,012	-0.0	43	1968
94,983,541	5,572,367,729	4,534,381,845	-0.2	45	1969
98,946,637	5,705,922,759	5,056,351,904	-0.5	47	1970
102,384,862	5,801,808,837	5,414,932,318	-0.7	48	1971
107,577,623	5,988,487,688	5,758,956,767	-0.6	49	1972
114,215,362	6,243,773,124	6,279,979,797	-0.7	50	1973
114,732,043	6,157,286,304	6,768,428,002	-1.3	52	1974
113,740,823	5,990,349,987	7,194,239,883	-2.0	55	1975
119,313,544	6,164,533,098	7,636,202,765	-1.9	55	1976
123,836,639	6,274,389,730	8,176,963,321	-2.2	57	1977
129,062,609	6,410,109,575	8,723,504,657	-2.3	58	1978
133,552,203	6,499,540,527	9,226,741,420	-2.4	59	1979
134,552,771	6,413,682,100	9,864,390,155	-3.2	61	1980
136,643,259	6,376,685,429	10,324,846,306	-3.5	62	1981
135,905,188	6,206,336,937	10,688,377,932	-4.0	63	1982
139,784,783	6,243,720,310	11,135,068,160	-4.0	64	1983
146,571,515	6,400,289,470	11,790,277,707	-4.0	65	1984
151,311,135	6,455,941,764	12,486,175,903	-4.2	66	1985
155,815,903	6,492,329,282	12,984,529,624	-4.2	67	1986
161,148,685	6,553,379,837	13,561,898,603	-4.1	67	1987
168,747,711	6,693,659,192	14,382,635,966	-4.2	68	1988
174,761,485	6,757,444,105	15,047,815,585	-4.1	69	1989

 

TABLE 5--SIMULATION

TABLE 5 Cols. Y-AC
sim	sim	sim	sim	sim
N=24	N=97	ratio	difference	N=121
OECD	non-OECD	OECD GDP/cap	OECD GDP/cap	World
GDP/cap	GDP/cap	to	less	GDP/cap	YEAR
		non-OECD	non-OECD
		GDP/cap	GDP/cap
intlPr85	intlPr85	ratio	intlPr85	intlPr85
(Y)	(Z)	(AA)	(AB)	(AC)	(A)
6497	1106	5.9	5391	2325	1961
6662	1152	5.8	5510	2391	1962
6807	1216	5.6	5591	2462	1963
7048	1312	5.4	5737	2579	1964
7224	1380	5.2	5844	2660	1965
7413	1446	5.1	5967	2738	1966
7488	1511	5.0	5978	2791	1967
7718	1594	4.8	6124	2890	1968
7911	1705	4.6	6206	3005	1969
8016	1857	4.3	6159	3133	1970
8066	1953	4.1	6113	3212	1971
8245	2029	4.1	6216	3296	1972
8526	2164	3.9	6362	3446	1973
8328	2282	3.7	6046	3488	1974
8031	2375	3.4	5657	3492	1975
8209	2470	3.3	5739	3592	1976
8294	2593	3.2	5701	3697	1977
8412	2713	3.1	5699	3805	1978
8467	2814	3.0	5652	3887	1979
8290	2952	2.8	5338	3955	1980
8182	3031	2.7	5151	3990	1981
7910	3076	2.6	4834	3966	1982
7909	3142	2.5	4767	4011	1983
8061	3264	2.5	4797	4129	1984
8083	3392	2.4	4691	4228	1985
8080	3459	2.3	4622	4273	1986
8108	3542	2.3	4566	4338	1987
8230	3683	2.2	4546	4467	1988
8266	3780	2.2	4485	4545	1989

 

TABLE 6 -- NOTES for TABLES 1 - 5

%pa         percent per annum
avg         average
GDP         gross domestic product
GDP/cap     gross domestic product per capita
GGDP        global gross domestic product (world GDP)
hist        historical data, based on Penn World Tables (not simulated)
hypoth      hypothetical (=simulated)
intlPr85    international prices in constant 1985 values(i.e., purchasing power
            parity dollars,with US dollar 1985=100)
N           number of countries upon which the information is based
OECD        24 countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
non-OECD    97 countries which are not OECD, including China,India,Indonesia,USSR
POP         population
PWT         Penn World Table (data source)
sim         simulated values
std         standard deviation
T           transfer value (aggregate)
 

DATA SOURCE
Penn World Table (Mark 5.6a)
(Col. B,C,E: GDP from Penn World Table,using variable RGDPCH from source, multiplied by variable POP from source)(Col. H,I,J: variable POP in source).
 
CALCULATIONS
Column
A     none
B,C,E from source: using RGDPCH * POP from PWT
D     growth rate for col. C
F     growth rate for col. E
G     = (E/B)*100
H,I,J from source: using POP from PWT
K     =(I/H)*100
L     =B/H
M     =C/I
N     =E/J
O     =M/N
P     =M - N
Q     growth rate for col. L
R     growth rate for col. M
S     growth rate for col. N
T     =C * 0.015
U     U1961=given=C1961
      U1962=U1961*(1+(D1962/100)) - T1962
      and so on for the other years
V     V1961=given=E1961
      V1962=V1961*(1+(F1962/100)) + T1962
      and so on for the other years
W     =((B-U-V)/B)*100
X     =(V/(U+V))*100
Y     =U/I
Z     =V/J
AA    =Y/Z
AB    =Y - Z
AC    =(U+V)/H

INCLUSION/EXCLUSION OF COUNTRIES
The world has more than N=121 countries and more than N=97 non-OECD countries. I excluded countries on grounds of data availability. Only those countries are included which have complete data series for 1961-1989 in the source (Penn World Table). China,India, Indonesia and USSR are included. Some oil-producing countries and several countries of Eastern Europe are excluded, as are various other countries. The following countries are included in the study:
 
Ordered by continents as in Penn World Table:

Africa
America, North and Central
America, South
Asia, incl. "South-West Asia" = Arabian peninsula, incl. Israel and Syria
Europe, incl. USSR and Turkey
Oceania

N=121

ALGERIA

ANGOLA

BENIN

BOTSWANA

BURKINA FASO

BURUNDI

CAMEROON

CAPE VERDE IS.

CENTRAL AFR.R.

CHAD

COMOROS

CONGO

EGYPT

GABON

GAMBIA

GHANA

GUINEA

GUINEA-BISS

IVORY COAST

KENYA

LESOTHO

MADAGASCAR

MALAWI

MALI

MAURITANIA

MAURITIUS

MOROCCO

MOZAMBIQUE

NAMIBIA

NIGER

NIGERIA

REUNION

RWANDA

SENEGAL

SEYCHELLES

SIERRA LEONE

SOMALIA

SOUTH AFRICA

SWAZILAND

TOGO

TUNISIA

UGANDA

ZAIRE

ZAMBIA

ZIMBABWE

BARBADOS

CANADA

COSTA RICA

DOMINICAN REP.

EL SALVADOR

GUATEMALA

HAITI

HONDURAS

JAMAICA

MEXICO

NICARAGUA

PANAMA

PUERTO RICO

TRINIDAD&TOBAGO

U.S.A.

ARGENTINA

BOLIVIA

BRAZIL

CHILE

COLOMBIA

ECUADOR

GUYANA

PARAGUAY

PERU

SURINAME

URUGUAY

VENEZUELA

BANGLADESH

CHINA

HONG KONG

INDIA

INDONESIA

IRAN

ISRAEL

JAPAN

JORDAN

KOREA, REP.

MALAYSIA

MYANMAR

PAKISTAN

PHILIPPINES

SAUDI ARABIA

SINGAPORE

SRI LANKA

SYRIA

TAIWAN

THAILAND

AUSTRIA

BELGIUM

CYPRUS

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

DENMARK

FINLAND

FRANCE

GERMANY, WEST

GREECE

ICELAND

IRELAND

ITALY

LUXEMBOURG

MALTA

NETHERLANDS

NORWAY

PORTUGAL

ROMANIA

SPAIN

SWEDEN

SWITZERLAND

TURKEY

U.K.

U.S.S.R.

YUGOSLAVIA

AUSTRALIA

FIJI

NEW ZEALAND

PAPUA N.GUINEA